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As its title suggests, the thesis considers various theoretical 
aspects of optimal government policy. The method is described in 
Chapter One: it is essentially that of 'normative' public economics 
and provides the common theme of the remaining chapters. 
Chapters Two and Three are concerned with redistributive policy 
in general. Chapter Two discusses the use of observed information in 
redistributive policy. It derives the appropriate optimality 
conditions in simple models of redistribution, comparing- the outcome 
with the existing theoretical literature and actual redistributive 
policy. Chapter Three considers quantities as redistributive tools, in 
contrast with the more usual concentration on incomes and prices. 
Chapter Four addresses the optimal taxation of wealth. To tax 
current wealth under optimal life-cycle saving may imply negative 
marginal tax rates at some point of the tax schedule, an outcome 
avoided when lifetime wealth is taxed directly. The principal 
theoretical obstacle to redistributing wealth is found to be the 
anticipation of tax implementation. 
Chapters Five and Six are both concerned with unemployment 
benefits. Chapter Five discusses them within the optimal policy 
framework. Attention is first concentrated on the optimal level of 
benefits and then on their optimal time pattern, in cases where they 
can vary with the duration of unemployment. Chapter Six digresses 
from the optimal policy format to discuss the macroeconomic role of 
unemployment benefits, arguing that the replacement ratio deserves a 
more explicit inclusion in the Keynesian income /expend i ture analysis. 
Chapter Seven applies the optimal policy method to pension and 
retirement practices. The initial concern is whether or not formal 
pensions and retirement are theoretically justifiable as part of an 
optimal approach to policy. The discussion is then broadened to 
consider redistributive issues, within and between generations. 
Chapter Eight concludes. 
CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INrRODUCrION 
The commn theme of the following chapters is the redistribution 
of inccrm and resources between individuals., This presupposes scae advantage 
to be gained from redistribution: anyone who is indifferent to the distribution 
of resources would find little of interest in the discussion below., Such 
views are probably rare, and anything less than the extreme position allows 
at least sons scope for redistributive policiesý More ccarmn opinions am 
that redistribution should be lintited to special circumstances or that it 
is subordinate to other policy rmasures., The formar idea arises when the 
objective is the maintenance of ntiniaun living standards; redistribution 
is valuable in guaranteeing these but not otherwise., Mach of the welfare 
state seems to have originated on these princip" and they find fornal 
expression in libertarian writings (Friedman (1962), Hayek (1960)). The 
role of redistribution is curtailed uncbr this philosophy, although it is 
not removed entirely.. A different set of argurrents sees redistribution 
as subordinate to other economic concerns. and in particular to economic 
growth (see. for exwrple. Beckem-nan (1979)). The discussion here does not 
aiin to contradict this view: a nation's prosperity has more to do with 
its long-term growth rate than its distribution of incone. All that is 
implied below is that sonre redistribution may be desirab" giving reason 
to inplemant it through a redistributive policy,. 
This introduction firstly sets out the background to the models 
used, then looks at their particular nature, and finally sumnarises the 
topics and issues to be covered. 
B2Lk2round and Rationale 
Most of the following analysis is utilitarian in form, using a social 
welfare objective defined in terms of individual utilities. 11,3distributive 
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policy is implemented by an outside agency (the 'governaent') in such a 
way as to maximise social welfare. The approach is 'consequentialist', 
in the sense that it is the consequences of actions that matter, rather 
than the actions themselves (on this issue see, for exanple, Smart and 
Willians (1973)). It follows that any feasible means of redistribution 
is legitimate in these models, ruling out objections based on fundamental 
individual rights (as put forward on a btbadifrontý: by,? Nozick. --(. 
1974))r4. ý In. 
practice some redistributive tools are quite likely to be seen as undesirable 
on principle (those based on certain kinds of discrimination, for instance), 
but there is no room for such views within the theoretical structure of 
the models below. The desire for redistribution arises formally from two 
main sources: 
(a) Diminishing norginal utility of income or goods inplies that 
equalization of income or consumption raises social welfare. 
This applies even where the social welfare function is strictly 
indifferent to equality, as under pure Benthamite utilitarianism. 
(b) The social welfare function may also entail inequality aversion, 
as sumarised. in its degree of convexity. to the origin. 
A standard exarrple of this is the isoelastic form, where 
1-6 hl (u h)1 -l' 
and 6 represents the degree of inequality aversion. Setting 
0=0 gives an inequality neutral objective, whi-le the limiting 
case as O+oo inplies Rawlsian. n-aximin social preferences (following 
the ideas of Rawls (1971)). 
One or other of these features is assumed below to provide a reason 
for redistributive neasures. The result can be seen as nornative public 
econcmics, which assesses alternative policies on the basis of a particular 
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social objective. Mre wi-11 be said later about the nature of the modelling; 
initially it is appropriate to consider the rationale for this line of approach. 
In modelling the redistribution of personal incomes, the sinplest 
possible starting point is to define a population of individuals and an 
agency for redistribution which has specific social objectives. A utilitarian 
rrethod provides such a franework and in that sense is an 'obvious' way of 
proceeding. Its nuin virtue is that it can look in a fonral way at the 
inplications of well-defined social objectives, and thereby give an explicit 
account of the interr lationship with policy nw--asures. Against this directness 
has to be set a nurTber of possible disadvantages, which are discussed below. 
An issue which immdiately arises is the nature and origin of the 
social welfare function. It is assurred here that social welfare is individual- 
istic in form, defined as a function of individual utilities. Since individual 
preferences are respected, this reduces the degree of paternalism iriplied 
in the nrethod. Other types of social welfare are also possible, and a relaxation 
of the individualistic approach would not alter the structure of the nx)delling. 
The precise functional form of social preferences does not have to be specified, 
allowing a variety of attitudes towards inequality within the general utilitarian 
franewozk (on the lines of Sen (1973) or Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), Chapter 11). 
Hence the use of social welfare maximisation is not particularly restrictive, 
and leaves roan for considerable variation in detail. A rmre substantial. 
set of problems concerns the origin. of the social welfare function. To 
atterrpt to derive an agreed view of social welfare from individual preferences 
leads to the questions addressed in social choice theory; nuch bas been 
written on this subject since the original contribution of Arrow (1951) 
(later work being suwnarised in Sen (1970)). In general it is not possible 
to apply a given social choice rule to move from individual preferences to 
a unique formlation of social welfare. This n-eans, that a particular view 
of social welfare cannot always be given a denx)cratic justification in te 
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of majority voting or sat other fon-n of decision rule. To use a social. 
welfare function in defining loptimall policy neasures, one has to accept 
that the social preferences used nay not have a firm grounding in the wishes 
of the population. Where this is the case social welfare becams paternalistic 
in tone, inposed fran without instead of arising spontaneously from within. 
The choice of social welfare can be seen literally as that of a zeforining, 
paternalistic government or alternatively as the opinion of an outside observer 
assessing different policy neasures. These conditions are not necessari1y 
restrictive or extrene. In practice sorre choice of policy has to be nade, 
and so sorre notion of social welfare is always being iqmsed; it seents as 
well to acknowledge this by adopting an expressly chosen set of social preferences. 
Another general difficulty is in the role of the state. The models 
below represent the state as an independent agent (the 'goverrment'), which 
inplemnts policy in the interests of society, as reflected in the social 
welfare objective. - Thereds no notion of the self-interest of the state, 
nor is there a supposition that the state defends the sectional interests 
of part of the population. Irrpartiality of the governrmnt is an assunption 
frequently questioned, with two nain lines of criticism: 
On the one side is the libertarian view that state activity 
is inevitably inefficient and cannot be relied on to pursue 
society's interests. Instead a growing bureaucracy tends 
to errerge, which is concerned with defending its own position 
and fails to fulfil its intended role. Such views are put 
forward, forexanple by the 'Virginia School' (Buchanan and 
Tullock (1962)) and lead to calls for a dindnution of state 
intervention. 
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(a) A contrasting set of argLuents is based on the Marxian principle 
that the state supports the interests of the dominant class 
in society. In a capitalist economy the governrrent is always 
biased in favour of the owners of capital, preventing the 
achieven-ent of any thoroughgoing redistribution. Only a 
change of economic system can offer any hope of inproving 
the relative position of the non-capital-ist classes. 
These ideas produce very diffemert conclusions, but share a common 
scepticism about the workings of the state. There is certainly some truth 
in the belief that the state will never be a perfect, impartial agent, but 
the conclusions to be drawn from this are less clear. one can support virtually 
anything with claims about the inadequacies of the state: Pareto used simi-lar 
reasoning in defence of fascism, and the arguments fit naturally into an 
advocacy of anarchy. In all cases the solutions put forward are less convincing 
than the criticism on which they are based. Libertarians seem unconcerned 
at leaving society to be dominated by private cxxm-ercial interests - in 
this environment even the self-interested state depicted in their theories 
would be an alternative power source, producing a slightly more pluralistic 
outcome. The Marxian view has little to say about post-capitc-0-ist society 
- if the state still exists it is not clear why the hitherto universal, 
scepticism suddenly ceases; if the state has withered away, it would be 
desirable to know what follows. These are difficult and controversial issues, 
with no prospect of being resolved in the near future. They are avoided 
in the following analysis by assuming an abstract and idealised 'government', 
which always acts to maximise social welfare. Nothing is said about the 
nature of the government, nor about the problems which might arise in the 
course of state economic intervention. This leaves two alternative ways 
of interpreting the models. Where state activity is acknowledged as having 
some social value, the 'government' in the model can be seen as an approximation 
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to a possible actual state. The policies in the models then represent state 
activity which might potentially occur in scae form. Under a wore critical 
view of state activity, the analysis is not necessarily worthless - it becoffes 
a hypothetical exercise, which can be contrasted with policies observed 
in reality. The differences can serve to support the various assorted critiques 
of the state. 
Associated with the previous point is the lack of any institutional 
detail in the models. Apart from the government and a population of individuals, 
there are no other agents which have any influence on the outccrres of different 
policies. No explicit mention is made of production or the form of social 
organisation it entails. The type of society being discussed is not made 
specific, although the topics covered suggest a developed capitalist economy. 
The outcomes obtained are therefore on the condition that the details of 
social institutions can legitinutely beIgnored. In some of the areas (such 
as wealth taxation) this nay not be true, and the results of the models 
have to be assessed accordingly. One institutional aspect that is always 
present is the question of policy administration. Costs of administration 
am assurred to be zero in the models below, but in practice they will always 
be present. For state intervention to be worthwhile, it must be true that 
the social benefits outweigh the administrative costs. The general fraffewozk 
used below addresses certain comTK)n features that can always be expected, 
but does not necessarily give an adequate representation of cases whexe 
institttional detai-Is are important. 
ýbny other, less central, issues can be raised. If individuals 
always dislike being constrained in their behaviour, then the case 
for interveationist policy is weakened (Haha (1982)). There are 
gezieral difficulties associated with the definition of 'utility'. In 
scrre cases the use of a static fonrulation. may not be desirable (as 
pextýs in the context of unwpioyaent). Assunptioas made about 
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the extent of goverment information (and use of perfect foresight in inter- 
terrporal models) can be viewed as unsatisfactory. This list could undoubtedly 
be lengthened. 
The basic point is that the models used are inevitably stylised 
and sinpl J fied. They are only a caricature of reality, and the best that 
can be achieved is a 'good' caricature, which identifies and highlights 
the most inportant sides of its subject. Whether the nethod used here 
accarplishes this is a matter for personal. judgement; as with any economic 
model 1i ng, the formal theory aim only to assist an intuitive understanding 
of reality. 
Structure of the Models 
Cnce within this particular 'vision' of the econany, the treatrrent 
of policy issues has a ccmTx)n pattern. There is a two-tier structure, with 
the goverment irrplenenting redistributive (and other) policies which affect 
the population and individual behaviour influencing the government Is policy 
decision. The position is as below: 
Objective 
Goverment 
Infonnation 
Individuals 
(h=l,..., H) 
W(U 1" *"u H) 
Redistributive Disincentives 
policy A 
Xh U, ( 
Activity 
max W by inccrre, price, 
quantity controlssubject 
to revenue/resource constraint 
and individual choice 
Max Uh b choice of 
yh .... X subject to 
Dý 
11 Zudget 
constraint 
At the top level cones the goverment, which has the maximisation of individual- 
istic social welfare as its objective. It can use a variety of policy instruments 
in trying to achieve this, which can be categorised as incom, price and 
quantity controls. Individuals seek to maximise their own utilities defined 
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in the conventional manner as a function of their consumption of a range of 
goods. Their choice is limited by the usual monetary budget 
constraint, and by any relevant policy measures inposed by the government. 
Decisions made by individuals and government constantly interact; individuals 
nust adhere to the government's requirements of them (with taxation, etc., 
]Legally enforced), whila the government's policy is subject to the behavioural 
responses of the population (which appear as 'disincentives'). There are 
four main obstacles facing redistibutive policy, namely, the economy' s resource 
constaint, the availability of policy tools, the extent of information, 
and the presence of disincentives. 
The underlying constraint facing the economy is its scarcity of 
currently available resources. Without such a constraint a bliss point 
would be attained, and them would be no economic problem to be faced. 
This appears in tlv-- present framework as the governrrent's resource or revenue 
constraint, which represents the limits within which redistribution rrust 
operate. In most of the following discussion this is expressed as a revenue 
constraint, such that the government has to balance its budget subject to 
a given revenue zequiremant. Since the economic constraint is real rather 
than monetary in nature, this is intended to represent a limited general 
resource availability. Changes in the precise form of the constraint would 
not dran-atically alter the character of the analysis. The target is to 
achieve an allocation at which no further redistribution of goods can increase 
social welfare. Fbrmally, let the function 
G(X 1" 'XN) 0 
Hh 
denote the general resource constraint, where Z X: A 
h--1 I 
f irst-best is obtainable by choosing Xh, V h, i, to maximise social welfare I 
subject to the resource constraint above- Solution by lagrangian gives 
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V(U u H) + 
3L 3V Uh 3G 
ýX-h x Uh 
av 3Uh 
= 
3V a 
Uk h, k 
3Xh 3u 
k 
3Xk u ah 
3- 
Hance the narginal social utility of consuming each good is equated across 
individuals. Any redistributive policy in the current frarrework is ain-Ling 
ultinutely at a first-best allocation of this type. 
The governrmnt Is success in iriplerrenting redistribution depends 
On thd Policy tools it uses. It is rational to deploy as many instruments 
as possible, although theoretical discussion often concentrates on particular 
neasures in isolation. Instruffents nay be classified as incam, price and 
quantity controls, corresponding to the three rrELin sets of variables in 
the analysis. None of these is unarrbiguously superior to the others, in 
the sense that any one of them can (hypothetically) be used to attain the 
ideal first-best' outcona. The position is as below: 
Lurrp-su-n incone transfers and efficient pricing 
'First best' Perfect price discrimination 
Direct quantity aJJocation 
'Second best' Any other policies 
A first best is most often linked with lurrp-sixn incorre transfers, 
which are regarded as the best redistributive tool. Their efficacy depends 
on 'efficient' pricing, so that there is a uniform set of prices that satisfy 
the usual efficiency requirenrents (equating marginal rates of substitution 
for all individuals with the marginal rate of transformation between goods). 
Such pricing does occur in the special case of perfect competition, although 
it cannot be relied upon in reality. The sarre first-best position can also 
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be reached by centralised control of prices or quantities. Under perfect 
price discrimination a separate price is charged for each good to each individual. 
This gives the governmant a total of HN instrumants, which is enough to 
choose the ideal quantity distribution. A similar outcom follows fXaL 
perfect central planning, where the planning body itself inplerrents the 
allocation of quantities. Again the government has HN instrumants at its 
disposal, allowing the first best to be selected. The standard view in 
welfare economics is to enphasise the benefits of lunp-sum, incorm transfers; 
as long as the economy is conpetitive, the first best is attainable by the 
use of H instrumants (as coapared with the HN instrumants in the other two 
mathods). The benefits of lunp-sun transfers are less clear in the absence 
of perfect conpetition, when they are insufficient to inplerrent a first- 
best position. There is consequently little justification for preferring 
certain redistributive tools to others. An efficient government would make 
the maximum use of policy tools, and would not allow any possible redistributive 
instrumants to lie dormant. Where a policy is genuinely not available, 
then there exists a-true constraint on redistributive policy. This issue 
is considered again in Chapter 3. 
A third obstacle to redistribution is the lack of necessary information. 
Theoretical models are often based on one- or two-dimensional populations, 
which make full information appear a feasible proposition. In reality the 
population has so many relevant and urureasurable dimensions that it is difficult 
to envisage what is meant by complete information. Oaniscience can be represented 
theoretically by imagining a characteristic vector, a, of enormous size, 
which depicts the 'absolute truth', unknagn to mortal observers, but enshrining 
each individual's identity. Without knowing a the first best is not attainable, 
and any redistribution must depend on a subset of characteristics. Suppose 
that a is partitioned to give a= [a*, at], where a* are measurable, observed 
characteristics; uncertainty must somehow be based on the unobserved vector 
a One possibility is that at is utterly unknown, ruling out any 
optimisatioa. A less pessimistic (and perhaps more plausible) view is that 
we are neither amiscieat nor bewildered, and that some information on 
at is available. Aa example of partial knowledge is lassignmeat 
uncertainty', where exact values of a cannot be ascribed to individuals, but the 
distribution of a is known. This is equivalent to a stochastic knowledge of a 
based on the true distribution of characteristics in the population. 
Optimisation can proceed through an expected maximand, although the outcome 
for any particular individual remains unknown. An informational barrier 
of this sort is partially but not wholly surmountable, enough to prevent 
a first best but not to prevent optimisation. Individual characteristics 
are further discussed in Chapter 2, which considers redistribution under 
partial information. 
The final barrier is the question of disincentives, which are found 
in many discussions of optimal policy. A 'disincentive' occurs whenever 
policy measures provoke an acconmodating response from the individuals concerned, 
resulting in an outcome different from that which the government had initially 
intended. The issue is addressed in a general form in the 'principal-agent' 
problem (Shavell (1979), Grossman and Hart (1984)), where the 'principal' 
seeks to maximise an objective conditionally on the behaviour of the 'agent'. 
An optimum is achieved when the disincentive effects of the agent's behaviour 
are minimised or removed entirely. The redistributive models set out below 
are particular cases of principal-agent problem, with the government as 
principal and the population as agents. Optimality - then requires the individual 
behavioural response to be included in the government's policy design fra, 
the outset. Disincentives can easily be associated with the informational 
question of the previous paragraph, as occurs whenever the goverrirrent' s 
infonratiai depends in sorre way on individual behaviour. Many other types 
of disincentive are also possible and exanples appear in Chapters 2,4, 
5 and 7 below. 
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The following chapters address particular policy issues within the 
general redistributive frarrework set out above. Each policy question raises 
difficulties which can be categorised in tems of the four main obstacles 
identified here. 
Topics Covered in Following Chapters 
The reffaining analysis is divided between different policy questions, 
all seen from the viewpoint of optirral mdistribution. The chapters are 
not intended to be exhaustive treatments of their particular subjects, but 
it is hoped that they identify scrm of the most krportant relevant issues. 
Discussion procia-eds as foUxms: 
Chapter 2 considers the optimal use of observed information when making 
redistributive incorre transfers between individuals. The outcorre is contrasted 
with previous theoretical discussion and with policies observed in practice. 
Chapter 3 looks at quantity constraints and non-rmnetary allocation scheaes, 
and ccnpares them with other types of redistributive policy. 
Chapter 4 considers wealth taxation within the optinul, policy fran-ework. 
Chapters 5 and 6 are both concerned with unerrployrrent benefits and the position 
of the unemployed in general. Chapter 5 adopts a utilitarian mathod, and 
considers its implications for unemployrrent benefits. Chapter 6 relaxes 
the optimal policy frwrewor-k, emphasising instead the it roeconomic impact 
of unemployment benefits. 
Chapter 7 deals with the issues of retizemnt and pension provision. It 
is not easy to identify an optirral approach in this area. but som of the 
main relevant aspects are discussed. 
Finally, Chapter 8 makes sorre brief concluding canmnts. 
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CHAPTER 2: REDISTRIBUTION BASED ON OBSERVABLE INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS i 
(1) Introduction 
The most inmdiate way to set about redistribution is to make use 
of observed information on individual characteristics, exploiting to the 
maximan the knowledge that one holds with certainty. Measures based on 
such information are 'direct' (in the taxation sense), since they depend on 
known features of the population. A redistributive policy does not have to 
take this form, and 'indirect' measures (such as comnodity taxes) can also 
be applied to the same objectives. There is no conflict between the two 
approaches, and indirect measures can be seen as supplementary, to be 
introduced when the possibilities for direct redistribution are exhausted. 
This chapter considers direct measures, concentrating particularly on 
incorm transfers. 
Before the theoretical discussion can begin, it is necessary to 
incorporate individual characteristics in the standard utility framework. 
The conventional model of consumer demand is based on a single individual's 
preferences, with utility a function only of the quantities of the 
particular goods consumed. Any differences between individuals are assumed 
to be incorporated in the functional form of preferences, without explicit 
nrantion of the differences involved. Such an approach is adequate in 
considering consumer demand behaviour, but it is not very helpful in 
representing specific individual characteristics. An alternative method is 
to enumerate the different characteristics and set them out as a vector, a. 
In reality a comprehensive list of personal characteristics would be almost 
infinite in extent, and virtually impossible to conpile in a definitive way. 
Some of the items included would have no bearing on utility levels, and in 
many cases would not even be known to the person involved; for example, a 
well-defined physical characteristic like the number of hairs on a person's 
LF 
head is not comnon knowledge and has little effect on utility (unless 
perhaps when visibly approaching zero). The notion of a corrplete 
characteristic set fa} is an intangible entity, although it seem 
reasonable to suppose that such a thing exists, even if it is not readily 
identifiable. To introduce this into a utilitarian analysis, it is 
necessary to incorporate the characteristic vector a in individual utility 
functions, so that utility depends on characteristics as well as consumption 
of goods. Since the full vector a enconpasses all differences between 
individuals, it is not necessary in this case to have variation in the 
functional fornis of utilities, which can be assumed unifoi: m (A view also 
retained in the following chapters, although the analysis there can still 
proceed with variation in preferences if the structure of preferences is 
known to the government). The following discussion is based mainly on 
simplified cases with only two characteristics, but behind this lies the 
idea of a very large list of characteristics representing 'full information' 
on a particular individual. 
When the entire characteristic vector a is accurately observed by 
the government, there is no obstacle to the achievement of a 'first-best' 
redistribution of income. Formally, suppose that there are H individuals, 
h=l,..., H, with associated characteristics ah. The government freely 
adjusts ex post incomes, Mh , so as to maximise individualistic social 
welfare, V=V(U l'---'UH)' subject to a total income constraint 
Ht 
I Mh ýM 
h=l 
where Mt denotes the aggregate income level in the econcmy. Solution by the 
Lagrangian method with Mh, h=l,..., H, as instruments gives 
Is 
L= V(U 11 *'UH) + ý(M - 
IMh) 
h= 
3L av au 
h 
-ýMh ý allh 5Mh 0 
av au 
h 
au h* aMh 
p is the marginal social utility (MSU) of government revenue, and is 
equated at the optimum with the MSU of income to each individual. Hence 
there is af irst-best income distribution, at which it is impossible to 
increase social welfare by inplementing a marginal redistribution of income 
between individuals. All redistribution based on income transfers is seeking 
to reach this position. 
Within the present theoretical approach, there are two main reasons 
why the f irst-best might not be attained. Firstly, the government could 
fail to observe some of the elements of a. If no information at all is 
available on some relevant characteristics, then an exact cptimisation cannot 
be undertaken, and the existence of a precise policy optimun of any sort is 
ruled out. For most characteristics playing a major role in policy questions, 
however, there is not presumably total ignorance on the part of the 
government. A lesser degree of ignorance may be represented by assignmeant 
uncertainty, where the government is aware of the distribution of the 
characteristics in the population, but is unable to assign a particular value 
to a particular individual. Under assignment uncertainty it is possible to 
carry out a policy optimisation, although the inpact of this on any 
particular individual remains uncertain. In the usual distinction between 
'risk' and 'uncertainty' (Knight (1921)), assignment uncertainty corresponds 
to a calculated risk as to the effects on particular individuals, while 
full ignorance corresponds to genuine uncertainty. The optimisations in the 
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rest of this chapter are all dependent on assignment uncertainty to allow 
thezn to proceed, ruling out a conplete lack of information. When the 
characteristics distribution is known, it is normally necessary to assume 
that the number of households exceeds the number of distinct characteristics; 
otherwise characteristics are not in any way sunnarising information (one 
could redefine. households as 'characteristics'), and the first-best is 
attainable given the requisite policy tools. Such an assumption is inplicit 
in the models below, which can be seen as discussing a more limited number 
of'relevant' characteristics. As was mentioned above, the number of 
personal characteristics in reality approaches the infinite, far exceeding 
the size of any population. This is perhaps fortunate for humanity: it is 
why no two persons are identical, and why we think of people as discrete 
individuals, rather than as points on a continuum. The discussion below is 
not on this level of complexity, concerning a more restricted set of 
characteristics, about which the government has considerable, but not 
corrplete, information. 
The second reason for not attaining the first-best is the possible 
presence of disincentives, interpreted in the broad sense of any 
behavioural response by individuals to the government's policy n-wa-asures. 
When inccme transfers are related to characteristics, individuals can benefit 
by changing or misrepresenting their level of the characteristic so as to 
increase their return from the associated payments scheme. Such behaviour 
would not be possible if characteristics were fixed, well-defined and freely 
observable by the government. In many cases, however, they will not satisfy 
these requirenvents, and will be subject to manipulation by the individuals 
concerned (either by a genuine change in the characteristic, or by 
misinforming the government about its true value). When disincentives are 
present, a full policy optimun will only be attained by including them in 
the optimisation problem, in the form of an additional mt of constraints. 
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This would prevent the achieverreent of the first-best outcame given above, 
even if redistributive payments were related to the full set of 'observable' 
characteristics. 
The remainder of this chapter discusses the points raised above 
in more detail. Section (2) sets out a basic model of redistributive 
income transfers related to individual characteristics, and Section (3) 
considers how these measures interact with optimal taxation. Section (4) 
extends the model of Section (2) to allow for disincentive effects arising 
from the manipulation of characteristics by individuals. In the final 
section the theoretical discussion is related to more practical issues, such 
as the inplementation of actual social security and redistributive policies. 
(2) Basic Model 
The policy instruments discussed in this section are income 
payments/taxes related to an observable cbaracteristic, ah. In order to 
facilitate optimisation, it is assurved throughout that ah is a continuous 
scalar variable, although this is not crucial to the analysis; the 
characteristic could alternatively take a discrete form, or even be 
qualitative, represented by a binary type Iduffmy' variable. For ah to be a 
viable basis for incare- transfers it should satisfy the following four 
requirermnts: 
(i) It sbould be observable; 
(ii) It should be objectively neasurable; 
(iii) It should either have a direct influence on utility, or be 
correlated with something that does (or both); 
(iv) It should offer a socially acceptable mans of discriminating 
between individuals. (Discrimination by cbaracteristics such 
as race is often seen as intrinsically undesirable. ) 
19 
1' - 
If these conditions are satisfied, then there is nothing within the model 
to prevent the government from carrying out redistributive income transfers. 
In part (a) below individuals vary in two respects, the wage rate, 
Wh, and the characteristic, ah, on which policy is based. The format of 
the model reflects that in optimal taxation models, with the wage rate 
not directly observable by the government, but with the assurrption of 
assignment uncertainty. Hence the government's available information is 
the data on the observable characteristic, ah, and knowledge of the joint 
distribution of ah and Wh. The introduction of Wh into the models is not 
essential, and they can be alternatively expressed in mre general tenris, 
as in part (b) . 
The income transfers way be related to ah in either a linear or 
non-linear fashion. Although the former case is less general, it can be 
rationalised. by appealing to the administrative difficulties associated with 
highly non-linear payments or taxes (they are rarely found in practice). 
Direct administrative costs are taken to be zero, and it is assuned. that 
ah is observed without error. The linear and non-linear cases are 
discussed successively below. 
(a) Linear Payments 
Let there be H individuals, h=l,..., H, (H>2) with identical 
preferences, and associated characteristics Wh, ah. Following the standard 
practice with household conposition effects, preferences can be depicted by 
the consumer cost function, of the form 
ch= C(P-'Wh, a h'Uh) 
where Uh is the utility level and p is the vector of consumer prices (this 
is equivalent to setting out the indirect utility function, incorporating 
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a h)' Each individual has T hours of available working time and receives 
no unearned incorrea. 
The goverruient is assumed to pay out a uniform lump sun, a, to 
all individuals, and a payment/tax which depends linearly on ah, ýah, so 
that individual h receives a+ýah (where a or ý may be negative). Denoting 
the revenue requirement by R, the government's revenue constraint is 
R+ Ha +ß1 ah =0 
h=l 
where a and 0 are arbitrarily regarded as payments rather than taxes; it 
follows that at least one out of a and ý must be negative to satisfy the 
revenue constraint for R>O. The government Is problem is to choose a and 0 
so as to nkLximise individualistic social welfare, V=V(U,,..., U H ), subject 
to the revenue constraint and individual utility maximisation. The Uh 
termsdenotethe indirect utility functions of the individuals concerned, for 
af ixed set of prices conmon to all consumers. Optimising gives the 
following conditions: 
H 
L= V(U I ..., UH) + jl(-R-Ha-ý 
Ia 
h) h=l 
aL H aV au h 
pH =0 (since U= U(p, Wh' Wjj+a+ýah)) 
h= 
au 
hhh 
DL H aV au hH 
ai -pJ ah = 7ß =i, -u -u . 71 h= h=l 
3V au h 
Let Xh =--= MSU of income to individual h. allh * 3Mh 
The first-order conditions can then be rewritten as 
zo 
H 
I 'I'h 
h=l H 
HH 
and I Xhah -XI ah =0 
h=l h=l 
The first equation hiplies; that the MSU of government revenue, 11, is equated 
with the mean MSU of incom to individuals. 
Dividing the second equation by H yields 
H 
1Hah Xhah -Xa=0 where a= h=17 
h=l 
cov(ah, Xh) ý 
This zero covariance condition is the basic optimality result for a linear 
paymnts scheme, and implies that at the optimun the social welfare function 
does not discriminate between individuals on the basis of the characteristic 
ah. In other words, any systematic relationship between ah and the social 
value placed on income received by individuals is eliminated. If the 
condition is not satisfied, then it is possible to increase social welfare 
by adjusting the payments scheme in favour of individuals with abigh ýh* 
The nature of the optimal payments scheme is influenced by the 
interrelationship between Wh and a h* Suppose, for exanple, that the wage 
rate is constant for all indiviauals, so that all variation is due to a h* 
The effect of ah on the MSU of incane will tend to have the same sign as 
ac 
aah' given that the marginal utilities of income decline with the income 
level. To satisfy the zero covariance condition it follows that payments 
must have the opposite effect to ah on the MSU of income, inplying that they 
are positive if 
! C- >0 and negative if 
LC < 0. The optimal a should in 3ah 3ah 
general be approximately at the level required to offset the direct effect 
of ah on consumers' costs; this corresponds to the usual view of welfare 
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benefits related to household composition (such as fa-nily allowances), 
where benefits are directly linked to the estimated effect of the 
carposition variable on the household's cost of living. 
In practice, however, variation in Wh is certainly present, and any 
correlation between Wh and ah effectively introduces a further avenue 
through which ah is seen to influence cost. For exanple, consider a 
situation in which Wh and ah are highly positively correlated, and the effect 
of Wh on the cost function dominates the direct effect of ah. In such a 
case, even if 
ac 
> 0, the optimal $ is liable to be negative, since a Dah 
high ah is usually accompanied by a high Wh, giving a negative net effect 
on the cost function. ah bas tberefore become a proxy for Wh, providing a 
neans of identifying individuals with a high income level (in this capacity 
it resembles the 'tagging' of Akerlof (1978)). Because almost all 
populations involve non-zero correlation between Wh and a h' some 
distortionary effect of this nature must virtually always occur, implying 
that the optimal payments scheme cannot be viewed narrowly as a conpensation 
for the immediate effects of the characteristic on costs. Indeed, it would 
be possible to have successful redistributive policies based solely on the 
'proxy' role of characteristics which themselves have no influence on 
utilities. 
(b) Non-linear Payments 
In order to generalise the discussion in (a), it will now be assurred 
that there is a vector a of different individual characteristics, of which 
only a subset ýaj is observable. a can therefore be partitioned in the form 
2= Lal, 221, and the wage rate included in (a) above would be an element in 
the vector of unobservcUe characteristics, R2. Viewing the population as a 
continuum, in contrast with the discrete population of (a), the distribution 
of individuals over the vector a can be represented by the joint density 
function f (a). Assignment uncertainty with respect to ý12 in-plies that the 
government knows the function f (a), but cannot assign definite values of 
the vector ý12 to individuals. The remaining characteristics in ýjj can be 
used as the basis of a redistributive policy. 
The government's optimisation problem is a straightforward 
generalisation of that in (a). Redistributive payments are based on the 
observed characteristics, and take the general functional form ýQjl) - 
Social welfare is given by 
Ja V(U(p, a, ýQjj))f (a)da 
where the sunuiation is over the full vector a, and the revenue constraint 
is 
+ fa 
1 
with g(a 1) denoting the joint marginal density of 21. The policy problem 
is therefore to set the function ME, ) so as to maximise social welfare 
subject to the revenue constraint and individual utility maximisation. 
I 
The Lagrangian and first-order conditions are: 
fa V(U(p,. ýj, ý(a 1 ))f(a)da + U(-R- 
fa 
aL 
=f 
Dv au (2)da, - lag(. 21) =0 l% a2 äU ý(a21 
f 
Rearranging yields 
1f av au f (a) 
g(al) a2 aU ' aaQ11, 
1 fa Xf (a) da2 
a 9(21) =2 -1 
22- 
av au 
where X :- TU MSU of incane to individuals. 
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The optimum requires that, for any value of ý,, the mean MU of incane 
taken over all the possible values of, ý2 is equal to a constant, p (which 
is the MSU of government revenue). Hence, in a similar way to (a) above, 
any systematic relation between X and the variables in a is eliminated. 
The outcome is analogous to the equating of MSU's which occurs at the first- 
best, but applies only over the subset a1 of the full vector a; the first- 
best is therefore a special case of this model in which. ý11=2. 
It is not possible to say anything definite about the nature of 
the optimal payments schedule, which could be quite canplex in form. The 
ý function obtained will depend on the nature of individual and social 
preferences and on the distribution of characteristics, f(a); exactly the 
same influences are present as in (a), so that the optimal redistributive 
paymnts are governed by the interrelationship, between the observable 
characteristics. ýj 1 and the unobservable ones. ýj 2. In general it1will not 
be accurate to view the optimal a as a con-pensatory payment for the effects 
of the characteristics a on utility. =1 
The central feature of the models in (a) and (b) is that they make 
the best possible use of a limited information set. At the policy optimun 
there is on average no relationship between the observed characteristics 
and the MSU of income to individuals. The inpact on any particular 
individual is unknown, and depends on the unobserved characteristics; those 
with atypical values may end up either better or worse off than the expected 
outcome for recipients of the same income transfer. Certain individuals 
could suffer badly in the interests of raising the average welfare level in 
the population, a situation which conflicts with the objectives of many 
social security policies. If the model is intended to represent welfare 
payments, then it may be necessary to make suitable modifications (see 
Section (5) below). Nevertheless, income transfers are highly efficient 
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redistributive tools, involving no disincentive effects. The next 
section considers how they can be used in conjunction with (and to replace) 
redistributive taxes, and Section (4) discusses the manipulation of 
characteristics by individuals. 
(3) Redistributive Incom Transfers combined with Taxation 
Much of the theoretical literature on optimal redistribution has 
concentrated on taxation rather than income transfers. The problem with 
taxes as policy instruments is that they may influence individual behaviour, 
causing a disincentive which constrains policy optimisation. Such effects 
do not occur with income transfers, and the optimal tax literature usually 
assumes that the information needed for lump-sum income redistribution is 
not accessible; in other words it assumes a unidimensional set of consumers 
with assignment uncertainty. When individuals are multidimensional (which 
is closer to reality), there arises the possibility that assignment 
uncertainty applies only to a subset of characteristics, with others 
directly observable. In this position it is rational for the government 
to implement income transfers related to the observable characteristics, 
in addition to taxation. The presence of income-based redistributive 
transfers in general leads to a different set of optimal taxes from the 
standard model, and the possible interaction between the different policy 
instruments is considered below, in part (a). A further possibility is that 
the tax rates themselves can vary with the observed characteristics, and 
this is allowed for in part (b). 
(a) Non-discriminatory Taxes 
The model used is that of Section (2), part (a), where H individuals 
differ in the wage rate, Wh and the observable cbaracteristic, a h' 
.Z5 
h=l,..., H. Taxation takes the form of linear direct and indirect taxes, 
as in Diamond (1975) (an extension of Rarrisey (1927)). There are N 
commodities, with producer prices normalised to unity and the tax on 
enployrrent income normalised to zero. The government's tax instruments are 
denoted by tir i=l,..., N, so that consumer prices are equal to 1+tip 
i=l'... 'N. In addition to the tax rates, there is also a set of income 
transfers based linearly on ah, of the form taken in Section (2), part (a), 
with each individual receiving a+ýý. The appropriate revenue constraint 
is 
R+ Ha +at. x 
h 
hý 
IIII 
h=l h=l i=l 
where xh is the consimption of the i 
th 
cmmdity by the ýth individual i 
The optimal policy problem is therefore to set tl, ... It N' a and 
ý to 
maxim. ise social welfare, subject to the revenue constraint and individual 
utility maximisation. This is soluble by the Lagrangian method, as below: 
HNh 
V(Ul,..., UH) +V(ijt1x1-R- Ha -ßJ ah) 
h=l i=l h=l 
3L H 3V au HN ax h 
-a ut h=l 
3h* 3Mh 
h=l i=l 3Mh 
3L H 3V au HNa xý H 
-ä -ß =111t* ah ah= 0 
h= 
Du 
h* 
-äMh 
h=l 
-- ah +Ilh. 
1 i=l i* 
-äMh 
H av au 
h Hh H N 
axjh 
Iu 
'ý- ' + 11 at 
Ix 
l 
+I It j h= 1 h i h=l h=l j=l 
axh H DV aUh hHhH 14 j 
x ->C -0 ji ý7an 7u tj * TD * xi + 11 
11 
i+11 aMh h=l h h= h=l j=l 
(S 
-vi 
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substituting fran Roy's identity and the Slutsky equation (where Sji is 
the j, I 
th 
element of the Slutsky matrix). 
av N axý 
Let X= 
allh 
+ 11 Xt net MSU of inccn-o to individual h h ýa -C. allh h i=l 'aMh 
Rearranging the optimality conditions gives 
H 
h=l 
i lh ah-71 ah =0 cav (X Wah) ý C) h=l h=l 
N1H Äh 
1 
ts. =j( xý - 
_X. vi 
i=, 3 li H h= 7)11 
where a bar denotes taking mean over h. 
The zero covariance condition and the optimal tax equation are unchanged 
from the separate optimisation problems, but they must now hold 
h 
simultaneously (S ij, xi and Xh are in general functions of ah). As 
is 
usual with optimal tax models, it is not possible to generalise about the 
resulting tax rates, although it is clear that they will not usually 
coincide with the outcome of the optimal tax problerws treated in isolation. 
An irrpression of the interrelationship between redistributive 
income payments and taxation can be gained by considering models with 
demand functions linear in ah. The hypothetical extreme case is where the 
cost function satisfies 
ac 
T= Xi = YI(p) + (p)ah pi 
irrplying that the conpensated demands are the same linear function of ah 
for all individuals. Substitution in the tax formulae above establishes 
that 
,Z7 
N 
I t. .=0 j=j 1 13 
so that there is no need for taxation. This confirms that whenever 
consumption patterns and the observable characteristic provide identical 
information on inequality, it is preferable to use income transfers in 
place of taxation as they involve no efficiency cost. A slightly more 
general case is a cost function satisfying 
aCh hh 
.c=y api -iiu h'P-'Wh) 1h 
that is, where the conpensated demands vary in an identical linear fashion 
with ah, but are otherwise general. Here the tax equation reduces to 
Hh- 
t. s H Yi - Yi 3 ii h 
i=l,..., N 
so that taxation is offsetting only that part of the inequality in the 
consumption of the i 
th 
commodity which is not due to ah. Assuming 
separability of goods from leisure and parallel linear Engel curves gives 
the unifarm camiodity tax result of Deaton and Stern (1986). 
With more corrplex and realistic demand functions the position is 
less straightforward, but as a rule one would expect both the proportionate 
reduction in corrpensated demand and the tax rate to be lower on goods whose 
demand is significantly influenced by ah. The intuitive reason for this is 
that the more efficient payments scheme takes over the redistributive role 
of the taxation of goods closely associated with ah, leaving taxation to 
mitigate the residual inequality unconnected with ah. It should be 
rezembered that the 'proxy' effect of correlation between ah and Wh is still 
present, and that, if this daninates the direct effects of ah, the remarks 
28 
above will apply to Wh rather than ah. For instance, with positive 
correlation the effect of the benefit scheme is likely to be to reduce 
the differential taxation of goods associated with Wh (viz. luxuries), and 
instead to penalise ah by setting a negative ý. It reniains possible to 
base payment schemes entirely on the 'proxy' effect, using characteristics 
which have no independent influence on utility. 
(b) Discriminatory Taxes 
Besides income transfers, information on observed characteristics 
can also serve as the basis of discriminatory taxation. By imposing a 
different level and pattern of ccnuK)dity taxes for different groups in the 
population, the government can increase the number of policy instruments 
and thereby (in general) improve on the optimum of part (a). A government 
would rationally seek to introduce consumer price discrimination wherever 
feasible, although in practice the scope is likely to be rather limited. 
The obstacles to such a policy reseinble those facing price discrimination 
by fi: rms: in particular, it must be possible to enforce the tax rates in 
question, and prevent the resale of goods between individuals. An 
additional difficulty is that tax discrimination might be opposed on 
principle as contravening the spirit of 'fair' taxation (despite its 
redistributive intent, it appears at face value to break Adam Smith's first 
canon of taxation). Taxes based partly on observed characteristics and 
partly on individual consumption decisions. do not fit easily into the usual 
direct/indirect classification, and do not feature in existing tax policies. 
These problem notwithstanding, it reniains the case that tax discrimination 
can contribute to redistributive policy, and a discriminatory tax optimum 
is set out below. 
Let the model take the sarre form as in part (a), except that taxes 
are now differentiated on the basis of the observed characteristic ah. Instead 
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of assuming a continuous set of tax rates defined as a function of ah, it 
seems more reasonable to have a finite number of tax regimes based on 
groupings of the pararreter ah. Suppose, therefore, that ah values can be 
assigned to one of R sets, Yr, r=l,..., R, each containing Hr 
individuals, such that Jr Hr=H. If all ccmnodities are included 
in tax discrimination, then a separate set of linear tax rates is levied 
on each Yr set, increasing the number of tax instrumients from N to RN; in 
practice discrimination might be restricted to a subset of commodities, 
producing a smaller number of tax rates. An optimum is derivable in a 
similar way to part (a), and linear income transfers (where present) lead 
to the same zero covariance condition 
cav( ýh ,a h) ý 
The only difference is in the optimal tax equations, which become 
N 
tr 
('ýýh 
yh - Hr =_ i j=l 
1hcY 
1 
heY 
-), 5ý II hcY 
rr(, r 
where X is still evaluated over the whole population. For each of the R 
sets of tax rates enforced, the tax equations have an interpretation similar 
to that for the standard non-discriminatory case. The compensated reduction 
in demand (on the left) is greater, the lower is the (negative) correlation 
between Xh and consuTption of the commodity by the relevant Yr set (on the 
right); 'luxuries' will tend to be taxed more highly than other goods. 
With tax discrimination, however, this relation is tailored according to 
observed ah values, allowing alternative tax treatment of different groups 
in the population. A good can potentially be a 'luxury' for one Yr set but 
not for another, leading to variations in tax treatment. Hence, although 
the nature of optimal taxation is not radically changed, it is now localised 
to smaller sub-populations, allowing an increase in its effectiveness. 
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There are two main situations in which tax discrimination is likely 
to be useful: 
Under certain individual preferences the value of Xh may be 
strongly influenced by other individual characteristics, in 
addition to inccme levels. This will tend to hamper the 
ability of inccme transfers to reduce variation in X h' leaving 
scope for other redistributive tools. Tax discrimination based 
on ah provides another means by which information on ah can 
be brought to bear on Xh, and thus may be able to inprove on 
income transfers alone. 
Discriminatory taxes also become valuable when relative 
consurption levels vary significantly with ah (either directly 
or via 'proxy' effects). The conventional tax optimum can 
distinguish appropriate tax rates for the whole population, 
but cannot guarantee that these are equally appropriate to 
sub groups. 
As in part (a), nothing can be said in general about tax rates at the 
optimum. The inportance of discrimination based on ah depends on the 
inportance of ah, both as an influence on individual preferences and as a 
source of information on other characteristics. Where ah does play a 
significant role, there are no grounds to expect discriminatory tax regimes 
to resemble each other: effectively the comparison is-between two separate 
tax optima. The same is true for comparison between discriminatory tax 
regimes and the standard tax optimum, where no systematic relationship can 
be expected. 
Differing standard and discrirrdnatorY tax Optima are illustrated by 
the following algebraic exarrple: 
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Exarrple 
t 
Let the characteristic ah take two possible values, a, a, such 
that individuals h=l,..., G have a and h= G+1,..., H have at, where G<H. 
The only other characteristic is the wage rate, Wh, which is freely variable 
over the population. 
t 
The goverTmnt wishes to implement optin-kal discriminatory taxes, tit tit 
for the two convK)dities i=1,2, coupled with a uniform lu-np-sun paymnt, 
a. Social preferences are utilitarian, such that V=EUh* 
Individual utilities take the form 
U -= a lnxý + ln 
h+1 
hh1 x2 
where 1 is leisure. The resulting demand functions are 
h ajPh h- Wh lh = (T-ah-1)'+ 
2 
X1 ý 1+tl ' 72 1+t2 ' Wh 
where 1>0 is assumed to hold. These preferences simplify calculation of a 
tax optimum, since income and cross-substitution effects are zero; they 
also increase the influence of relative prices on consumption patterns, and 
thus enhance the role of tax discrimination. 
Calculating the optimal tax rates for the standard and discriminatory cases 
yields the following: 
32 
Standard tax optimu-n 
H 
tah 
1+t 1H I ahý)h 
VL-1 
>ý0 
t=t as cov(a 1<2 h'Wh) 
t21H 
1+t 2H 
(IW 
h-) h=l 
H 
where MSU of goverment revenue H h= 1 
(ýýh) 
man MSU of incaTe to individuals 
Discriminatory tax optimum 
t t2 t 1 G 
1+t 1 1+t 2 1+t 
G 
ýw 
( 
h h=l 
tt 1 tt tt 1 2 H-G 
t 1+t t 1+t t. 1+t H 
) ( 
1 2 Iwh 
h=Gi-1 
as 
G>H 
Iw=Iw =w 
LI-1 
h< h=G+l h 
G H-G 
The government in this exarrple wishes to tax the unobserved Wh' on which 
the population's inequality is based. Because consurption patterns vary 
with ah, this can be achieved at the standard tax optirmn by setting 
differentiated tax rates. Consunption of the first good increases with a h' 
so t1 >t 2 if ah happens to be positively correlated with Wh. At the 
discriminatory optimun, however, it is possible to link tax rates directly 
to a, removing the need to have differential taxation of commdities. The 
outccrm is two uniform tax regirms, in which the higher tax rate falls on 
the group with the higher average wage. Hence tax discrimination in this 
case permits non-uniform redistributive ccm-nodity taxes to be replaced by 
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separate uniform tax regimes for each ah group. 
One can conclude that there will in general be a case for tax 
discrimination wherever it is-feasible. This is sinply a matter of using 
information to the best advantage, and it is rational to base as many 
policy instruments as possible on observed characteristics. The practical 
value of tax discrimination is rather less apparent. CCITpared with, say, 
income transfers, it is likely to be difficult to enforce and administer 
on a large scale: feasible schemes are probably limited to a few 
commodities and a small number of tax regimes. Even when discrimination 
is possible it faces a further hurdle of public acceptability, as it 
appears to break conventional notions of horizontal equity. 
This section has argued that standard tax optima can be improved 
on by using directly observed information, as the basis of income transfers 
or tax discrimination. The inpact of redistributive income transfers is 
especially significant in this respect: it is difficult to generalise about 
the interrelationship between policy tools, but the presence of income 
transfers can be expected to lessen the general, level of redistributive 
taxation at the social optimum. Although commodity and income taxes remain 
valuable redistributive tools, their relative in-portance is somewhat 
overstated by the usual formulation of optimal taxation models. 
(4) Redistributive Income Transfers based on Variable Characteristics 
The previous two sections have assuned that the characteristic in 
question is outside the control of the individual and accurately observable 
by the governmeant. When these conditions are satisfied the individual 
cannot manipulate the characteristic so as to increase net receipts fran 
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redistributive transfers. In practice, however, manipulation may take place, 
and its effects on the policy optimun are considered in this section. 
The model is again that-of Section (2), part (a), where individuals 
vary in the wage rate, Wh, and an observable characteristic, ah, and receive 
a payment a+Oah. There are two main cases to be considered, depending on 
whether the true value or the reported value of the characteristic is 
altered. 
(a) True Value 
In this case the characteristic is not rigidly fixed, and can be 
altered by the individual in response to government policy. Any such change 
is liable to involve a cost to the individual (monetary, psychological, 
etc. ), which is weighed against the additional income received. The 
government, given that it is aware of the individual responses taking place, 
must allow for them in its policy formulation, if it is to achieve a full 
social optimum. An example of this type of characteristic is family size, 
when it forms the basis of family allowance payments. One possible view is 
that family size is not very responsive to monetary incentives, and that 
it can be treated as af ixed characteristic in the manner of previous 
sections; this presumably is not far from the truth in a downward direction 
for an already existing family. However, monetary payments have sometimes 
been used in the attempt to influence family size in the long run, and some 
theoretical discussions of family allowances have been based on their 
population effects (see, for example, Mirrlees (1972) and Cigno (1983)). If 
one accepts the latter view, then it is necessary to incorporate the family 
size responses in any optimisation model. 
In order to include these effects in the theoretical model, it is 
assumed that the characteristic ah is one of the individual's decision 
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variables, inplying that Wh is the only exogenously fixed characteristic. 
Preferences are defined by the indirect utility function. 
Uh= U(p, Wh, ah Wlj+a+ýah) 
and ah is chosen by the individual to noximise this. If ah denotes the 
opt imalchoice of ah, then it satisf ies 
ou 
hN 
7ah 3Mh 0 
and can be expressed as ah = a(p, Wh, WhT, a, a). For the manipulation problem 
to be meaningful it is necessary to assume that this optimun exists. Letting 
Uh denote the associated utility level, it follows that 
A 
a Uh ý U(P-'Wh'ýh'Wlj+('+O^ U(p, falo) 5h Wh'WhT 
where U is a modified form of the indirect utility function incorporating 
the effects of variation in ah under the linear payrwnts scheme. Given 
this situation, the government can undertake its policy optimisation in a 
similar way to Section (2), but allowing for the effects of a and ý on a h' 
The Lagrangian and first-order conditions are: 
H 
L= V(U u+ p(-R-Ha-ý Ia 1""' H) h=l^ h 
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(using the above indiVidual optimality condition for the cboice of a h)' 
Let Xh denote the net MSU of incorne to individual h, so that 
av au a h 
3ýh 
h au . llýuý h aMh a 
This differs fran its equivalent in Section (2) in that it is a net 
expression involving an extra term to represent the effects on government 
revenue of the induced changes in a h* 
Consider also the term -aah in the equation 
3L 
= 0. If 0 is viewed as (minus) 
I 
30 a$ 
the 'price' attached to a h, then this resembles an uncarpensated price 
derivative in demand theory, and can be decarposed in a similar way. Thus, 
noting that ah is expressible in the particular form ah = a(p, Wh, O, WhT+a+ýah) I 
one can write 
aa Ba Ah 3c'h h 
aa ýF 
I 
Uh h 
7K 
where the first term is the positive 'substitution' effect, holding inccrre 
and utility constant, and the second term is the incane effect, which could 
be positive or negative. 
3ah 
Using these expressions for Xh and-5f, the first-order conditions becane 
HX 
Ih 
h=l 
T- 
and 
HHH Ba h I )Lhah 1 ah pa 1 3ý h=l h=l h=l Uh 
COV(X h'%) = man MSU of revenue losses from compensated 
responses of ah to a 
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The equation ji=T is unchanged from the standard case, apart from the 
revised definition of X h* The covariance condition 
differs from the 
standard case in the presence of the extra term jiý 
H 3a h 
which 
h=l aý 
1Uh 
determines whether or not X and a are positively or 
negatively correlated. It is known that the Lagrange multiplier, 11, 
denoting the MSU of government revenue is positive- One can also say that 
the compensated adjustment 
aa 
hI is positive, implying that an increase aa Uh 
in the return to the characteristic leads to a rise in its level (although 
the net response could be negative, via the income effect). Hence the sign 
of cov(X ah) depends entirely on the sign of 0, in such a way that h' 
cov(X a0 as 0 h' h<< 
This outcom can be explained intuitively as follows. If ý is positive, 
then the characteristic ah is being favoured by the redistributive policy, 
3a 
h 
and the direct adjustment effect - causes an increase in a. This aý 
lu 
h 
'disincentive' is an obstacle to redistribution, resulting in af ailure to 
eliminate totally the positive correlation between Xh and a h, so that ah 
continues to be indicative of the less well off (those with a high value of 
xh). In other words, for $ to be positive a high ah must have been 
associated on average with the relatively disadvantaged in the no policy 
situation, and the redistributive policy has not been able to offset this 
relationship entirely. When 0 is negative exactly the opposite is true, so 
that aS is being penalised, the adjustrmnt 
35h 
leads to a fall in ah h 3a 
IU 
(ccapared with the status quo), and redistribution does not entirely remwe 
the favoured position of those with a high ah. The desired zero covariance 
condition of Section (2) is not achieved because of the disincentive 
constraint arising from variation in a h* 
The case discussed here is rendered slightly artificial by the 
presence of only two characteristics, Wh and ah, of which only Wh is 
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exogenously determined. Individuals are tberefore essentially 
unidimensional, which removes any informational deficiencies and jzplies 
that policy is constrained only by the n-ovements of ah and the linearity of 
the incane transfers. In models with more than two variables, however, 
the same informational considerations apply as in Section (2), with ah 
providing an inperfect indication of the levels of the other characteristics. 
(b) Reported Value 
Even if the true value of a characteristic is fixed, it may still 
be possible for individuals to increase their net income fraim redistribution 
by altering the value reported to the govexTumnt. This presupposes that 
the government cannot directly observe the characteristic, or can only 
do so at an excessive cost, a situation which may well be a reasonable 
representation of certain actual characteristics. If the government is 
totally unaware of manipulation, then it will proceed to design its policy 
on the lines of the previous sections but using the misreported values of 
characteristics; this will generally lead to a suboptimal outcome, with 
some individuals possibly better off than at the true optimum, but society 
as a whole worse off. Alternatively it may be that the government is aware 
of the presence and extent of manipulation, without being able to prevent 
its occurrence. In this situation the manipulation is an additional 
constraint on policy formulation, which can be included in the formal 
optimisation problem. As in (a), the act of false reporting of characteristics 
probably involves a cost to the individual, to be set against the monetary 
returns. In practice the misrepresenting of personal characteristics to 
the taxation or social security authorities is usually declared illegal, so 
the potential costs to individuals of being discovered are quite high. 
In order to represent this theoretically it is necessary to specify 
the costs involved in manipulation of the characteristic (a similar 
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situation is considered in Section (3) of Roberts (1984)). Unlike (a), 
there is no direct effect on utility through movements in the true value 
of the characteristic, and it is assumd here that the cost of manipulation 
can be expressed in monetary terms. Let the money cost of manipulation be 
given by g[(ah7ah) 
2 1, where ah is the true characteristic value, ah is the 
reported value, and g is an increasing function (here taken to be conynon 
to all individuals, although this does not have to be assumed). The cost 
involved therefore rises with the size of the absolute deviation of the 
reported value from the true value of the characteristic. Since welfare 
payments are based on ah, an individual's utility can be expressed as 
Uh =u (p, Wh, a h' WT+a+ýý g[ (a h7 a h) 
ý2 so that g[ (aj, 7ýih) ] is a conpensating variation measure of the costs of 
manipulation. The optimal ah is chosen to maximise net income, satisfying 
3Mh 
2 
TAý + 2g (a, 17a h)I 
(a 
h7 a h) 
so that ý= -2g'[(ah7a h)21 (a,, 7a h) 
and the return fran the welfare payments is equated with the marginal cost 
of adjusting ah. Fran this equation it is clear that 
aa as h< h 
which means that the characteristic is exaggerated when it is favoured by 
the redistribution schem and understated when it is penalised. Since ah 
is an increasing function of 0 alone, the relation can be suTmarised as 
ah=ah (ý), where 3ý > 0, h=l, ..., H, and the function ah depends on the 
(fixed) true cbaracteristic value, ah. The goverrinent's policy problem 
proceeds as in Section (2), but allowing for the ah (a) relationship. The 
Lagrangian and optin-ality conditions are: 
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H 
V(U,,..., U 
H+ P(-R-Ha-0 
Ia 
h")) h= 
3L H 3v au h 
u ým - jaH h=l ah* aMh 
HHH aa 3L av allh Ih ahah pa 0 
hm 4-a-ý -13Uh 
, aMh 
h= h= 
Following Section (2), one can define 
3V au h Xh = au 
h. 
aMh = MSU of income to individual h 
HX 
so that p=I 
-h 
h=l H 
HHH 3a h 
and IX^- -ý Ia pa ý- 
h=l hah h=l h h=l 3ý 
Hence the covariance between Xh and ah at the optimun depends on 0 in such 
a way that 
cov( ah 0 as ýh'^ )<< 
The outcome is similar to that in (a), and has a similar interpretation, 
namely that the adjustments in individual behaviour prevent redistributive 
policy from reaching the desired zero covariance condition. The chief 
points of difference are that the optimality conditions are in terms of the 
reported values, ah' rather than the true values, ah, and that, unlike (a), 
there is no dependence of ah on incon-e, so that revenue effects do not 
appear in the expression for X h* Again the essentially unidiwensional 
nature of this particular example does not carry over to models with a 
greater number of characteristics. 
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For actual exarrples of cases (a) and (b) there will generally be 
a time lag involved in an individual's adjustment to a policy change. If 
adjustment is fast and the policy is well anticipated, then a static model 
constrained by the individual's response is the appropriate one to use. 
On the other band, if the response is slow and/or the policy is not 
anticipated, then in the short run the government may be justified in 
ignoring the individual behavioural constraint when designing its initial 
policy (although possibly making suitable changes later on). The 
distinction between models with and without variable characteristics may 
not always be as clear cut as suggested, perhaps in some cases requiring a 
more unified vim%T. Certainly for situations where a protracted individual 
adjustment to the policy is a central element in its total inpact (as could 
be the case with, say, family allowances), it would be desirable to set up 
an ad hoc intertemporal model of optimal policy. 
In conclusion, the ability of individuals to vary their observed 
characteristics presents an additional barrier to redistributive policies; 
indeed, if undetectable it stops exact policy optimisation fran taking 
place. When the government knows the extent of individual responses, 
however, it can adjust its policy formulation accordingly, yielding 
constrained optima on the lines of those above. 
(5) Policy Applications 
In practice the closest equivalents to the policy instruments 
discussed in this chapter are the monetary payments included in social 
security system (such as family allowances, pensions etc. ). It is 
consequently worth considering whether theoretical models of redistribution 
can be viewed as representations of, or prescriptions for, actual welfare 
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policy. This section considers some of the issues which arise when trying 
to relate redistributive theory to practice. 
The basis of the models is the inclusion of a vector of 
characteristics a in the utility functions of the population. Merely 
defining and quantifying a leads to difficulties, as mentioned in Section 
(1), and knowledge of the distribution of a is also necessary before policy 
optimisation can occur. These would be real problems in any policy 
application, and could probably be 'solved' only in an approximate manner. 
Assuming that a is adequately defined, it then has to be introduced into 
preferences, an issue which has received relatively little attention in the 
economic literature (presumably because it concerns utility effects which 
are not based on consumption of material goods and fall outside the 
traditional subject area of economics). The matter is mainly raised in the 
context of household conposition effects, with comparisons made by index 
numbers termed 'equivalence scales' (see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), 
Chapter 8). The main types of equivalence scale are based on either income 
or price effects, and their impact on redistributive policy optima can be 
summarised as below: 
(i) Income Effects : Engel Equivalence Scales 
This is the sirrplest case, originating in the observations of Engel, 
and estimated, for example, by Muellbauer (1977). Preferences are assursed 
to take the form 
C(P-'Wh"Vh )= k(ah) C*(p, Wh'Uh) 
where k(ah) is a multiplicative constant dependent on ah, and Uh is a per 
capita value; the inpact. of the characteristic ah is then limited to an 
income effect, raising or lowering the cost of attaining a given utility 
level. Introducing this functional form into the tax/benef it cptimun of 
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Section (3), part (a), yields the following. The MSU of incorm to 
household h is such that 
Mh Mh 
alý w k(ah)) N 3xhi(p, Wh, k(ah) av (P-' h' 
Ix h 
(a 
h) = 5u . 
k(ah) +ItI k(ah) 
h 
aMh 
i=l 
aMh 
av 3u h 
3u 
h* 
aMh 
h N 3x. 
I 'ýh t 
i=l 'aMh 
and hence Xh is not a function of ah. The zero covariance condition remains 
mcbanged from Section (3), but in this case must be seen as removing the 
indirect association between Xh and ah, given that there is no systematic 
functional link between them. Adapting the general tax equations of 
Section (3), part (a), to the present case yields 
N1H I *h) 
= 
hp *h tj 
(hHllk(a 
h3Sij H 
k(a h)x. -x1 vi h= 1ý 
where S 
*h 
and x 
*h 
are defined in per capita terms. Although ah explicitly 13 i 
appears in these equations, it does so in a relatively simple way, based 
solely on incon-e effects. An Engel equivalence scale therefore prevents 
ah from having much visible inpact on the optimality conditions, but still 
leaves roan for strong 'proxy I effects, which would be apparent in the tax 
rates obtained rather than the tax equations. 
A modification of the above is termed the Prais-Houthakker 
equivalence scale by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), and is used in Prais and 
Houthakker (1955) and Muellbauer (1980). This allows for a series of 
fmctions ki (a i ), i=l,,.., N, varying over comnodities, 
but simultaneously 
forces price substitution effects to be zero. It is less restrictive to 
define equivalence scales based on prices, as in (ii). 
(ii) Price Effects : Barten Equivalence Scales 
The main alternative method is to define separate equivalence 
scales acting on the price of each commodity, as originally suggested by 
Barten (1964) and applied by Muellbauer (1977). Extensions of this 
approach are the models of Gorman (1976) and Poilak and Wales (1979). With 
a standard set of Barten equivalence scales, preferences are such that 
Ch=C (p: ýnj (a h)'* * *, PNrrý (a h)' w h' u h) 
where the functions mi(ah), i=l,..., N, represent the impact of ah on the 
consumption of individual conTrodities. These preferences leave the 
functional form of Xh and the zero covariance condition unchanged frorn 
Section (3), although prices are now adjusted by the relevant m. (ah) factors. I 
The associated optimal tax equations are 
1N *h H *h Itm. (a a j) uI(: m. (ah)x -a i h)m, h) 
Siý1i-x vi 
j1i 
(hH! 
1 h=l 
T) 
where S 
*h *h 
are again per capita values, calculated at the adjusted prices ij, 'i 
Pi =mI (ah)pi. Ccnpared with (i) it can be seen that the conposition effects 
now enter the optimality conditions in a slightly rmre complex fashion, 
allowing for interaction with the substitution effects on the left-hand side 
of the equation. 
The two cases above are me-rely specific examples of how ah can enter the 
functional form of the optimality conditions. Their main significance is 
that they are sirrple enough to permit eirpirical estimation of household 
conposition (and related) effects. When such estimates are available, it is 
feasible to calculate optimal tax/benefit rates, and thus to, derive a 
numerical solution to the government's policy problem. It is son-e-times 
claimed that this is the purpose of optimal tax theory (Deaton (1981a)) 
whereas others take a more cautious line (Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), 
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p. 12). Considering the (inevitable) gulf between reality and theory, it 
seems unrealistic to expect theoretical modelling to produce meaningful 
policy prescriptions. If this ambition is abandoned, the particular cases 
in (i) and (ii) above lose much of their attraction, and it is preferable 
to return to the more general formulations of previous sections. 
Beyond the question of modelling a, there is a need to reconcile 
the optimisation present in theoretical models with the objectives 
apparently attached to existing welfare policies. In the models of this 
chapter the government is assumed to decide its policy measures on the basis 
of the constrained maximisation of a social welfare function. The implication 
is that the objective is truly redistributive, aiming for a ccnprehensive 
readjustment of the income distribution at all levels. In reality, despite 
the occasional labelling of some taxes as redistributive, welfare policies 
based on income payments are rarely framed in these terms. Instead they 
are often described as 'social security', with the mote cautious objective 
of preventing hardship at the bottom end of the income distribution; in 
other words, of guaranteeing a certain minimum income or utility level. It 
is rather difficult to explain this in term of policy optimisation. There 
are two possibilities: that the welfare policy is an accurate reflection 
of the true social welfare function, or that the government is failing to 
implement an optimal policy, whether by irrationality or by a fundamental 
set of constraints (institutional, infornutional, etc. ). The former case is 
conceivable, but it would be a strange view of social welfare, at odds with 
the forms of social welfare function which are usually put forward. It is 
more plausible to suppose that actual policy is subject to additional 
complexities and constraints above those featured in the theoretical analysis. 
A prime ex ample is the political process to which policy making is subjected, 
and the fact that governments do not always act in the best interests of 
society. Accepting the presence of additional constraints allows the usual 
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picture of social welfare to be retained, while regarding the simple 
theoretical models of redistribution as an inadequate representation of 
actual policy formulation. It remains possible that the model offers a 
potential policy prescription, the fate of which depends on whether the 
additional constraints on policy are removable or genuine facts of economic 
life. The basic point here is that there is a marked contrast between the 
theoretical efficiency of income transfers as redistributive tools and their 
inhibited use in actual welfare policy; this suggests that either the 
theory or policy (or probably both) are at fault and that the true social 
optimum lies somewhere between their outcomes. 
In view of these difficulties it is not really possible to regard 
the redistributive models above as representations of social security 
payments in the usual sense of the term. Nevertheless, it is worth noting 
that (as remarked in Section (2)) the policy optima covered so far do not 
guarantee any minimum income or utility level, often an explicit objective 
of social security policy. In particular, if any initially disadvantaged 
individuals have atypical observable characteristics which are correlated 
with high income levels, then they will fail to benefit from the income 
redistribution, and may even become considerably worse off. This makes 
little difference in a social welfare maximisation, which ensures that 
society in general is better off than it was before, but it sits uneasily 
with a desire toprevent hardship. It may thus be desirable to inpose an 
explicit minimum income or utility constraint on the redistributive model in 
order to safeguard against unpalatable outcomes (although one could also 
argue that this aim should already be embodied in the form of the social 
welfare function). In the context of the model of Section (2), part (a), it 
is preferable to inpose a minimum utility, rather than income, guarantee, 
of the form 
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Uh= U(p, Wh ,a h' wJ+a+ 
Oah) 
where U is some exogenously determined 'acceptable' minimum utility level. 
If the inequality constraints are notbinding at the optimum, then there is 
no change from the cases above. But if, say, the constraints on the first 
J individuals, h=l,..., J, are binding, then the optimality conditions 
become 
9L H av au hi 
au 
h 
-äm Hp +Vh -je Dei au 
h 
3L H av au h 
« jm .ahah+vh 
au 
h ah =0 
h=l 
äu 
hh h=l h=l aMh 
h=lo @v 
h- 
Uh -Uý0 
where vh (>O) is the Lagrange multiplier attached to the inequality 
constraint on the hth inaividual , h=1'... 'J. From this it is apparent that 
v is no longer equal to the mean MSU of inccnv-- to individuals, and takes a 
lower value owing to the constrained nature of the optimun. Similarly, the 
zero covariance condition is also disrupted. The presence of a binding set 
of utility guarantees is therefore a barrier to achieving the maximun 
possible degree of redistribution, emphasising the differing nature of the 
redistributive and income support objectives. The importance of the 
constraints tends to be greater where there are highly atypical individuals 
(regardless of the number of them), although the effect should be less 
important when there are many observable characteristics. If a small 
mnber of eccentric cases does turn out to be hampering redistribution, it 
is to the mutual benefit of the government and the individuals concerned to 
remove the informational deficiency in their particular case, so that the 
constrained optimum may not be stable in the long run. Generally speaking, 
this kind of redistribution plus social security frc-mwork has theoretical 
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shortcomings (not least the determination of the threshold -5), and cannot 
be proffered as an ideal means of analysing policy design. 
Much discussion of social security has concentrated on the choice 
between an income-related and needs-related payrrents scheme- (Meade (1978), 
Kay and King (1983), Chapter 8). A pure incorre-related scheme gives out 
payments based solely on an individual's incm-e level; social dividend 
schemes and negative income taxes come into this category. Conversely, 
pure needs-related payments take account only of an individual's needs, as 
reflected in some observable characteristic, such as family size, sickness, 
enployment status, etc.; this in the U. K. largely corresponds to the 
original Beveridge approach. Both of these have been suggested as the ideal 
social security system, but in practice most benefits tend to be a hybrid of 
the two. Hence there are income support payments which vary with an 
individual's observed needs, and needs-related payments which are means- 
tested and thereby depend partly on income. This conpromise is strongly 
supported by the theoretical models above, where the choice between 
characteristics as a basis for payments is something of a non-issue. In 
the absence of administrative or practical difficulties it is always 
preferable to maximise the information used to determine payments, by 
considering as many relevant observable characteristics as are available. 
If income happens to be one of these characteristics, then the result is a 
scheme which is partly income-based and partly needs-based. The bias 
towards one or the other approach depends on the structure of characteristics 
in the population and their effects on utility, but it is almost certain that 
any socially optimal scheme involves elemnts of both. Of course in practice 
there are other conplicating factors (administration costs, social attitudes 
to means testing, etc. ), and these have to be allowed for in formulating 
policy. 
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(6) Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at sane simple models of redistribution, 
in which income payments are related to the observable characteristics of 
multidimensional individuals. The approach is slightly different from many 
redistributive models, which are based on a unidimensional population 
differing in a characteristic not directly observable. Such models 
(originating in the optimal income taxation framework of Mirrlees (1971)), 
lead to a constrained policy optimun in which inccme transfers provoke 
disincentive responses by individuals. In practice it is clear that 
individuals are (emphatically) multidimensional, possessing a combination 
of observable and unobservable characteristics. Given that some characteristics 
are observable and that income transfers are the most efficient redistributive 
tool, it is natural for a government to ask whether income transfers can be 
related to the observable characteristics, leading to the type of model 
considered above. Provided that assignment uncertainty'applies, the optimun 
is derivable in a perfectly straightforward fashion, with no difficulties 
arising from disincentives; the only fundamental constraint on policy is the 
inability to observe a subset of characteristics. It remains the case 
that further policy tools (such as indirect taxes, discriminatory taxes, or 
rations) could improve on the policy optimum, although income transfers are 
fairly clearly the first choice of instrument. In situations where the 
characteristic is subject to known systematic variation by individuals, the 
cptimisation can still go ahead, yielding a modified optimality condition. 
Within the theoretical framework used, there is consequently no overriding 
obstacle to achieving a significant degree of redistribution. 
Such sirrplicity does not carry over to the hTplementation of actual 
redistributive policies. There are two principal difficulties involved: 
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(a) The enumeration of personal characteristics on the lines assumed 
in the models is not feasible in reality, and the same can also 
be said of the accurate specification of both individual tastes 
and the distribution of characteristics in the population. Any 
actual redistributive me-asures are perforce an approximate 
exercise, perhaps better described as policy reform than 
optimisation. While the prospects for redistribution are not 
nullified by these difficulties, it has to be conceded that a 
high degree of exactitude attached to policy proposals would be 
spurious. 
(b) In practice the presence of social institutions has an inportant 
influence on the chance of redistribution, and this elemnt is 
neglected by the theoretical rwdels above. The mdest degree of 
redistribution acccnplished by existing social security system 
seem to be a reflection of this. 
Consequently these models cannot really be advanced as a precise policy 
prescription or as a representation of conventional social security measures. 
Their main value is that they give a clear picture of the basic 
informational constraint facing redistributive policies, and therein 
represent an upper bound to a govenment's redistributive ambitions. In 
terms of policy practice, one ventures to say only that the models raise 
some doubts about current redistributive policies, considering that income 
transfers are physically feasible policy tools and that the present income 
distribution is an in-probable candidate for a social optimun. 
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CHAPTER 3: QUANTITY PFDISTRIBUTION 
(1) Introduction 
In economics utilitarian discussion has a materialistic flavour, 
centring on the physical consumption of goods and services. Individuals 
are assuTed to have utility functions defined in terms of quantities linked 
to market transactions; all other facets of utility are amitted from the 
analysis. Although I utility' is a nebulous concept, one can safely say that 
it has more ingredients than the consu-rption of goods. Material prosperity 
is only one element, albeit an important one, in the full set of influences 
on an individual's welfare. Economics does not deny this, of course, and 
can defend its approach as a choice of emphasis rather than a restrictive 
assumption. Non-material influences on utility can be either embodied in 
the functional form of utility (if they interact with material influences) 
or regarded as an additively separable component of utility (if there is 
no such interaction). There is consequently no need to mention them explicitly 
whenever a utilitarian formulation is being used. Many non-material 
influences on utility are based on fixed 'personal characteristics, which 
are not feasible targets for the government's social welfare maximisation 
policies. In other cases, however, variation is possible, irrplying that 
utilitarian policy may go further than the production and distribution 
of goods; an exanple is manipulation of legal and political rights, where 
these are considered flexible. Policies based on such parameters are 
not a standard concern of economics, and are absent from most theoretical 
discussion. Economics generally lives up to its role as the material 
social science by restricting its attention to the consumption of observable 
goods and services. 
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This places the burden squarely on quantities as the foundation 
of individual and social welfare. A large proportion of economic theorising 
starts with the assunption that individual util-ity has the form 
U U(X 1'***'XN)' where X ll***IXN are the quantities of goods 1 to N 
consuned in a given period. All subsequent conclusions depend on what 
happens to these X variablea, even if this is not always apparent from 
the terms of the discussion. Anything that is said about prices and 
incomes must boil down to quantity effects when the analysis is framed 
in these terms. The highlighting of quantities means that the modelling 
is 'real' as opposed to 'monetary', and that all welfare results have 
to be based on the consurrption of physical comTDdities. This is probably 
entirely justified, but it does mean that the monetary variables of prices 
and incomes are secondary where welfare issues are concerned. One is 
therefore proapted to ask why relatively little is said about qLmtities 
when redistributicn is being discussed. The neglect is such that redistribution 
is often equated with incorre redistribution, and othex redistributive 
policies are seen as contributing to that end (for exwple, wealth or 
conTiodity taxes). This view is misplaced whenever utility is derived 
from coasuaption of goods; income redistribution is a means to the end 
of redistributing consunption, not an end in itself. There may well 
be good reasons for concentrating on incomes and prices, but they do 
not emerge from the body of the theory itself and they are not so obvious 
as to be self-evident. It is consequently of interest to consider quantity 
redistribution. 
This chapter looks at sone issues relevant to the direct allocation 
of quantities. Section (2) is a general isation of rationing theory to 
allow for any type of quantity constraint; the outccn-e is used in Section (3) 
to consider the cbsizability of quantity allocation. 
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(2) Generalised Rationing 
The polar cases in allocating goods are a complete reliance on 
prices, inccnr- and consumer choice (as is usual in practice), and a direct 
centralised distribution of comnodities. Between them there is a wide 
range of mixed situations, involving a combination of allocation by incomes 
and quantities. In consuTer theory these appear as rationing problems, 
where the consLrier faces both income and quantity constraints. This 
section generalises the conventional rationing model to allow for a variety 
of restrictions on quantities. 
Rationing theory originated in Rothbarth (1940), with the notion 
of 'virtual' prices at which the ration is voluntarily chosen by consurers. 
This was elaborated by Tobin and Houthakker (1950), who caTpared the 
demand elasticities of rationed and unrationed demand functions. In 
recent years the theory has been refined by the application of duality 
methods (Neary and Roberts (1980), Deaton (1981b)), and the resulting 
rationed dezond functions have a general applicability equivalent to 
that of ordinary demand functions. The keystone of the modern theory 
is the definition of virtual prices as a function of other prices, utility 
and the ration level. If good 1 is rationed to a level X, , then the 
virtual price is defined such that 
ac => (p , U) 
ap, 
Hence the derivative of the consumer's cost function with respect to 
Pi is equated with Xl, yielding an equation for the virtual price p, 
in terms of the remaining ccmmodity prices p, the ration level X1 and 
utility, U. When the function p, is substituted for p, in conventional 
demand and cost functions, the outccm is a setýof rationed functions 
which can be used in a similar way to standard consumer theory. Details 
of the relation between rationed and unrationed deniand functions are 
given in Neary and Roberts (1980). 
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Besides restrictions on a single good, it is also possible to 
have quantity constraints applying to several goods (for exanple, in 
the allocation of tirre). In discussing quantity constraints in general, 
it is consequently desirable to extend rationing theory to cover any 
type of quantity constraints. The discussion below firstly looks at 
additive constraints, and then at the general case. 
(i) Additive Constraints 
Suppose that there are N goods, with associated prices pl,..., pN. 
A consuner has preferences defined over these goods, with utility 
U= U(X 1 '... 'XN), where XI 
is consuaption of the ith good. The first 
M goods are subject to a binding additive constraint 
M 
i: . x. =T i=1 11 
where T is sorre given constant. Otherwise any bundle of goods can 
be chosen within the budget constraint set by the incare level. 
To treat this as a rationing problem, it is necessary to obtain 
the relevant virtual prices for goods I to M. The first requirerrent 
is that they nust satisfy the quantity constraint, so that 
ac 
api 
Hence, at the virtual prices, the weighted sum of the price derivatives of the 
cost function must equal T. On its own this relation is not enough 
to define a unique set of virtual. prices for the M goods inside the 
constraint. There is a range of potential virtual prices, reflecting 
the fact that the consumer can choose how to distribute the ration 
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between the M goods. The appropriate virtual prices are those which 
minimise the cost of attaining a given utility level, subject to the 
relation above. The consumer's choice of X is ... #XM within the ration 
can be represented by a choice of the corresponding virtual prices 
PJ,..., PM. Let _q 
denote the prices of the N-M goods outside the 
ration and Xý'- (p, pensated demand function for good j. The J _q, 
U) the conT 
relevant cost objective is 
C (ý' m _q, U) +E -) )F (K, _q, u) j=l(pj-pj I 
that is, the consun-er's cost at virtual prices t plus an adjustment to 
allow for the difference between P and p. The problem and solution are 
as below: 
m 
Choose to minimise C(ý, 
_q, 
u) +E (pj-ýj) Xý (i, 
_q, 
U) 
m 
j=l 
subject to Z, Xc (&,, U) =T j=i iI 
L= C(,, U) ý 
3L ac 
aýi a5i 
mm 
2: (pj -j; j ) Xý +ý (T -E0 )F) j=l I j=l jI 
m 
-i; j )a X3 E (pi 3ýi j=l 
M 3X 
4Z 3"-z-=o 
j=1 
i1, ... 
Fran the properties of cost fmctions it follows that 
mmm 
E (pi -Dj )sii+Ei sii =E (pj -ýj + 11 j) sij 
M 
j=l j=l 
where S ij 
is the i, j th term of the Slutsky matrix. The equations above 
are satisfied if 
Pi ý Pi + i=i fm 
such that the virtual price of the Ith rationed good is the sun of its 
actual price and the 'price' incurred by its presence in the ration. 
Eliminating ý yields the M-1 conditions 
Pj-Pj Oi 
pDfiý4 Om i=1, ... 
56 
treating good M as the ccmTion basis of caTparison. At the optimum the 
relative impact on cost of adjusting any two rationed goods is equated 
with their marginal rate of substitution within the ration. 
Ccrrbining the quantity constraint with the M-1 independent conditions 
above is enough to define a unique set of virtual prices for the rationing 
problem. These can be used in a manner closely resembling that in 
the standard case. In practice it way not be possible to derive explicit 
expressions for virtual prices, but the properties of the resulting 
implicitly defined functions renain the same. The rationed cost function 
is defined as 
mN 
C(p, 
_q, 
U, T) =min pixi+Eq3x1. S. 
j=m+l 
M 
L . X. 
= T, U=U 
i=1 - 1 
If )F denotes a carpensated demand, one can then write 
mN 
Cp 
j=ml+l cý. 
Rc (p, 
_q, 
u) iI _q, 
u) +3 
mCNc 
Pi Xi (p_, 
_q, 
U) +ZX1 (iogou) 
j=M+l 
m 
U) + =C (i, Pi) X. (i, 
as is also the case with the standard theory. The cost function has 
the usual properties, and in particular the relation 
ac 
a pi 1 
still holds true. The only real dLfference from the usual case is the 
effect of a change in the ration level, T. With a single good ration 
this has a known effect on the consunption of the good concerned, whereas 
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in the present case a change in T can produce a reallocation of the ration. 
The effect of T on the virtual prices therefore has to be taken account of. 
Differentiating C with respect to T yields 
ac 3 
5 -T ý TT 
2T 
mc 
(p x q, U) 
mm ax ca 
E (Pi-ýi) Ei. 
p 
i=l j=1 
-Zi 
;; ý 
mm 
Es -ýT (p-p) 
i=l 
(pi i) 
( 
j=l ij 
p 
where S refers to the section of the Slutsky matrix relevant to the first M 
goods (evaluated at virtual'prices). The equivalent expression for a single 
good ration is simply p-ý, since there are no substitution possibilities. 
Remaining properties of the rationed functions vary fran the standard case to 
the extent that this relation is relevant. They can be sum-arised as follows: 
Change in T 
-c xi (p, q, U, T) X q, C, T) vi 
a 3ýý 2x. nx. x g+v ac ai+ axi 
aT U-T am TT = UT ýM 
[(-p--p) 
-' 
aPT 
axax. 
i11 (2--5) sap aT3T am TI 
Change in Incom, M 
M, T) =Rm 1(2,9, M, ZP X-(2,9, M)) = XI(2, q, M) i =1 jI 
ax. ax M. ax 
+ am j=lý- am am 
ax 3R 
iza 
=> j am am 3T 
(j=l 
-- 
where 
aX'/BT 
is as above, and ordinary denund functions, XI, are evaluated 
at virtual prices. 
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Changes in Prices, q, p 
_q, 
U, T) = 2. (j2, _q, 
M, T) = k. (, p, g, Z p. X., T) 111 j=J 11 
3x, ak, ax~ 
- k. aq 7q am 
ak. a 2ý a k. 
aq aq am 
Hence there exists a standard Slutsky equation for the rationed demand 
functions, with 
aR i/ am as defined above. Changes 
in p are analogous, with 
p in place of 
_q. 
For a general ration there exists a direct substitution 
effect for p, arising from the allocation of gopds within the ration. 
As with single good rationing, there is a corrplete set of rationed/ 
unrationed, corrpensated/uncoupensated dermnd functions, with associated 
derivatives. The effect of the ration on the vadoz derivatives is to 
introduce a 'quantity' effect (operating through changes in T), to set 
alongside the incorre and price (substitution) effects. A change in T has 
both a direct inpact on denund and an inconre effect, while a change in 
M has a direct inpact and a 'quantity' effect. Changes in the prices of 
unrationed goods have a rather coaplicated mixture of all. three effects,, and for 
rationed goods the position is similarwith the presence of direct substitution 
effects. The intuitive rationale for the 'quantity' effect is fairly clear. 
A movezent in prices or incoiTe serves to 'tighten' or 'slacken' the ration, 
according to whether the inposed constraint becorres closer or further from 
what the individual would choose voluntarily. The perceived effect on 
the ration is therefore relevant in considering the net inpact of price 
and incorm changes. 
Before discussing applications of this theory, it is worth extending 
it to the general case. 
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(ii) General Constraints 
When several goods are involved quantity constraints need not always 
be linear, and could well take more corrplicated non-linear forms. To allow 
for this, suppose that a constraint is again imposed on the first M goods, 
but that it now takes the general form g( X11 .... XM)=0. Discussion can 
follow the same procedure as in (i), firstly defining a set of virtual ' 
prices, and then using them to obtain rationed cost and demand functions. 
The appropriate virtual prices rrust induce the consurmr to satisfy 
the quantity constraint voluntarily, inplying the condition 
(ac 
8 
ac ac ) its 
ap, ap 2" * "' 
ýýj 
As in (i), this is not enough on its own to identify a unique set of virtual 
prices. Allocation of goods within the ration can be mpmsmbad by a cost 
minimising choice of virtual prices, such that 
m-ccc 
L= C(p, 
_q, 
u) +E (pj-pj)x I+ 
Cg(x Q 
i -: 1 
3L Ic m 3)F m ag ax. 
-=- - Xý i 'i + api ap IE 
(P. -P. ) 
i j=l iI api j=l ax I 
api 
From the properties of cost functions one obtains 
mm ag m 
z S. 39 )S0 
j=l 
lpj-pj) sji U-i ji jil 
lpj-pj+ 4x 
I 
ij 
These equations are satisfied if 
i=1,..., m 
+ 10 ... om Pi «, '2 Pi 
.i 
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3g 
so that q. is a sun of an actual price, pi, and a shadow price, xl 
The sign of ý depends on the value of the function g in the unconstrained 
consurrption decision : let this be denoted by g*. If q* > 0, then the 
ration reduces the value of g, and ý>0 nust hold, so that a higher 
permitted value of g reduces the consuTer's cost. The converse also 
applies, and hence 0 as g* ý: 0. From the expression for p. -it follows ZZ 
that if 
3gl3X. 
> 0, then p-i >= pi as 0. The virtual price of x. I<<1 
exceeds its actual price when the level of g is reduced (ý > 0), and 
vice-versa. if 
Bg /ax. > 0, then the relation is reversed, so that 
> 
pi as 0. Eliminating ý yields 
I 
39 Pi-pi /ax 
Pk-PM ag/axm 
with good M as the arbitrary basis of corrparison. Thus the relative cost 
of substituting any two rationed goods is equated with their marginal rate 
of substitution within the function g. Otherwise the sarm utility can be 
achieved at lower cost by reallocating the ration. 
Rationed cost and demand functions are derived by substitution of 
virtual prices (as functions of other prices, utility and the parameters 
of the quantity constraint) into the ordinary cost and demand functions. 
It is not possible to analyse demand derivatives in the same way as in 
(i), since there is no longer an analogy for the 'quantity', T. The goods 
involved in the ration are not necessarily measurable bya coamn quantity 
unit, and the constraint nay involve many different coefficients. Thus, 
although a set of demand derivatives exists, it will always depend on the 
particular coefficients of the constraint function g, and consequently 
a general form cannot be given. 
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In rrost cases it will not be possible to obtain explicit equations 
for virtual prices, but the same principles still apply to a set of inplicitly 
defined virtual prices. one can always therefore interpret quantity constrained 
derrand in terms of rationing theory. 
There are numerous instances where denund rray be influenced by quantity 
constraints, and where a general rationing theory rray be appropriate. 
Sone exaWles are: 
(a) Allocation of Tirre 
Tirre is the classic exarrple, of a scarce corm-odity subject to a well 
defined quantity constraint. Any activity that takes tirre rrust be included 
in a constraint on the total tirrexýrdilable. This is a commn feature 
of household production theory, where tirre may be an input into nuny different 
activities (Becker (1965)). 
(b) Physical Constraints 
In sane situations demand forgm: Js is subject to a physical constraint 
on the amount that can be consurred. An exanple is where storage is involved 
and spatial. capacity is limited; in stocking, say, a refrigerator or freezer 
it is necessary to make allowance for the available space, which may impose 
a binding constraint on demand. Another case is where previous decisions 
restrain current consumption, as when the purchase of a given type and 
size of house dictates the choice of other consumption activities over 
subsequent years (choioe of furnishings, range of activities compatible 
with size and location of house, etc. ). 
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(c) Non-physical Constraints 
The individual may also face non-physical constraints on consuaption. 
One possibility (increasingly common) is limit3 imposed for health reasons, 
as when dietary rules restrict the consumption of food. If the constraint 
is self-hriposed, it can potentially be integrated with an unconstrained 
utility function, although it remains the case that the consumer's 'spontaneous' 
choice has probably been influenced by external information and persuasion. 
A similar situation arises with advertising, where 'voluntary' consumption 
decisions can be seen as guided by the activities of producers (a major 
theme of Galbraith (1958,1967)). In some cases there are legal restrictions 
on consumption, as when it generates excessive noise or pollution. 
Rations 
Quantity constraints can be inposed deliberately as a tool of redistri- 
butive policy, appearing either as rations or som other form of non- 
monetary allocation. Specific restrictions on particular goods are depicted 
by standard rationing theory. Voucher scherms or other restrictions require 
the generalised theory given above. 
(e) ConsuiTer Psychol 
Consideration of consuner psychology can easily lead to notions 
of constrained consunption. In household production theory, for exanple, 
utility depends on unobserved characteristics or qualities, which way 
be psychological in nature; consunption of characteristics is then constrained 
partly by the household production technology. in addition to the need 
to purchase goods (Lancaster (1971)). Alternatively, in trying to analyse 
what is iieant by utility, one can envisage diminishing returns inposed 
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(or strengthened) by constraints; an absolute 'psychological' valuation 
may be corrpromised by 'physical' restrictions, as occurs with Over-consunption 
of food. Another example is the possibility of 'positional' goods (Hirsch 
(1977)), which can -lead to quantity constaints 
if, say, consumars wish 
to match the (exogenous) consumption patterns of their neighbours, (or 
otherwise to collective constraints on all consumars). These issues can 
often be subsurred in preferences, but in sorre situations it may be instructive 
to look at them more explicitly. 
The above are merely a few examples of where quantity restrictions 
may be relevant to consumer demand. Generally speaking, there is little 
cause to believe that consumption decisions am universally explicable 
by a monetary constraint alone. The choice of many goods appears to be 
influenced by other restrictions, requiring a more complex den-and theory 
subject to several different non-monetary constraints. In this sense 
quantity restricted theory is more general than the usual representations 
of consumer demand. Rationing is also applicable in other areas, such 
as the constrained decisions of fir= or other agents. 
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The discussion above has set out an extended version of rationing 
theory, applicable to general quantity constraints. It differs fran the 
standard version in the formulation of virtual prices, which need an additional 
set of conditions in their definition. For the general constraint 
g(X 1, -, Xm) = 0, virtual praces pl,..., p m are 
defined by 
g(, )'Fl(i, 
_q, 
U), ..., NýA(j, 
ag 
(b) pi-pi 
/3xi (p, 
_q, 
U) 
M-1 
Pi4-pm 39/3X q, U) 
m 
(a) ensures the satisfaction of the constraint, coriesponding to the condition 
that uniquely defines the virtual price in single good rationing. The 
M-1 conditions in (b) arise from the allocation of goods within the ration, 
and can be characterised as the consurrer choosing the optinIal set of virtual 
prices. The theory of Mary and Roberts (1980) is then a special case 
of the above, where there is no scope for allocation within the constraint 
and the second set of conditions is not required. 
A generalised rationing theory is useful in considering the redistrib- 
utive role of quantity constraints, a question addressed in Section (3). 
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Quantity Allocation 
Welfare economics custorrarily enphasises the desirability of lurrp- 
sum incaTe transfers, coupled with unrestricted consumer choice under 
efficient pricing. Quantity constraints are then viewed as distortionary, 
upsetting the marginal efficiency conditions that errerge from unconstrained 
behaviour. Under these circumstances, the value of quantity redistribution 
depends on special conditions outside the usual assunptions iTade in economic 
theory. An exanple is 'specific egalitarianism', where social preferences 
diverge from an individualistic form and depend also on the consunption 
of a particular commodity; it nay then be justifiable for the governrrent 
to intervene in redistributing the said comTodity (Tobin (1970)). In 
practice there is little prospect of efficient pricing, so the inpact 
of the usual conclusions is accordingly diminished. When pricing is inefficient, 
an optimum optimorum cannot be achieved by lunp-su-n inconre redistribution, 
and there is scope for the use of quantity redistribution. It is prwuture 
to dismiss intervention in quantity allocation on the basis of principles 
derived from idealised conpetitive equilibria. In suboptiftal 'second- 
best' situat: kns there is a much stronger case for the use of quantity 
controls, which persists even when lunp-sxxn incone transfers are available. 
One can therefore say that the value of non-mnetary allocation is underr ted 
by conventional economic discussion. Far from needing to be justified 
by special conditions, the opposite is true; quantity allocation has nothing 
to contribute only in the special case of a fully efficient monetary allocation 
system. 
As practical policy rreasures, rationing and quantity controls are 
traditionally associated with a definite shortage of one or rmre goods 
relative to others. In these conditions rationing by price may be viewed 
as inequitable (given an unequal incorre distribution), and it nuy be felt 
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desirable to withdraw the goods from the usual monetary allocation rrethods. 
The rrain observed example of a distributional 'crisis' is in wartime, 
when the supply of consumer goods is curtailed by a redirection of resources 
towards military production. Any other situation which significantly 
reduced the supply-of certain goods could be used as a basis for similar 
arguments. The main feature is that there is a perceived aggregate constraint 
on certain goods which is more severe than that applicable to others. 
This does not n-ean that the value of rations and other allocation tools 
is limited to extraordinary conditions, as was pointed out above. A more 
general case for non-n-onetary allocation schemes could certainly be n-ade, 
although the outcome would not fit in very easily with the custcMry set 
of policy tools. The discussion here relates to those positions comnonly 
recognised as requiring an alternative to price allocation. 
Quantity aLlocation can be divided between 'direct' and 'indirect' 
scherms, in the sense of Chapter (2) above. A 'direct' scherTe distinguishes 
individuals either fully or by scae observed characteristic, whereas 'indirect' 
allocation cannot predict the inpact on any particular individual. The 
fonmr cases are more efficient redistributive tools, but may be ruled 
out by the absence of the required inforffation. Both types of scherre 
are considered below. 
Direct AUocation 
As with income redistribution, one can distinguish between cases 
where fu. U information is available and those where only a limited subset 
of individual characteristics is observed. 
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(a) Full Infonration 
The govenurent is here assurred to have corrplete knowledge of individual 
preferences and characteristics, allowing it to redistribute quantities 
in a manner resembling a lump-sum income redistribution. Suppose that 
a single good, X1. is in short supply, such that the aggregate availability 
is equal to 3? 1. All remaining goods, i--2,..., N, are allocated in the 
usual way, with consurrers; allowed to purchase as nuch as they wish within 
their budget constraints. The governrrent's problem is therefore to choose 
3Eh the quantities 1. h=l,..., H, to maximise social welfare subject to the 
condition 
H 
--I z X, 
h=l 1 
where is the armunt of the first good allocated to individual h. 
Individual preferences can be depicted by the rationed indirect utility 
functions Uh =Uh(p, Mh, Vj), where p is the vector of consuner prices 
for goods j=l,..., N and mhis the incam of the hth individual. There 
is nothing to be gained from charging a price for the first good, so p, 
is assurred to be zero. The rationed good is therefore allocated by admin- 
istrative fiat, entirely outside the monetary system. The govemTent's 
policy problem and solution are as below: 
H 
V(U 1'***'UH) +0 ('l 
h=l 
av au 
11 
auh 
=> 
DV a5h 
a5 ae 
h 1,1 
At the optimun the MU of raising 
P for each individual is equatpd with 11, 
which is the MU of raising the aggregate quantity RV There is no further 
scope for raising social welfare by reallocating the first good, and the 
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economy has attained a 'first best' with respect to non-monetary allocation. 
The optirrality condition can be rewritten using the relation 
0 
h/2-Rh 
-h 1 
ý1/ 
? Mh 
where is the virtual price of the first good for individual h; this 
is a general property of rationed demand functions. Substituting into 
the conditions above one obtains 
-h 
h Pl 
3V 
a Uh 
where Xh s- HSU of income to individual h 
Hence the optinum equates the virtual prices of the first good weighted 
by the relevant MU of incorre. Individuals with a high MU of incorre 
will have a lower virtual price of the first good, and vice versa. This 
rreans that X1 is distributed so as to ccnpensate partially for the inequalities 
of the income distribution. In general the tendency will be for individuals 
on low incomes (and thus usually with a high HSU of income) to receive 
a relatively high allocation of the good (through their having a low virtual 
price). At a first-best income distribution the Xh values are by definition 
equal, so that the optimal X1 allocation requires an equalisation of the 
virtual prices for all individuals. 
In strict theoretical terms the rationale for this policy is not 
clear. A government with fill I knowledge of individual preferences could 
reach a first-best position by redistributing income and allowing X1 to 
be allocated by price. Alternatively, the sarre outcorre could be attained 
by an administered non-monetary distribution of all N goods. Theme is 
consequently no conpelling reason for a mixture of monetary and non-rronetary 
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allocation; the case above does not even attain the first best, since 
a lunp-sum inccrre redistribution is assurred not to take place. The model 
is theoretically justifiable only if there is somathing blocking the irrplermn- 
tation of incone redistribution. This could sinply be an institutional 
constraint, as far emmpla when the need for redistribution is only perceived 
in 'crisis'. periods related to a subset of goods. The obstacle could 
otherwise be built into the nx)del as a disincentive effect, in the manner 
of optimal taxation models. Since full scale incaTe redistribution does 
not occur in practice, the case for a direct quantity allocation is stronger 
in reality than it appears in this particular frarrewozk. 
An example of the scope for quantity allocation is the distribution 
of employment. Individuals often have little immdiate control over their 
working time, in which case they can be regarded as constrained in their 
hours of work. Efficient allocation of work would be on the lines of 
the model above, producing an outcome where the weighted virtual wages 
of all individuals are equated (presumably with some sub-division between 
types and locations of employment). Such a result is a long way from 
the current method of organising employment, with some individuals fully 
unemployed and others working a fixed number of hours. If working time 
were to be allocated in the same way as other goods, the resulting inequality 
of hours worked would depend largely on the inequality in non-employment 
incomes - income redistribution together with efficient pricing could 
produce a socially optinal result. Whether optimal or not, the outcome 
would be very unlikely to coincide with the situation found in practice, 
rigidly differentiating the unemployed from the fully employed. Instead 
there would be a continuous range of working hours, and no unemployment 
in the standard sense of the term. 7his fits in with a pure neoclassical 
labour market theory, which presents employment as an unconstrained equilibrium 
arising from the interaction of employers' and workers' behaviour. Observed 
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errployrmnt distributions appear, in contrast, to be non-monetary in origin, 
ixrplying a set of constraints placed on the individuals involved. They 
are not the optiml. non-manetary allocations described above, and cannot 
be justified by the theory of this chapter. To explain why they arise 
one would have to delve deeper into the institutional side of the question. 
(b) Partial Information 
The goverrumnt may have insufficient infonmtion to irrplerrent a 
fully optimal quantity redistribution of the type set out in (a). It 
will not usually have zero information, so a feasible quantity allocation 
is liable to fall somewhere between the case in (a) and the no policy 
situation. This can be treated in the same way as in Chapter 2 with respect 
to monetary redistribution. 
Let the policy problem remain as before, with the first good in 
short supply subject to an aggregate constraint XV The only difference 
is that individuals am now distinguished by an observable characteristic, 
ah, as well as their inccnes, Mh. Preferences are such that 
a Uh =U (-P I Mh h' 1 
where the functional form of utility is assunred to be identical for all 
individuals. The government either cannot observe incones. or for some 
other reason does not make use of the Mh values in allocating X 11 Infonnation 
on the joint distribution of Mh and ah is availab" however, permitting 
ah to be used as a basis for redistribution. If a linear functional fon-n 
is used, the aLb: )cation of X1 is such that 
-h Y, ýa+ ýah 
where a and B are the policy pararreters to be chosen by the govenumnt. 
The constraint on the first good then becorms 
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aH +ßZ 
h=l 
The policy problem is to choose a, a to rrEudmise social welfare subject 
to the restriction above, producing the following solution 
H 
V(ll H) + 11 (R, --a H-5 Ea h=l 
3L 
=H 
av- 
.A- E. H=0 ýa 
h=l allh 
HH aL 
= 
2-Y 
. 
LS 
. ah - 11 Ea0 w 2: 3Uh h=l h= h=l 
Let Vh denote the MU of raising individual h's allocation of X1,, so that 
av 
-; W- 
h3 Uh a Pl. 
The first-order conditions can then be rewritten as 
H 
h=l 
Hah I? h 
vH0 => cov ah) H h=l h= 
Hance the HSU of relaxing the aggregatn constraint is equated with the 
rrean MU of increasing the allDmtions of X1 received by individuals. 
When corrbined with the equation for a this yields a zero covariance condition, 
such that there is no systerratic relationship between V and ah at the hc 
optim" The values Of a and $ obtained will depend on the joint distribution 
of Mh and ah, and their interrelationship within the functional form of 
preferences. If individuals started out with an initial suboptirral allocation 
of X1, then their net gain or loss is equal to the optirral allocation 
rrdnus the initial XI holding. 
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The optknality conditions are identical in form to those derived 
in Chapter 2 relating to income redistribution. One can repeat the question 
raised in (a) on the govenment's use of information; an ability to redistribute 
x1 using knowledge of the distribution of Mh and ah suggests that income 
could be redistributed in the same manner. Doing so would produce the 
zer-o cavariance condition of Chapter 2, such that. 
cov (X h' ah) =0 
3V 3ý1 
wheme X= -T- - Tjýý = IýBU of incom to individual h. h U, t h 
Ts in (a), X and V are related by the equation Vx -h, where hhhh P1 
-h . p, is the virtual price of X, for individual h. This rreans that zero 
covariance between vh and ah fol-lows from the equivalent incorre condition 
if all virtual prices are equated, that is 
cov (, i h' ah) ý cc)v (ýIP1 1 ah) ý' ' Pl cov(1 h' ah) «ý 
() 
-h - if P, = pl, h =1,..., H, and cov (ý'h, ah) = 0. It foLlows that 
HH Xh-pl 
,=E -% =EH 
h=l H h=l 
where ý= HSU of government revenue, 
so that p is equated with the DBU of govemrmnt revenue nultiplied by 
the single virtual price of X l' Hence, 
if the available infonmtion is 
also used to redistribute incorre, the optirrality condition for the allocation 
-h- of X, reduces to an equating of the virtual prices, p, = pl, h=l,..., H. 
This corresponds to the situation found under the sane circumstances in (a). 
Eblaxing the linearity of the policy rreasures does not change the 
basic nature of the outcome. If one aLlows for a continuous joint distribution 
f(m, a) and a non-linear ex post allocation XX1 (a), then the resulting 
optimality condition is 
av aff 
jX- f (M, a) dM f (M, a) dM 
-m 
J-u =IMV 
la 
=ll 
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so that the rrean MSU of raising the X1 allocation is equated for all different 
values of a. When incorre is redistributed on the same infonnational basis, 
the optimal-ity condition again reduces to an equalisation of virtual prices 
between all. individuals. The madel is not dependent on the particular 
two-dimensional structure used here, and could be extended to a larger 
set of observable and unobservable characteristics. 
In conclusion, the results of direct quantity allocation can be 
divided between 'pure' and limpurel cases, according to whether or not 
incon-e is redistributed sinultaneously using the same available inforrration. 
'Pure' cases are those with the best attainable incorre distribution, ensuring 
that there is no element of income readjustrrent involved in quantity allocation. 
The optirml allocation then requires an equating of the virtual prices 
of all individuals. Such an outcam is intuitively appealing, since virtual 
prices indicate people's subjective valuations of the good, which should 
be equated at an efficient allocation. I DTpure I cases occur when incorres 
are distributed in a fixed arbitrary rmnner, and policy is confined to 
rrenipulation of quantities. In these situations the optirral quantity 
allocation is influenced by the desire-for incone redistribution, so that 
a full equalisation of virtual prices is not inpleffented. - The optirmlity 
conditions are instead defined in term of virtual prices weighted by 
the individual's HSU of incorre. Theoretically speaking, there is no just- 
ification for the linpurel cases, and a rational goverment would make 
full use of its available information. In practice such a global approach 
7/t 
rray not be forthcoming, in which event it is desirable to adjust for the 
incorTe distribution when directly allocating quantities. 
(ii) Indirect Allocation 
In some cases it is not feasible to redistribute quantities by directly 
identifying the recipients or by observing sorre of their characteristics. 
This occurs, for exanple, if the necessary infont tion is not available 
or if there is som administiative obstacle to direct allocation. Uider 
these conditions allocation has to proceed by 'indirect' rreans which are 
not dependent in any way on the personal characteristics of the population. 
Three nain approaches can be identified, based on prices, quantities or 
sone form of generalised rationing constraint. 
(a) Allocation by Price 
The first possibility is to set the prices of the rationed goods 
so as to equate aggregate demand and supply. Such an outcorre might env--rge 
spontaneously from mn-ket forces, or could alternatively be inposed as 
a policy neasure by deliberately setting the appropriate prices. The 
amunt of each good received by individuals will depend chiefly on the 
prevailing incon-e distribution. 
Suppose that the first L goods are in short supply, such that their 
aggregate availability is given by 9 l' 
R2'* 
*" 
3ýL* The remaining N-L 
goods are allocated in the usual way, and are free to be purchased at 
a given set of prices, denoted by q. Individuals receive fixed incorres 
Mh' h=l,..., H. Allocation of the first L goods by price requires setting 
their prices pl, at the levels which produce aggregate denands JL 
The price vector pt is defined such that 
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H 
2: Xh( 
h=1 i 
pl'* * *'PtL' '! ' Mh) i-- " ..., L. 
where Xh is the ordinary demand function of individual h for good i. The I 
nunber of aggregate equations is equal to the nunber of pt values to be i 
set, so in general there will be a particular solution for pt. The scope 
for any choice over pt is correspondingly limited. 
This outcorm wi 11 not usually coincide with the social optinium, 
as defined in (i) (a) above. An optirral allocation r--qjims, that X -h hP 
be equated for all individuals, where Xh is the PSU of incone to h and 
-h . p is the vector of hIs virtual prices. Those with a high Xh value should 
ideally face a relatively low virtual price, and vice versa. This does 
not occur in the case considered here, where all individuals are paying 
the sarre price and individuals on low incorres will generally receive less 
of all goods. Allocation by price can only reach a social optimim when 
there is a first-best incaTe distribution, such that the X values are h 
equated for all individuals. In that case there is no need to set different 
virtual prices for all individuals, and a uniform price is desirable in 
social welfare terms. Although price allocation is always Pareto efficient 
(equating the marginal rates of substitution for all individuals), it 
does not normally provide the best neans of allocating goods in short 
supply. 
(b)_ Quantity Rationing 
An alternative approach is for the govemnent to specify the quantities 
of each scarce good that individuals receive. Unlike direct alloqation, 
the govemrrent is not able to base the distribution of goods on individual 
characteristics. This usually rreans that the first L goods are shared out 
evenly,, giving an identical allocation to each individual. There is nothing 
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to be gained from charging a price for these allocations, so it is assuny---d 
that the rationed goods are simply given out in fixed amounts, while the 
renwmig goods are allocated in the usual monetary manner. The resulting 
allocation is such that 
X 
h 
. -h th where Xi is the fixed an-cunt of the i good received by h, and H is the 
total nunber of individuals. Fbr each individual there is a set of virtual 
-h . prices, pL, i=l, o .., M, at which the quantity allocation would be demanded 
voluntarily. These satisfy the relation 
Xh (-h -h -h 
i Pl' P21' I pW q, 
M) 
where Xý is the ordinary demand function of h for i; the absence of any 
prices on the rationed goods means that there is no inccne cost incurred, 
and net income remains equal to Mh. In general the level of virtual prices 
will decline with income, so that those on low incomes will have relatively 
low P- values. As in (a), this can be compared with the optimal di=t 
h 
allocation, which requires an equating of X,,, -Pi for all h. There is no 
cause to believe that the outcomes wi 11 coincide. but since Xh is usually 
inversely related to Mh, the general pattern of virtual prices will be 
similar. To distribute scarce goods evenly therefore has a redistributive 
effect which may be seen as desirable in social welfare terms. The outcome 
will be superior to the price allocation of (a) as long as low income 
individuals have a higher MU of consuming the good in question than high 
income individuals (as is quite likely). While an even share out is 
not in general Pareto efficient, it can easily produce a result socially 
preferred to allocation by price. 
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(C) General Constraints 
Apart fran uniform pricing or quantity rreasures, indirect allocation 
can take a nunber of other form. The only absolute requirexrent is that, 
by definition, the nethod of allocation exhausts the available supply 
of the goods in question; otherwise there is freedom to choose any particular 
form of constraint to be inposed on individuals. The resulting constrained 
demands can be analysed in terms of the Igeneralised' rationing theory 
set out in Section (2). On the whole a more flexible approach to allocation 
will produce a better outccne than the price or quantity allocation considered 
in (a) and (b) above. 
A constraint irrposed on the rationed goods could take any functional 
form, and the particular approach adopted could be rrade subject to govemrrent 
choice. In practice, however, a feasible scherm is likely to have a fairly 
sinple structure. The prin-e e., orrple is a uniform linear constraint iriposed 
on goods which are in short supply. This corresponds to a voucher scheme, 
whre all individuals are allocated a given amount of purchasing power 
which can be distributed freely an-ong the rationed goods at fixed rates 
of exchange. Most of the discussion below assurres linearity of the constraint, 
although other approaches are also possible. 
Suppose that the economy is again facing a shortage of the first 
M goods, with aggregate availabilities JR 11 ... 1 
5ý4- The goverment wishes 
to ixrpose a linear constraint on the consunption of these goods, such 
that the total demand for thern is equated with their availability. Each 
individual therefore faces a constraint of the form 
ýlXl + 02X2 +-+ OMXM ý-- " 
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where a, a1#... Fa M are constants. It is assumed that no monetary price 
is charged for the first M goods, so they are allocated entirely on the 
basis of this constraint. All individuals receive a uniform allocation 
of 'vouchers', a, which can be 'spent' on the first M goods at 'prices', 
ail, i=l,..., M. Effectively there are two separate allocation schemes 
operating in the same manner, one for the first M goods and one for the 
remaining N-M. Each can be viewed as a constraint on the other, and the 
only real distinction between them is that there is a uniform allocation 
of vouchers, a, whereas income is unevenly distributed with values Mh' 
h=l,..., H. Demand for the first M goods can bed4Acbed in terms of generalized 
rationing theory, with virtual prices pl,..., defined by M. 
m 
Xýh -h, (p 
_q, 
Uh) = ol 
-h Pi7Pi 
- FN P, 4-pý 
i=1 Fm-l 
1,..., H 
Fbr a given set of ai values, the resulting virtual prices will usually 
be different for aU individuals. 
The govenumnt wants to set the pararreters a and a,, ... I am so that 
total denund for the first M goods is equal to their availability. This 
irrpl. ies that 
H 
Z Xh (Y)h(q, a*ý,..., aý, at, Mh), q, M) 
h=l I-1m 
where p is the vector of virtual prices cE the first M goods for 
individual h. It can be assurred that there is no Imney illusion, with 
7q 
respect to voucher prices, allowing a*ýto be treated as an arbitrarily 
defined nurreraire. The remaining pararreters 
t 
nust satisfy the 1m 
M egmtims above; as with prices in (a) the nunber of equations and parameters 
is equal, so there is not in general any scope for choosing the 
t 
values. 
Once again the resulting virtual prices will not correspond to the optimal 
values in Section (1), part (a) . Since at is equal for all individuals, 
however, those on a low income are able to obtain a relatively large 
share of total consumption of the first M goods. . This should 
reduce the average level of their virtual prices, and thus be distributively 
benevolent, provided that low incorre recipients have a high MU of incorre. 
As with quantity rationing, the outcorre must be preferable to price allocation 
if the less well off have a higher I-BU of consuming the rationed goods. 
A voucher system can also be expected to be superior to the quantity distribution 
in (b). In particular it leads to a levelling of purchasing power over 
the first M goods, coupled with efficient allocation. The consurmr's 
choice within the linear constraint can be represented directly, in a 
Xh mmner analogous to ordinary consumer theory. The optina. 1 values 
are chosen to maximise 
Xh Xh 
M 
5. Xh Mh, 
M) S. 
t. z 
where ýh is the rationed indirect utility function corresponding to quantity 
rations on the first M goods. Choice of XhIj., XhM within the linear constraint 
yields the usual form of optimality condition, such that 
a Uh allh 
= 
dý- ýi Di 
ij ýXh 
3ý dX'. l 
I/ Ij 
Dj 
The marginal rate of substitution between any two goods within the constraint 
is equated with the 'voucher price' ratio, ensuring efficiency in allocation. 
Such ef Eiciency is not attained in the quantity rationing of (b), and since 
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the equal share out in (b) is a feasible position within the linear constraint 
used here, it follows that the voucher scherre is preferable to quantity 
rationing. A general rationing constraint can therefore oonbine the virtues 
of price and quantity allocation, allowing a more efficient allocation 
through the elemnt of choice and a mre equitable one through the evening 
out of purchasing power. 
The position can be illustrated diagramatically for a two-good, 
two-consumr case. Let the first two goods be subject to an aggregate 
availability R, , 
R2, so that the allocation between the two individuals 
rrust satisfy 
i=l, 2 i11 
All other goods are sold in the nonnal numer, allowing preferences to 
be represented by the rationed indirect utility functions 
Mh Xh 4) Uh= U(q, h=1,2 
Any division of Xl, X2 between the individuals can be represented as a 
point within an Edgeworth box of dinensions (R I, 
R2). Pareto efficient 
allocations are given by the tangency points for the U" funticm defining 
a contract curve in the usual way. The position is as below: 
n 
X2 Contract Curve 
social 
Indifference 
Curves 
The diagram is set up in the conventional way, rreasuring the allDcation 
received by individuals one and two from the bottom left-hand comer and 
01 xl 
81 
top right-hand corner respectively. (In this case a fixed availability 
of the two goods is taken as literally true, so the Edgeworth box is perhaps 
more appropriate here than in its more general usage). On the contract 
curve the tangency of the U functions guarantees that neither individual 
can be made better off without making the other worse off. The social 
valuation of. different allocatia-is is given by the social indifference 
curves, based on a welfare function V=V(Ul, U2). These curves satisfy 
the relationships 
av 3V [ aU2 ab 2 dV dX +d (-dX (-d aü ax 1 X2] ax 1 'u - X2)] X2 1 aX2 aU2 1+ X2 
av 35, av a U- 2 
dX 
[ 
. Tu -- 
1*T- 
ýu Z2 
-2 3X2 
dK2 av 351 av a U2' [ 
X1, au2a X2_ 
where X, , X2 values are measured fran the 01 origin. The resulting 
indifference curves are liable to be 'circular' with a negative slope in the 
central regions (similar distribution pattern for both goods) and positive 
slope towards the outer edges of the box (opposite distribution patterns for 
the two goods). 
. 
If 
ý 
it exists, a social optimum will occur in the interior 
of the indifference map, at a point on the contract curve. This is the 
outcome of the direct quantity allocation of Section (1), part '(a); on the 
diagr&n above it is drawn closer to 02 than 01, irrplying that individual 
one is in this case likely to have the lower incciTe. 
Using the Edgeworth Box to illustrate the alternative allocation 
n-ethods yields the following: 
sz 
X2 
C 
0i xl 
Point A is the social optimu-n, located on the contract curve, and attainable 
by the direct allocation of Section (i). With symetric social preferences 
a position such as A suggests that individual one is disadvantaged in terms 
of inccrrv--, receiving a higher allocation of x1 and x2 at the social optimm 
in partial conpensation. 
An even distribution of x1 and x2 leads to the point B exactly in 
the centre of the Edgeworth Box. This is not in general on the contract 
surve, JjTplying allocative inefficiency. 
A voucher or coupon allocation scheze with uniform purchasing power 
produces a symmtrical budget line passing through B, with slope -ý 1/ý2* 
If the 'prices' ý1 and ý2 are set to equate supply and demand, then the 
outccire is a point such as C on the contract curve. Point C is in general 
superior to B (unless they- coincide), since B is available in each individual's 
budget set but remains unchosen. Hence a voucher scheme with equal 
purchasing power and efficient pricing is at least as good as an even quantity 
allocation. 
Allocation by price gives a point on the contract curve, towards the 
bottan left-hand corner of the Edgeworth Bmc (on the assunption that 
individual two has the higher inconne and purchasing power). Although Pareto 
efficient, this outcam is inferior to C as long as the social optirmin 
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lies on the segment of the contract curve above C, favouring individual one. 
Such a position is likely to arise under normal- circumstances, and, indeed, 
probably provides the wain inducement to inplement a rationing scheme. In 
caTparison with point B the greater efficiency of price allocation rvay be 
offset by its bias towards higher income levels. The social ranking thus 
depends on the configuration of income levels, as uN--ll as on individual and 
social preferences. 
Non-linear constraints are a theoretical, if not necessarily practical, 
possibility. Relative to linear constraints, their rationale depends on the 
social value of Pareto inefficient points, where no tangency between 
indifference curves or the budget line occurs. It is possible that a Pareto 
inefficient point achieved by non-linear constraints is superior to the 
outcome of a linear constraint, depending on individual and social preferences. 
The same goes for the comparisons with price allocation or quantity rationing, 
whexe non-linear constraints are potentially but not inevitably superior. 
The fill I range of possible allocation scherres is illustrated by the 
following numerical exanple: 
Exarrple 
Suppose that there are three goods, i=1,2,3, and two individuals, 
with preferences 
= (XB 1) r- oý 
iý 
3 
(X. 
' 
(4-10)1 (X3 
The first two goods are in short supply, such that 
Y, = 60 R2 = 30 
8ý 
The rwaining good (laU otboar consuTption') is allocated on the basis of 
individual inccims, subject to a given price level p3 . Since all income 
must be spent on the third good (except under price allocation), it follows 
that 
, ýA 
mAmB 
; X- 3 p3 3 p3 
Setting arbitrary num-rical. values P3 ý"Ma= 125, MB = 216, one can write 
XA- = 125f XB- = 216. Given that no price is to be charged for the first two 33 
goods, the relevant utility functions are 
IIII 
6 
4)-6 4-10)-6 5(X. : 6(XB. )6 UA 1 UB ý1 
Social uelfare, V, takes the fom 
Výu AUB 
so that scrre value is placed on equality. 
The outcares of various possible allocation methods are as below: 
Direct Allocation (Social Cptimum) This follows fran maximising V subject 
XA + XB to X11 60, X2 + 30 
The solution is XA. = 30j 10, XB. = 30,20 11 
Hence XA = (30,10,125) XB = (30,20,216) 
12.94 U= 15.52 V= 200.83 AB 
Allocation by Pr - Prices for the first two goods are set so as to equate 
the demand for them with their availabi-lity. Using the individual demand 
functions, this rreans that 
85 
MA MB-lOPZ 
= 60 => 34'1 - 240 P, - 1OP2 =0 4p, 4p, 
MA 
+ 10 + 
MB-lOP2 
30 => 341 - 90 -- T 2- P2 ý0 4pz P2 
Solving for pl, p2 gives pi = 1.26, P2 = 3.79, implying a set of deniands 
XA. = 24.74, X'! ' 12 = 8.25,0- = 1 
35.26,4 = 21.75 
Hence XA = (24.74,8.25,62.50), XP = (35.26,21.75,89.06) 
UA=6.61 UB = 12.19 V= 80.65 
In this case the need to use inccrne in purchasing X1 arxi X2 reduces the amount 
of X3 received by both individuals. 
Quantity Rationing - The first two goods are divided evenly between the 
individuals, such that 
XA 0 30 15 
Hence X4 (30,15,125) (30,15,216) 
UA= 13.84 , UB 13.83 V= 191.43 
General Linear Constraint (Voucher Scherrie) - Individuals receive an identical 
endowment of purchasing power for goods 1 and 2 at an arbitrary face value 
of 100. * The 'voucher prices' a,, 02 must satisfy 
100 loo-loa2 
= 60 => 200 - 120 10 a=0 2ý 1,2$1 12 
100 
+ 10 + 
loo 
2 
'"2 
= 30 => 200 - 50 02 00 ýT2 ý2 
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Solving for 02 gives 1 1.33, $24, implying a set of demands 
XA. = 37.5 12.5 22.5 7.5 1 
Hence (37.5,12.5,125) XP (22.5,17.5,216) 
UA= 13.94 ,UB= 14.10 ,V= 196.56 
Non-linear Constraint Suppose that individuals face a non-linear constraint 
of the fonn 
X2 + Wý = 100 
Individual demands are such that 
X, A I 2Mý 
01 2b4 
4 2a)(h, ' 4-10 2 c-21 
Setting a and b to satisfy the equations above simultaneously with the 
resource constraints XA. +4 60, X-A + 30 yields a solution XA. = 34.32, 12 
13.63,25.68 16.36 
Hence XA (34-32,13.63,125) )3 = (25.68,16.36,216) 
UA 13.93, UB= 14.03 V 195.42 
The position diagramatically is as below: 
30 
x2 
Non-linear 
Constraint 
Quantity, 
Ration X 
-: V7oucher Scherre 
social. 
Optinim PrIce 
Al. locatiori 
08 
10 
0 60 
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The contract curve is here given by the line X'ý. ' = 3XB. on which the individual 1 10 
indifference curves have the same slope. The price, voucher and direct 
allocations all produce efficient points on the contact curve, but with 
widely differing levels of social welfare. By definition the optimal 
direct allocation must be the best of the three, and the voucher schems 
dominates price allocation. An even share out of quantities leads to 
a point off the contract curve, but its more egalitarian impact makes 
it socially preferred to the more efficient distribution by price. The 
particular non-linear constraint used here fails to improve on the linear 
voucher scheme, leaving the latter as the best of the indirect allocation 
rmthods considered. 
In general there is no definite ranking of indirect allocation schemes, 
the ccrrparison depending on the particular case considered. Suitably chosen 
linear or non-linear rationing schemes should, however, be able to inprove 
on allocation by price or quantity rations. As a feasible policy tool it 
vrjuld be hard to inprove on a linear constraint allowing individuals to 
choose their own consunption pattern within the budget set offered. This can 
be seen as nexely confirming the efficiency of consumer choice under 'monetary' 
allocation system, although the efficiency counts for little when the 
inccme distribution is highly unequal. In the absence of a thorough inccme 
redistribution it is better to set up subsidiary allocation methods for scarce 
goods, rather than relying on the conventional method of a universal monetary 
distribution system. 
It is possible to see the inposition of non-mnetary constraints as 
a roundabout way of achieving price discrimination. Under perfect 
price discrimination (charging a separate price to each individual for 
each good) the first best can always be attained. A fully flexible choice 
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of personalised prices is not achievable by the broad constraints assurred 
here, but sorre influence can nevertheless be exerted on the virtual prices 
faced by individuals. For a given incorre distribution, one can therefore 
use constraints as a rreans of shifting virtual prices towards the ideal 
set of personalised prices. The supposed benefits of uniform pricing are 
nullified when income is unevenly distributed, so there is little reason 
to preserve it. 
When direct allocation is weigl-ed against indirect, there are two 
particular situations which can be distinguished, according to whether 
or not the income distribution renuins constant: 
For af ixed, arbitrary income distribution the best outcome achievable 
is the optimal direct allocation set out in part (i) above. Indirect allocation 
methods cannot improve on this unless they influence the underlying income 
distribution, an effect assumed not to occur here. If the optimal direct 
allocation is not attained (because of inability to observe certain character- 
istics, or for some other reason), then there arises some scope for indirect 
allocation. It remains true that the government should use any directly 
observed information in its possession, but this still leaves roan for 
indirect allocation. When partial information is present the best approach 
is liable to be a mixture of the two methods, with a general functional 
fonn of constraint incorporating the available information on individuals; 
for example, one could have a voucher scheme where the allocation of purchasing 
power depends on observed individual characteristics. 
When inccrre is freely redistributed ai the basis of the available 
infonnation, the need for direct quantity allocation is renmed (except 
under the special conditions of 'specific egalitarianism'). Full information 
would lead to a genuine first-best social optimm, with no further need 
for redistribution. Partial informtion produces only a suboptimal inome 
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distribution, leaving a rationale for indirect allocation mathods. This 
could possibly be restricted to a few scarce connodities, in the manner 
assun-ed above. It is also true that indirect allocation mathods for a 
subset of 'scarce' goods can be used to influence the distribution of the 
reinaining goods. Charging monetary prices for rations (possibly negative) 
could help to alleviate incoma inequalities, which may be of value if social 
preferences are egalitarian. Stronger effects are achievable when indirect 
tams are present : the situation then is that of Guesnerie and Roberts 
(1984), where quantity controls influence tax revenue through 'forced' 
consunption of taxed coamodities. 
Unless the economy is at a first-best social optimum, there is always 
a case for allocation methods which diverge from the usual monetary allocation. 
This observation applies generally, and need not be limited to situations 
where a few goods are identified as being in short supply; the same conclusions 
would arise for any general type of production constraint. 
Conclusion 
The analysis above does not seek to diminish the attractiveness 
of monetary allocation. It remains true that a palatable income distribution, 
efficient pricing and no other constraints would be the best way to allocate 
goods. Unfortunately, the concentration of all purchasing power in the 
single income parameter (as opposed to, say, differential pricing) inplies 
that the allocation system is vulnerable to any inadequacies in the incom 
distribution. Privilege in consuming one good means privilege in consuming 
all goods. In this way the very sensitivity of monetary allocation (which 
makes it a powerful agent for redistribution) acts against it when the 
income basis is deficient. The best rezedy is to redistribute incomas, 
but failing this the next line of approach is to alter the a1location system. 
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Adding more constraints to allocation is hardly a panacea, as is demonstrated 
by the rarity of rationing and its unpopularity when it does appear. Further 
constraints could not remove any fundamental disincentives preventing redistri- 
bution (given that they are defined in quantity rather than inocne terms), 
and might not produce benefits sufficient to justify themselves as practical 
measures. The experience of the welfare state suggests that it is not 
easy-to counteract the fundamental inequalities in society (see, for exanple, 
Le Grandý(1982)). One should therefore be cautious in advocating non- 
monetary allocation, and should not give a false inpression that allocation 
through incomes and pricing is a poor distributive tool; problems should 
be blamed on the way the tool is used rather than on the tool itself. 
This leaves a pragTatic conclusion : non-monetary allocation might be useful 
to us under the prevailing conditicns, and thus deserves more attention 
than it has received in the past. 
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CHAPTER 4: OPTIMAL WEALTH TAXATION 
(1) Introduction 
Of the many dimensions of inequality between individuals, theoretical 
discussion has concentrated mainly on the distribution of income. This 
is undoubtedly an important issue, but there is also a good case for looking 
at other aspects of inequality, the most conspicuous being the ownership 
of wealth. Statistics for the U. K. and elsewhere show that wealth is distributed 
in a highly unequal fashion, considerably more so than income (see, for 
example, Lydall and Tipping (1961), Atkinson and Harrison (1978), Harrison 
(1979), and Atkinson (1983), Chapter 7). The figures are sensitive to 
the particular definition of wealth being used, and still greater dispersion 
is observed in the ownership of certain assets, such as stocks and shares. 
A desire for equality, coupled with observation of the present wealth structure, 
would suggest the need to consider wealth taxation, both from a theoretical 
and practical perspective. The conplexity of wealth holding means that 
a conprehensive theoretical discussion is virtually impossible, and the 
treatment has perforce to be selective. The rest of this introduction 
outlines some of the basic problems involved in wealth taxation, together 
with the particular approach to be used here. 
A central difficulty, facing the theoretical modelling of wealth 
is its close relationship with the economy' s instituticnal structure. In 
a capitalist economy wealth is a major source of power and influence, both 
in specifically economic affairs and in society generally. A radical redist- 
ribution of wealth could therefore expect to meet strong political resistance, 
to the extent that its political feasibility is in doubt. This seems to 
be borne out by the extensive opposition faced by even minor increases 
in taxes facing the rich, and the rapidity with which appropriate loopholes 
are found. In the NbLrxian view a complete restructuring of capital ownership 
qz 
would require a change of economic system, entai-l-ing the end of the capitalist 
mode of production. This may well be true (given the absence of counter- 
exarrples), and it is certainly likely that any economy with a very egalitarian 
wealth ownership would be substantially different from those observed at 
present. 7he organisation of production in particular cannot be expected 
to be imrme to changes in the wealth distribution. Such considerations 
inply that large scale wealth redistribution would be a difficult undertaking, 
raising issues which go beyond the normal subject boundaries of economics. 
When using sirrplified theoretical models it should not be forgotten that 
wealth ownership has substantial institutional and social aspects, which 
are not represented in a purely utilitarian and individualistic approach. 
Issues frequently raised in discussing wealth tax proposals are 
the administrative difficulties in implementing the tax. These centre 
on the many forms in which wealth can be held, and the problems of identifying 
and quantifying them. A coirprehensive definition of wealth would involve 
numerous separate iterrLs : among the possibilities are property, land, carpany 
securities, cash, bank deposits, life insurance policies, future pension 
rights and (as is sometimes argued) human capital, in the form of expected 
future earnings. Several of these assets are subject to fluctuating market 
prices, and are difficult to value accurately. Those items dependent on 
future expectations (such as pension rights or human capital) are the most 
problematical, and can only be treated inexactly using probabilistic assessments 
highly sensitive to the specific assurrptions made. Consequently a wide 
ranging definition of wealth can only provide an approximate tax base, 
and is likely to mean significant administrative costs in obtaining the 
required information. A further administrative issue is the prevention 
of tax avoidance and evasion, so as to guarantee that the ncminal tax rates 
are actually being paid. This will be an especially important concern 
with capital and wealth taxes, given that some individuals stand to lose 
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a great deal from high tax -rates. Illegal non-payrrent (tax evasion) could 
potentially be removed by stricter enforcement of the tax laws, presumably 
involving higher administrative expenditure. Where non-payment is legal 
(tax avoidance), there is little that can be done to restore the intended 
tax rates unless the definition of the tax is adjusted to remove the loopholes. 
In practice the movement has often been the other way round, with influential 
pressure groups securing legislation to introduce loopholes which lessen 
their tax burden. One can foresee that even if a substantial wealth tax 
were to be introduced, it would face continuing difficulties in its operation. 
Assuming that the political and administrative obstacles can be 
surmounted, there arises the question of the design of a wealth tax. Cne 
possibility is an annual tax on wealth, according to some given definition, 
similar to the approach used for income taxes. Such taxes have been applied 
on a limited scale in soma European countries, although never on a national 
basis in the U. K. They have occasionally been advocated (Flem-ning and 
Little (1974)), but local authority 'rates' remain the only significant 
annual property tax. The other main approach is to tax the transfer of 
wealth, rather than wealth holding, by imposing a tax on bequests or inheritances. 
This has been the wain method applied in the U. K., although the taxes have 
always been easy to avoid (increasingly so in recent years; see Sandford 
(1983)), and have not brought about any dramatic changes in the wealth 
distribution. Taxation of wealth holding and transfer are not incompatible, 
and a full policy optimum is liable to include both to some degree. Inheritance 
issues are considered enpirically by Harbury and Hitchens (1979) and 
theoretically by 14--ade (1964,1973) and Stiglitz (1969). The discussion 
in this chapter concentrates instead on taxes within a given generation, 
that is, on a wealth tax in the literal sense. This does not inply that 
bequest or inheritance taxes are less effective redistributive tools, and 
it is, in fact, possible to argue the opposite case (Atkinson (1972)). 
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Even when attention is restricted to wealth taxes, there rervain several 
ways in which the tax can be defined. These issues will be considered 
in the following sections. 
Within an optimal policy mcdel, a wealth tax does not incur the 
same disincentives as an income tax, but other forms of individual response 
may be present. Two important effects are the shifting of wealth between 
different assets and the impact of the tax on saving behaviour. The former 
is essentially the tax avoidance issue, whereby the imposition of a wealth 
tax induces wealth holders to transfer their wealth into untaxed assets 
or to move it abroad. The extent to which this occurs depends on the costs 
involved, and whether or not the introduction of the tax is fully anticipated. 
This aspect is considered in Section (4), and in practice is closely bound 
up with administrative issues, as well as the purely economic effects of 
the tax. A saving disincentive may arise because an annual wealth tax 
reduces the -net returns to wealth, and consequently disrupts the pattern 
of wealth accumulation. one way to consider this is within the context 
of economic growth models, as in Atkinson and Sandmo (1980). Attention 
here is focused more on the redistributixe role of wealth taxation, where 
social welfare depends on the current consunption levels of individuals, 
which in turn are influenced by wealth taxation. Nevertheless, it is important 
to be aware of the numerous links between wealth ownership and production, 
which could lead to tax effects different from those represented in models 
of interpersonal redistribution. 
The discussion of this chapter is divided as follows. Section (2) 
considers taxes based solely on the current observed wealth of individuals, 
without taking account of the taxpayer's total lifetim wealth. Section 
(3) allows taxes to be inposed on lifetime or Itruel wealth, which can 
be accouplished in a life-cycle model by letting tax rates depend on the 
Is 
individual's age as well as the current wealth level. Section (4) looks 
at the issues which nust be faced when the introduction of taxation is 
anticipated by taxpayers. 
(2) Optimal Taxation of. Current Wealth 
The rrK)st basic annual. wealth tax depends on estimates of each individual' s 
current wealth at the date when the tax is inposed. This neglects the 
possibility of systematic variation in wealth holding over the life cycle, 
so that current wealth may not be a reliable indicator of an individual's true 
wealth (Atkinson (1971. a & b). For exanple, at a given level of current 
wealth the taxpayer could be a relatively poor person at an age when wealth 
is near the maximum or a relatively rich one at an age when it is near 
the minimum. To separate these individuals it may be preferable to base 
taxes instead on 'true' 1-ifetirre wealth, by including information on the 
person's age in the tax system. The policy outcome depends significantly 
on which approach is used; taxes on current wealth are discussed in this 
section, and taxes on true wealth in Section (3). 
The policy framework is the same as previously, with the govenurent 
aiming to maximise social welfare by means of redistributive taxation. 
Individuals ae assurred to organise their saving and consurrption in a rational 
manner over the life cycle, following the optimal saving of Ramsey (1928). 
It can be argued that most individuals do not save in such a systematic 
fashion, and that there would be little response to marginal changes in 
tax rates. This could well be the case, but the life-cycle model has the 
virtue of enphasising any disincentives present, and thus errs on the pessimistic 
side. QBnerally, the less is the individual behavioural response the greater 
are the prospects for redistribution, so any inaccuracy in this respect does 
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not diminish the value of wealth taxation. Savings are sometimes modelled 
as being determined on class lines, arising mainly out of profit as opposed 
to wage incorre, or alternatively as being institutional in nature. These 
views are quite compatible with a role for personal wealth taxation, and, 
if anything, suggest a lesser degree of difficulty with individual disincentives 
(leaving aside the possible institutional aspects). The theoretical approach 
taken below can be seen as exaggerating rather than underestimating the 
saving disincentive from taxing personal wealth. 
It is assumed that the population differs only in initial wealth 
holdings, K0, distributed as F(K 0 
), and returns to wealth are the only 
income source. Activity is restricted to consuning part of interest income 
and saving the zest, although it would be straightforward to include eriployrrent 
in the model. Consurrption of income yields utility U(C), where C is consuTption 
and U satisfies UI(C) > 0, U"(C) <0 (so that utility is derived only 
from the income return to wealth, not from wealth itself). Time is continuous, 
and individuals have a known life span, with a certain value being placed 
on wealth left over at the terminal date, T. The individual objective 
is to maximise the discounted intertenporal sum of utilities plus the value 
of terminal wealth 
,T 
U* e- Pt U(C t) dt +e 
-pT z(KT) 
t=O 
where p is the discount rate on future utility, Z is the current valuation 
of terminal wealth and Kt denotes the capital held at date t, for te [0, T]. 
Income returns to wealth are linear, equal to rKt. but a non-linear formulation 
could also be used if preferred. Wealth taxation is described by the general 
function B(K t ), leaving a net return to wealth of rKt-B(K t ); the tax can 
q7 
also be interpreted as levied on the incone derived from wealth, and a 
I 
clear distinction between wealth and incom taxes appears only when alternative 
incorre sources are introduced. By definition all incon-e at a given date 
nust either be consurred or saved, iffplying the condition 
rK t- B(K tKt+ Ct 
where the dot denotes differentiation with respect to time, so that 
ýt 
is saving at time t. The individuals full optimal saving problem is to 
maximise U subject to 
ýt 
= rKt - B(Kt) -Ct Vt 
K=( 
00 
for some fixed level of initial wealth, K0. A solution can be obtained 
by optimal control methods, with K as a state variable and C as a control. 
The Hamiltonian and first-order conditions are: 
H= e-Pt U(C) + e-pt X[r-K-B(K)-C] 
Hc= e-Pt Uo(C) - e7Pt X=0 U'(C) 
0 
HK ý-- e- Pt r-B I (K) -e'- 
Ot X+ -'p e- PtX 
with transversality condition XTý UI(CT) = ZI(KT) 
Substituting for X in the condition for K inplies that 
t= -U'(C t) 
(r-p-BI(K 
t 
vt 
Ulf( ct) 
which is a standard optin-ality condition for a saving problem. A relationship 
of this type applies to all individuals, with the appropriate K0 superscript. 
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The population is constant and in a steady state, so that the cross- 
sectional distribution f(K 0) 
is invariant over tinne and fonns the basis 
of utilitarian social welfare. In reality the position is almost certainly 
much more coirplicated, with the presence of population growth, inheritance 
behaviour and general uncertainty about life spans. Policy design including 
all these features could. only be undertaken over a long-term planning horizon, 
and would be difficult to mc)del theoretically. Although a steady-state 
model must in literal terms be inaccurate, it can be viewed as an approximation 
to a society with a relatively stable population arid pattern of wealth 
ownership. Assuming a steady state means that there is no redistribution 
of true, rather than current, wealth; individuals are unidimensional and 
differentiated only by their true wealth, K0, which has a distribution 
invariant aver time. The current wealth tax B(K t) 
does not distinguish the 
age of the wealth holder, and. consequently cannot bring about any changes 
in the underlying distribution f(K 
0 
). Inheritance behaviour would in practice 
rrean that f(K 0) 
is linked in sorre way with terminal wealth, leading inevitably 
to variations over tiffe in f(K 0 
). This is absent fran the present model, 
so there is no explanation of wealth transmission between generations. 
Under the assumptiom- above, the gavenvuent Is policy problem can 
be viewed in tems of a single generation born at the sarre date and living 
through the conyron life span of 0 to T. If consuaption and current wealth 
are indexed by the initial wealth holding, %, then social preferences can 
be written as 
V=J. 
K 
0[ 
IT 
e--Ptu(c 
K0) 
dt +e -PT Z(KT) f (K ) d% 
K t=o 
I 
assuming a standard utilitarian form. For the budget to balance at each 
date it nust be the case that 
jq 
K0TK 
RK 
It=o 
B (Kto) dt f (K 
0) 
dK 
0 
where R is the revenue requimrent in each period. The governrrent's problem 
is to choose B(K) to maxiinise V, subject to the revenue constraint and 
the individual optimal saving conditions above. This is potentially highly 
corrplex, and a conplete analysis is not given here. Some idea of the issues 
involved can be gained by considering the likely tirre paths of current 
wealth holdings. These will in general adhere to a 'hurrp saving' pattern 
(Harrod (1948)), as below 
Currert 
Wealth 
K -44 K K t 0 
Kp- I III p 
ylýr 
t2t2 
Age, t 
The diagram shows the probable life-cycle saving behaviour of two individuals, 
designated 'wealthy' and 'poor' according to their initial wealth holdings, 
KW and KP. With the sarre preferences current wealth holdings wiU usually 00 
be an increasing function of K0 at all dates, so that the two tirre paths 
do not cross. It can be seen from the diagram that certain current wealth 
levels, such as K ,- are held by both individuals at two separate stages 
of the life cycle; the poorer individual holds K* at ages closer to the 
centre of the life span, so that tW<tP and tP<tWA tax inposed on 112 2* 
current wealth K therefore-influences the saving-behaviour of both individuals 
too 
at two distinct ages, and the same is true for other current wealth levels. 
More extreme values of current wealth may not be held at all by certain 
individuals, or held only once. Given that the optimal saving paths a 
functions of the wealth tax rate, the choice of B(K) is clearly going to 
have an intricate effect on saving patterns, and the nature of the optimal 
B(K) need not be straightforward. As often occurs with non-linear taxation 
general conclusions about the shape of the optimal tax schedule are not 
available. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to rrake scme observations about the 
signs of marginal tax rates. In particular, it cannot be guaranteed that the 
optLmal tax schedule B (K) has non-negative marginal tax rates at all levels 
of current wealth (as might be expected). To show this, suppose that there 
exists an optimLn at which B*'(K) >, 0 at all K, including the highest observed 
value fenax. It is knowm that leax is attained only by the wealthiest group 
of individuals at their naxinum current wealth. Suppose that the next 
wealthiest group has a discretely lower K0 value, so that a change in the 
marginal tax rate at 1(max affects only those with true wealth K0. This 
is a reasonable assun-ption, since at the upper extrerves of the wealth distribution 
we am rrK)re likely to be talking about discrete individuals than continuous 
groups. Let B denoted by 0, be reduced 
mn, ginally to ý-da, and consider the effect on the optimal saving plan 
of the wealthiest individual. Differentiating the savings constraint with 
respect to a gives 
ai 
=a( 
3K) 
= (r-B I (K) ) 
3K 3C 
Ta at aa Ba aa 
and differentiating the tenninal condition U'(CT) =ZI (KT) yields 
acr 3KT 
Ulf( = Z11( T) CT) aa 
K 
35 
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These relations can be depicted on a phase diagram relating aK / to ac /Sa ze 
as below 
Terminal Condition. 
taKN 
= ý-aF) 
T/ 
11 
The equation-, 
a-t 0 is a straight line with slope /r-BI(K) , above 
which 
aK is rising and below which 
aK is falling. It rotates about 
the origin as K varies over tirre, but is positively sloping as long as 
taxation does not overcorre the interest return to wealth. The terminal 
condition is also linear, with slope U''(C T) /Z 
I (KT) > 0, and may or may 
not be steeper than 
a/, 
t 
( aK / 
aý 
)=0 (as makes no difference in this case). 
Since a change in a has no influence on K0, the tine path of 
aK / 
aa against 
aC/ 
aý on 
the phase diagram must start on the 
ac / 
3a axis. Under plausible 
assumptions 
ac 
0/ aa >0 also 
holds true. To see this consider the fact that 
6<- W/U"(r-p-ý+ dý). If - U"/U1 falls with higher C (decreasing absolute 
risk aversion), then lower consuffption. at Olax is required to restore the 
optimal saving condition. For K <1ýý there is no change in tax rates, and 
the tirre path of consuTption is governed by the same equation as previously. 
ac 
Lower consurrption at Oax is achievable only if 0/ as > 
0, reducing the 
values of (ý and C at each given level of K; saving then proceeds more quickly 
and KPax is attained in a slightly shorter period. On the phase diagran, 
the tirre path of 
3K 
/30 against 
ac 
/a, starts at a point Like A and finishes 
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on the tenrdna-IL condition line, never going above the 
3K /3ý axis. It'. 
follows that a zeduction of the m3rginal tax rate at the top end of the 
scale leads to an increase in wealth holdings at all points of the life 
cycle. The effect on the tirre path of Kt is as below 
post tax 1. 
currezit / change I 
Wealth, oux 
K t 
pre tax 
change 
Age, t 
T 
with the individual induced to enter the new tax range beyond the previous 
Oax (although, unlike the above diagram, the effect is infinitesimal). 
Because current wealth is higher at all ages and B*I(K) >, 0, it nust be 
the case that revenue receipts frCR the wealthiest individual are increased 
by the tax change. This applies even if B*1(1ýý) was originally zero, 
as the decreased tax paid at the single point 
0 ax is outweighed by the 
increased tax receipts elsewhere in the life cycle. The wealthiest individual 
nust be better off after the tax change (since the initial savings path 
could still have been chosen) and nobody else is affected (given the discrete 
separation of R0), so there exists a perturbation in the tax schedule which 
both adds to governmant revenue and increases social welfare. It cannot 
therefore be true that B*M is optimal, and the true optimLun has a negative 
nurginal, tax rate at sorre point of the tax schedule. Such an outcone does 
not match the conventional view of redistributive wealth taxes, and suggests 
that this type of model could lead to caTplex and counter- intuitive tax optima. 
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The result is stronger than those typically found under optiffal non-linear 
incorre taxes (Seade (1977)), since muginal tax rates are here known to 
be negative at some point, rather than zero. 
Evidently current wealth taxation is not an ideal redistributive 
tool in an economy with overlapping life-cycle savings patterns. The problem 
is basically that the tax iffpo. %d on any particular wealth level ffust be 
paid by all individuals holding that wealth, regardless of the stage they 
have reached in the life cycle. The tax cannot therefore distinguish the 
true wealth levels of taxpayers, which hanpers its ability to inplerrent 
. redistribution. Such 
difficulties are reduced where there is -little overlap 
between individual life-cycle patterns, so that current wealth holding 
gives a better indication of true wealth (although a large overlap inplies 
that there is less need for redistribution in the first place). In the 
extreme case of no overlap between wealth holdings at any stages in the 
life cycle it would be possible to identify true wealth from current wealth 
holdings, allowing a full redistribution of true wealth. This can also 
occur if no life-cycle saving behaviour is taking place, with capital holdings 
constant, and current wealth accurately indicating true wealth. In populations 
with overlapping wealth patterns, however, the shortcomings of a tax on 
current wealth encourage the inclusion of information on true wealth in 
the tax system. This possibility is considered in the next section. 
(3) 22timl Taxation of Tnie Wealth 
When capital holdings vary aver the life cycle, observation of current 
wealth is insufficient to indicate I true I wealth, interpreted as total 
lifetime consumption plus any termixial wealth. At the most, if the individual's 
preferences are known, observation of current wealth gives a range of possible 
true wealth values within which an individual lies. If true wealth is 
loý 
to be identified, then information must be 'dated' by the individual' s 
age, regardless of the particular point in the life cycle observed. Information 
on true wealth (assuming known preferences) can be derived fran observing 
the initial or terminal wealth level, the wealth holding at any age in 
between, or the current value of the total lifetine wealth at any age. 
True wealth as defined here is essentially a two-dkrKmsional entity, involving 
a current wealth value (either the current holding or a current valuation 
of lifetine wealth) and the age of the individual by whan it is held. 
Taxes in the previous section were based only on the current wealth dimension, 
neglecting the age dinension; it is equally possible to have the opposite, 
with a 'wealth' tax based only on the age dimension. But for wealth taxation 
to be inplenented in the true sense of the term, the aisn should be to tax 
true wealth, allowing both for current wealth and age. The discussion 
below considers the issues involved when redistributive taxes are based 
on true wealth. 
Suppose that individuals have identical preferences, but differ 
in their true wealth endcmmnts, denoted by their wealth at age zero, 
Life spans are assumed to be infinite, and the population is in steady 
state, such that its cross-section is equivalent to the life cycle of 
a single individual. At each date a new generation of fixed size, H, is 
born, possessing a given exogeneous distribution of wealth endavamntsf, 
f(K 
0 
). As in Section (2), individuals pursue optimal saving beh-M 
subject to an interest return, r, and a common utility discount rateý p. 
The government can observe %, and isýtherefore able to tax true wealth. 
Basic Case : the Desirability of a Redistributive Capital 
The goverment wishes to maximise a social welfare objective of 
the form 
los 
K 
0 
v 
IK 
0ý 
t=O 
t u(C t 
') dt f(K. ) df% 
where () is the discount rate applied to utilities. If 0=0, then V can 
be seen as taking a cross-sectional fonn, whereas 0>0 suggests that 
the goverment is discounting the future utilities of each generation. 
Observability of K0 rreans that a tax schedule b(K 0) can 
be inposed. 
Assurre initially that p=0, so that the pattern of individual savings 
exactly mirrors the governuent's. With no conflict over saving behaviour 
it remains only for the government to impose redistributive taxes on initial 
wealth, subject to a budget constraint 
K 
0 
b(K 
0)K0f 
(K 
0) 
dK 
0=0 
Given that UI I (C) < 0, it is always optirral to equalise, initial wealth 
holdings, so that 
K -K 
b*(K 00 
0K 
0 
where RO is rrean initial wealth. Taxation of this sort has no irregtqar 
ab 
=K0 features, and is always progressive in average tenns, with 31ý0 /K2 >0 0 
No further taxation is needed at later dates, and the outcorm is a first 
best. 
When p00 there is disagreermnt between individuals and the govemrmnt 
over optimal saving behaviour. The most likely case is where p>0, so 
that individuals discount utility at a higher rate than the government 
this happens, for instance, when a cross-section social welfare objective 
is being used. 7he divergence in saving attitudes can be removed if an 
appropriate flat rate wealth tax (or, equivalently, an interest rate tax) 
is used to influence individual saving. If a constant tax of b is in-posed, 
then optimal saving satisfies the relation 
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-U' U, p-b) 
The govemnent, on the other band, would like to adhere to the tin-e path 
6= 'Ulf (r-. e) 
Coaparing the two equations, settir., g a constant tax of b=0-. p is enough 
to rmove the discrepancy between thern. When 0>pa positive tax is 
inposed in order to slow down individual savings, whereas 0<p (the more 
likely case) leads to a subsidy to encourage wealth accunulation. As previously, 
a first date set of wealth transfers can be kplerrented to equalise true 
wealth holdings. It memins only to caThine these policies within a single 
revenue constraint. For each generation the current value (at age zero) 
of the receipts fran the interest rate tax is 
-R (Kt) = (0-p) 00 e t(Kt) 
dt -rtKt 
0 
t=o 
where Kt. is the aggregate capital holding on the optirral saving path and 
R0 is the associated revenue requiremant. R0 rises in magnitude with aggregate 
(post redistribution) initial wealth Kt, and so Kt is determined by the 00 
relation 
K 
Kf (1ý0) dKo =Kt+ R(K 
t 
000 
where the left-hand side is the exogenous aggregate wealth endoment. 
The policy optinum therefore takes the form: 
At t=O 
Redistributive wealth transfers 
-R0 
b( 
K0 -%+ /H 
Kd 
K 
0 
At all other t 
Interest rate taxation 
b= 0- p 
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with R0 satisfying the relations above. Taxes are divided into two distinct 
elerrents, a set of wealth transfers inposed at the outset, and an invariant 
interest rate tax guiding subsequent saving behaviour. 
In practical terms the redistributive element of the optimum is 
best described as a capital levy, involving a oom and for all rearrangermnt 
of a particular generation's assets. An annual redistributive wealth tax 
is not needed, and the role of annual taxation is restricted to the encouragerrent 
or discouragement of saving. Strictly speaking, a fully anticipated levy 
can be imposed at any stage of the life cycle, since it is based on invariant 
lifetime wealth. The choice of implementation at age zero is therefore 
arbitrary, although it seem as reasonable an assunption as any. At later 
dates the initially wealthy might be tempted to over-consurm at early ages 
to prevent paynent of their tax bill; if this did happen, it might lead 
to bargaining equivalent to that in Section (4). The scope for strategic 
suboptimal saving is rrdnirdsed by early wealth redistribution, as in the 
model. Otherwise the instantaneous nature of a capital levy removes any 
saving disincentives, leading to a first-best outcome. 
Exception: Increasing Returns to Wealth 
A single-date redistribution of assets can be regarded as the basic 
wealth tax optinium whenever true wealth is identified. The one wajor 
exception is when increasing returns. to wealth are present, so that a larger 
stock of wealth generates a higher income per unit of capital. In these 
circumstances an equalisation of true individual wealth ndnin-Lises total 
income, creating a potential conflict between the redistributive desire 
to equalise consuWtion and the need to achieve the highest possible aggregate 
inccme. -The difficulty can be avoided by adopting a centralised solution, 
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in which all wealth is held by the government, and saving decisions are 
made collectively rather than by individuals. Instead of equalising inital 
wealth, the government confiscates the endowments into a central fund and 
subsequently pays out uniform incomes at the level ccn-rrensurate with optimal 
aggregate saving. Where individual saving opportunities renain open, the 
government can ensure voluntary ccrrpliance with its plans by offering to 
subsidise private returns to wealth up to the social level. if, for 
instance, M(K) denotes returns to wealth (with M'>O, M">O), then a 
guaranteed return to private wealth of (1/N)M(NK) ensures that individual 
saving plans coincide with the government's. Since incomes conform to the 
optimal consuirption pattern, it follows that individuals choose to consume 
their current incomes; no private savings occurs, and there is no need 
actually to pay out the (hypothetical) subsidy. Wealth holding in these 
circumstances is a 'natural monopoly', requiring a-concentration of wealth 
in order for a first best to be attained. Although the implications for 
w-alth ownership are very different fran the standard case, the inpact on 
consurrption patterns is similar, and in the present frarrework individuals 
are no worse off for the loss of their private vRalth holdings. A real 
policy conflict arises only if a decentralised solution is felt to have 
scm intrinsic value, to be set against the associated loss of aggregate 
inccrm. 
Regardless of whether or not the model produces a centralised 
optimm, one can always avoid saving disincentives by taxing lifetime wealth. 
Compared with Section (2) the only additional information requirement is 
to know an individual's age, something which is well defined and readily 
observed. It may not be easy in practice to estimate lifetime wealth, 
but the main difficulties are common to a current or lifetirm definition, 
IN 
so that current wealth based masures have no real advantage on these 
grounds. Saving disincentives need not be a major obstacle to w-alth 
redistribution, provided that policy concentrates on lifetime w-alth. 
(4) Anticipation of Tax Irrplen-entation 
Given the outccme of Section (3), the main obstacle to wealth 
redistribution is likely to be tax avoidance. This section considers the 
problems posed when tax inplerrentation is anticipated by wealth holders. 
In practice a wealth tax cannot easily be introduced without wealth 
holders having foreknowledge of the policy measures. If an extensive 
wealth redistribution results from an open democratic decision, then the 
w-althy have both the incentive and the opportunity to find out about it 
and take appropriate action. At the very least they can consume much of 
their uealth before taxes are enforced. (Aumann and Kurz (1977)), and they 
can probably do better than this by finding a means of tax avoidance; for 
instance, by converting vealth into alternative untaxed form or by 
transferring it abroad to somewhere with lower tax rates. When such 
responses occur, it is in the goverment's interest to make specific 
allawance for them in formulating policy. 
Ito 
To model this theoretically one has to make a distinction between 
the date at which policy decisions are made and the date at which they 
are irrplerrented. The steady-state frarrework in the previous sections fails 
to do so, leaving no tirre period when the tax regirm is not in force and 
avoidance can occur. The discussion below instead uses a sinple two date 
rrudel, with a delay between the fornulation and introduction of policy: 
at date one a public decision is made about policy rreasures, which are 
then fully anticipated at date two. It is convenient to distinguish between 
general anticipation by all individuals and a case where anticipation concerns 
only a wealthy subset of the population. 
GeneEally Anticipated Tax 
In this case all individmi-s are aware of the f irst-date policy measures, 
and nuke an appropriate response at the second date. Since the whole population 
is involved, it is assuTed that individual responses are unco-ordinated 
and that the model is non-co-operative in nature. 
All individuals are identical apart from their initial wealth, and 
rrake a single consurption/saving decision at date one. If K is wealth 
at date one and Cl, C2 are consuaption at dates one and two respectively, 
then the budget constraint is C2= (1+r)(K-CI). The individual chooses 
C1 to maximise 
U* = U(C + 
U((1+r) (K-C 
1+p 
yielding an optirnal-ity condition 
U, (C 1+r U, (C 1 1+ p2 
Mirginal utilities at each date are equated, with a suitable allowance 
for the interest and discount rates. 
If the goverrumnt's taxation ignores anticipation effects, it airns 
to maximise social welfare at date two; with uti-litarian social preferences 
this sinply mans an equalisation of whatever wealth is held at that tirre. 
Facing such taxes the i 
th individual can expect a second date consumption 
of 
C21 (1+r) (K-C') + NI joi 
where denotes the anticipated date two wealth (before taxation) of other 2 
individuals and N is the size of the population. Optirral saving then satisfies 
(1+r) U, (C 11-13) 1) 13) 
U' (C2 
with given by the equation above. First clate consurrption therefore 2 
depends on expectations of the behaviour of others, which may or rray not 
be accurate.. The Larger are the anticipated wealth holdings of others, the 
smaller is first period saving. In general, out of any savings the individual 
can consume only a fraction 
1+r IN in period two, so if N is large the 
marginal returns to saving are close to zero. This is partly counteracted 
by the rise in U' (C 2) as saving falls and by possible low anticipated values 
of other people's saving, but these effects are l1kely to be outweighed 
by the impact of the redistributive taxation. Equalisation of date two 
consumption can therefore be expected to induce a collapse of saving behaviour 
and considerable reduction of date two consumption. The outcome can easily 
be worse in social welfare terms than the no policy situation, and there 
is little justification for undertaking redistribution in this way. 
liz 
If the governrrent is to naximise social welfare, it must make allowance 
for individual anticipation of policy responses. Suppose that in the two 
period model above, the population is divided into two groups, a 'wealthy' 
group comprising a proportion aW of the population and owning initial wealth 
KW, and a 'poor' group comprising ap = 1- aW of the population and each 
owning wealth. KP. The government wishes to set fu-Uy anticipated taxes 
bý and bP which maximise social welfare over both periods and satisfy a 
revenue constraint 
aWbW(l+r) + (1-a 
w )b'(l+r) 
where taxes are inposed on net wealth at the start of the second period. 
Provided that the govenment is aware of individual anticipation effects, 
it is able to inpose them as constraints on the optirral policy decision. 
Individuals adhere to the condition 
ul (C (1+r)(1-b) Ul((l+r)(1-b)(K-Cl)) 
1+p 
for both wealthy and poor groups. The outccn*e of this adjustuent can be 
sum*arised by the functions Cli(bi), j---w, p, giving the response of first 
date consuription to the rate of wealth taxation. It is probable that 
acl] / @bj ý* 
0' so that rising taxes reduce saving and increase first period 
consunption, although the opposite effect is also conceivable (through 
a rising b causing a sufficiently Large ircmase in the mirginal utility 
of consuaption in the second period). Either way round the noven-ents of C 
lead to a disincentive constraint which has to be allowed for in policy 
fonftilation. Assuming utilitarian social preferences, the optirml tax 
problem is as be1w: 
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U(C *j + -. 
E- ((l+r)(1-bi)(Kj-C*j 1 1+. P J--w p 
[xjý 
1 
R+ (1+r) . 
2: ajbj(Ki-C*j 
i WIP II 
aL 
aj(l+r)(KI-C 
* 3) 
Ul (C]2) 
+ paj(l+r)(K 
j 
-Cj 
ab3 1 1+. p 1 
ii(l+r)ajbj 
ac 1 
Ul (CI) 
3b 
2 
=> 
P) 
bi ac*lj- 
[ 
(K]-C*lj 3bj. 
* 
Without the adjustment effects on C, the cptimxn sirrply equates the MU 
of govenumnt revenue, p, with the discounted second date mirginal utilities 
of consurrption for both individuals; second date consunption is equalised 
3C 
* 
if preferences are identical. The presence of a non-zero 1/ clearly ab 
disrupts the preferred social optimxm The rmst probable outcorre is that 
3C *. ij 
1, > 0, j---w, p, and that the wealthy are paying positive taxes, so 3b 
that bý > 0, while the poor are either being subsidised, such that bp< 0, 
or are paying a substantially lower tax rate than the wealthy. This yields 
the relations UI(C 
W)<U, (C? and 
W CP- irrplying that the wealthy are 2 2) Cý 21 
able to prevent an equaLization of date two wealth by transferring their 
consurrption to the first period. Cn the other hand, if the reversed saving 
ýC*. W 
disincentive 1 /ýb <0 holds true, then the wealthy can possibly have 
lower second date consunption than the poor. R3gardless of the precise 
form of the policy optinun, it is apparent that the desired extent of redistributio 
is not achieved, despite the full observability of aU relevant characteristics. 
The only disincentive allooed in this case has been the adjustrrent 
of first period consunption, or, in other words, the individual saving 
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decision. Indeed, the two period model is sometimes used as a sinple version 
of the life-cycle savings frairework of the previous two sections. Although 
both are concerned with savings disincentives, however, the approach taken 
here is significantly different from the previous sections. In the format 
of Section (3), the government can tax wealth in all periods. achieving 
a first best by equalising initial wealth. The crucial feature of the 
present model is the existence of the pre-tax period, which allows individual 
adjustments to take place. and not the presence of individual saving. 
Anticipation effects can take alternative forms. and these may in practice 
be more effective (see below). Policy anticipation in a sense revives 
the saving disincentives found lacking in Section (3), but the underlying 
behavioural. response is really a tax avoidance measure rather than a true 
saving decision. 
Any rradel representing anticipation of policy rrust essentially have 
a two-period structure, with the date of tax irrplerientation dividing the 
nudel into pre- and post-tax periods. One feature neglected in the above 
two-period nx)del is the fact that the post-tax period is likely to be longer 
in duration than the pre-tax period for most individuals. This would give 
greater weighting to the post-tax period (albeit reduced by any future 
utility discoLmting), and would lessen the value of consuming a large part 
of personal wealth before the taxes are inposed. The government's position 
nay thexefore be stronger in practice than in the nudel considered here. 
A higher degree of tax avoidance is attainable if strategic 
bargaining behaviour takes place (Aunann and Kurz (1977)), or ifwealth 
can be converted into untaxed forms. These two possibilities are considered 
below. 
I 1.5 
Concerted Tax Avoidance :a Bargaining Model 
The crux of wealth redistribution is the treatrrent of the highly 
unequal. wealth ownership found at the top end of the scale, and those 
taxes inposed in practice have genezally been limited to individuals above 
a certain level of wealth. The issues at stake largely between the 
governaent and the very wealthy, and the latter have rruch greater incentives 
to avoid taxes than the average person. In. the model considered below, 
anticipation applies only to a relatively small subset of wealthy individuals, 
and the reminder of the population pay taxes passively without any behavioural 
adjustnent. This is not an especially inplausible picture of reality, 
considering that the wealthy generally have greater access both to information 
and to the facilities for tax avoidance. 
Let the model take a similar form to that above. with two groups 
in the population and early consurrption as'the sole n-eans of avoiding the second 
date taxation; other form of tax avoidance could easily be included, but 
would not change the fundarrental nature of the outcorre. ' Policy anticipation 
applies only to the wealthy group, who form a small and horm9eneous, part 
of the population. If this group can be unified in its response to redistributive 
taxes, then it can attain a better position than it would by responding 
individually to taxation policy. It is assumd hem that such ba=nious 
action occurs, whether or not by conscious agreerrent. The wealthy are 
thus confronting the govermi--nt in a ganre theoretical situation, and strategies 
are defined by date one consunption and the wealth tax rate respectively. 
Because the poor do not anticipate the tax (or do not act on their anticipation), 
their behaviour is predictable to the other agents, and plays only an incidental 
role in the gaffe. The gan-e structure can be described by 
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Govenimnt 
Wealthy 
Strategy Payoff 
b wuý Uý Up. 1' 2' V UP2) 
el 
1+ UW2 
1+p, 
where b is the tax rate on the wealthy in the second period. Choice of 
b and Cw autcmatica. Uy detern-dnes 
w, bp, Cp and Cý, via the goven-urent 1 Cý 1 
revenue constraint, the budget constraint of the wealthy and the known 
saving behaviour of the poor. Within this frarrework it is in the cc)rrrrDn 
interest of the government and the wealthy t: ) find a co-operative solution 
through bargaining, rather than to accept the non-co-operative position. 
This does not necessarily rrean that organised bargaining takes place, and 
co-operation can take the form of a tacit understanding of the responses 
of each side to the strategies pursued by the other. A Nash bargaining 
solution is obtainable in the usual way, given a pair of optinal threats 
and a set of feasible payoff pairs. For the wealthy the most potent threat 
is that of consun-dng all their wealth at date one, so that CWl = KW; for 
the government it is to set b to unity. The government's threat presents 
a difficulty in that it rray not always be a rational course of action in 
the event of a failure in bargaining. In social welfare term it nay be 
preferable to set b<1 in such a way as to equalise second date inccrres 
(under separability of social welfare over tine), inplying that in a 'perfect' 
equilibrium the governnent is restricted to a weaker threat than b=1. 
The set of feasible payoff pairs is defined by the assumd payoff functions, 
conbined with the bounds inposed on the strategic variables. It is ccnpact 
but not necessarily convex, neaning that the existence of a solution can 
be guaranteed, but not uniqueness. 
To illustrate the nature of the bargaining outcorm, an algebraic 
exwTple is worked out below. Prefeia--nces are chosen for ease of calculation, 
rather than plausibility. 
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Example 
let N= size of population 
aN= number of 'wealthy' individuals 
(1-a)N = nuaber of 'Poor' individuals 
KW, KP = initial capital holdings of wealthy and poor individuals 
Utility at each date is synonyrrDus with consurrption, so that total uti I ity 
is 
uj C] c 12 j=W, P 1+p 
Social preferences are maxin-dn, for the interteaporal sum of utilities, 
that is 
v= min 
j+ 
I C2j W, P J+r) 
This is more egalitarian than utilitarianism, and avoids any irrationality 
of the governmnt's threat of b--l. 
The linearity of individual preferences neans that all consurrption 
is concentrated at the first or second date according to whether p is greater 
than or less than r. In the former case second date taxation is clearly 
powerless, so it is assumed that r>p. Individuals would ideally like 
to consume all their wealth at date two, and this is always true of the 
poor group (who do not anticipate taxes, and in any case benefit from them). 
The wealthy, however, face the threat of a punitive tax rate at date two 
and may choose to consme part of their wealth at date one. 
The payoff functioris for the wealthy and the govemnent are such that 
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www c (K -C 
1+r (1-b) 1 Enip 
CP 'ff 2= 
[KP 
+ (1ýýýW1)bl 71+rý 
i+ p 
where the goverment Is revenue requirerrent is assurmd to be zero. 
.W The optinal threats for the wealthy and the governrrent are C 
and b=l respectively, producing payoffs TrW = KW, 719 Kp(! -+r 14 P) 
The Nash bargaining solution is obtained by maximising 
(7rW-KW) (7fg-O (1+r/ 1+, p) ) 
subject to the above equations for iT 
w 
and, lT9, and to the conditions 
.W 0<c14 KW 004b<1. Substituting for 7rW and Trg, the problem involves 
w 
setting C1 and b to rraximise 
(KW-el) 
2 
(r-p-b(l+r))(l+r)b = (KN-ýWj)l[(r-P)(l+r)b-(l+r) 
2b2 
Since the expression nust be positive, it is imrrediately clear that Cw 1 
b is determined so as to maximise the square-bracketed expression, and 
setting the first derivative to zero yields 
2 r- p (r-p) (1+r)-2 (1+r) b=0 => b=2 (1+r) 
The tax rate obtained thus rises with the interest rate and falls with 
the utility discount rate. 
The various possible cutcorres of this mochl. can be sumarised as 
4 
below: 
Ili 
No inteivention 
Non-co-operative 
solution 
Nash bargaining 
solution 
Asyrrtretric soln: 
govt. dominant 
AsynnBtric soln: 
wealthy dominant 
b 
0 
p 
2 (1+r) 
r-P 
1+r 
0 
cl ip 
(1+rý P 0 ýi- -+P ), 
KW 
(i+r 2 
ui-+p) 
1+r 
-P1( 
Ci )(ýZP)KW 0 
-a 
l+P "-2 Tz p 
(1+rý p( ot \- 0K+F, 
+p u-+P) p)KW 
0 
(1+r\KP 
ý -1+p) 
llw 
ll+rý 
KW -f+-p 
e 
: FM)KW K1 
W+2 
(1+r\,, 44 
ý-f-+Pp 
With no policy intervention all individuals consurre their wealth at the 
second date, whereas the non-co-operative solution forces the wealthy to 
consurre at the first date to avoid the tax rate of b=l. In temis of consurrption/ 
utility, the total difference between these solutions is 
aN'('+r\ KW - KW ad2LO KX U i+-P) ý1+p) 
which can be viewed as the aggregate utility loss from non-co-operative 
governrrent intervention. These utility units can be recovered through co- 
operative behaviour, involving an agxeerrent to defer all consunption to 
date two. At the Nash bargaining solution the extra utility is divided 
equally between the governnent and the wealthy, who then distribute it evenly 
between the poor and themselves respectively. 
It is also possible that unequal bargaining skills lead to an unequal 
distribution of the co-operative surplus between the governrmnt and the 
wealthy. The two extrerre cases correspond to the asymmtric solutions given 
above. Where the goverment is dominant, it can act as aI leader' in the 
Stackelberg sense. deciding its own policy in the knowledge of the response 
of the wealthy. Taxation can therefore be increased to the level 
b= r-p/l+r' at which the wealthy are indifferent between consuming at the 
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first and second dates, and the utility surplus goes to the govemurent. 
This solution is equivalent to the optimm in the previous mx3el, where 
there is no unity of response between individual taxpayers. At the opposite 
extreme the goverment is frightened off inposing any taxation by the threats 
of the wealthy to consurre all their capital in the pre-tax period. The 
outcorre then coincides with the no intervention position, and the entire 
utility surplus is appropriated by the wealthy. In a rmre general bargaining 
sense one can say that the tax rate rrust fall somewhere in the interval 
ON< b< r_P/ 1+r' less than or equal to the rate obtained when taxpayers 
e--4ert no bargaining power. 
The exarrple above is not intended to be realistic, but it does illustrate 
the ability of the wealthy to secure a lower tax rate if they can threaten 
a unified response to redistributive taxation - in the extreme case they 
nay be able to deter the introduction of any taxation. The goveninent's 
position in rrK)re corrplex models would be stronger if preferences displayed 
diminishing rrarginal utility, so that the threats made by the wealthy represented 
a higher utility loss. The sarre would also be true if the second period 
had been given a greater weighting than the first. On the other hand alternative 
rreans of tax avoidance benefit the wealthy, and sorre of these are considered 
below. 
Alternative Forms of Tax Avoidance 
Tax avoidance in practice is often accarplished by transferring wealth 
into assets which are untaxed. or face a lower rate of taxation than the 
standard definition of wealth. Unless the tax basis is truly conprehensive 
it is always possible to make a response of this kind, and wealth may also 
be transferable abroad to tax havens with little or no taxation. Whether 
these loopholes can be closed is largely an aaninistrative issue, but if 
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any are left open they will lead to a further constraint on the ability 
to redistribute wealth. 
Conprehensive tax avoidance occurs if wealth can be rmved. costlessly 
outside the tax systerr6 earning the same interest return and allowing consuaption 
to continue as before; such conditions render redistributive taxation conpletely 
ineffective arO discourage tha inplementation of any tax measures. In reality 
tax avoidance almst certainly involves soma costs, either in a lurrp-sun 
form or as a lower interest return to transferred wealth. In the two period 
nx)del above, this can be depicted by assuming that there are two assets 
available for holding wealth, one of which is t&-. v-d. bearing a net return 
of (1+rl)(1-b), and the other untaxed, with a return I+r2, r, > r2. Individuals 
always hold their wealth in the form which maximises the incoms zeturn, 
and pay the tax only if (1+r 1 )(1-b) > I+r2. Hence the maximam tax rate 
imposed is such that 
(1+r )(1-b) = 1+r2 => b2 1 1+r 1 
since any tax above this level provokes a move into the untaxed asset. 
The policy optinum in general will involve a wealth limit above which the 
nuximum rate is inposed, and a set of lower tax rates (in scrre cases negative) 
for those below the limit. No wealth is ever held in the untaxed asset 
at the optirruxr6 although nore caTplex nudels could yield optinu in which 
this is true (for exanple, where individuals face differing costs of transferring 
wealth between assets). Consurrption and saving behaviour follow a similar 
pattern. to the previous model, and pre-tax consurrption, continues to 
be an. alternative form of avoidance. The outcome ia social welfare 
terms must be worse thaa in the single asset case, and the govenzeat 
has ran, incentive to try to include the second asset in, the tax base. 
It will choose not to do so only if under a direct constraiat (as, 
for exaffple, when, wealth is held abroad) or if the administrative 
costs outweigh the benefits. 
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As befoze the weal-thy may be able to emrt their collective bargaining 
power. The ability to transfer assets into unta d forms provides them 
with an alternative threat to pre-tax consuirption, and leaves them at least 
as well off as in the case considered above. The gavernnent may be able; 
to counteract wealth transfers by threatening an extension of the tax base, 
although the effectiveness of this depends on the costs involved.. Analysis 
is otherwise similar to the previous case, with the sam possible range 
of outccnes. 
In conclusiori. the presence of policy anticipation provides a genuine 
constraint on wealth redistribution, even when wealth is fully observed. 
This contrasts with the steady-state policies of Section (3), where a single 
date first-best wealth redistribution was general-ly achievaýle. The irrportance 
of anticipation depends on a wide variety of different features. even in 
the sirrplified nixIals used here. Anticipation is Liable to exact a greater 
welfare cost 
the greater is the initial wealth inequality 
the faster mn-ginal utility declines with consunption, that 
is, the lower is U' I (C) 
(iii) the longer is the pre-tax period relative to the post-tax 
period 
the lower is the interest return to capital 
(v) the higher is the discount rate on utility 
the lower is the fixed or interest cost of converting wealth 
into unt&, P-d fon-ns 
(vii) the greater is the extent of concerted tax avoidance by taxpayers 
(viii) the imre egalitarian are social prefemnces. 
123 
This list is not ccrrprehensive, and in practice other issues are also relevant. 
The inportance of disincentives depeods ai the particular case in question, 
but it does seem that in general son-B constraint ai redistributive policy 
will be present. Whatever the other circumstances, it is always true that 
anticipated tmns cannot directly confiscate wealth, in that wealth holders 
can choose. to avoid all. tax payrrent by consuming their wealth during the 
pre-tax period. Sorre tax avoidance is alrmst certain to take place, and 
the tax's efficacy depends largely on the inconvenience to individuals of 
taking these rreasures. The best way to redistribute wealth is to avoid 
anticipation by surprising the taxpayers, a feat which nuy be difficult 
to achieve in practice., 
(5) Conclusion 
This chapter has considered redistributive wealth taxation in the 
context of individuals undertaking life-cycle saving. As was pointed out 
in the introduction, rnany other factors are relevant, and the design of 
wealth taxes involves najor administrative, institutional and political 
aspects. The present discussion is limited to the theoretical feasibility 
of redistributing wealth, in tenns of the ability to overconn individual 
disincentives, and nny consequently overestimate the scope for redistribution 
in reality.. Within this restricted frams of reference, three nain issues 
enTarge. 
Firstly, for wealth redistribution to be efficient it is preferable 
to base taxes on an individual's full lifetirre wealth, rather than the current 
wealth holding. Within a life-cycle franework this rreans including infonration 
on the individual's agEx, as well as observed wealth, allowing an accurate 
indication of the person's true wealth to be obtained. When tams am inposed 
I2I- 
on observed current wealth alone, the analysis beccnv--s carplex in form, 
and, as was noted in Section (2), the resulting tax optimum may not 
correspond to the usual notion of redistributive taxation, involving negative 
marginal tax rates at some points. Saving disincentives always arise in 
taxing current wealth, and the, extent of possible redistribution is 
consequently limited. Since information on age is generally available, there 
is little cause to formulate taxes in this way, although wealth tax proposals 
in practice do not always make the distinction between current and true 
wealth. 
Secondly, when taxes are based on true wealth and are introduced 
without anticipation it is possible to avoid any individual saving 
disincentives. The models of Section (3) generally pennit a first-best 
outcane-, either by luTp-su-n wealth transfers (decreasing or constant returrs 
to wealth) or by a centralised w-alth holding (increasing returrs to wealth). 
Saving disincentives need not be a significant problem, as long as 
policy rreasures have the appropriate informational basis. 
The third issue is the role of tax anticipation, considered in 
Section (4). When the introduction of taxes is known beforehand, individuals 
have the chance to avoid payment by pre-tax consurrPtion or transfer into. 
untaxed assets. To maximise socialvelfare the government must include 
these responses as constraints in its policy fonTulation, and it may find 
itself in a bargaining situation if uvalthy taxpayers can make a concerted 
response. The first best under these circumstances is not attainable, 
even if the government has full information on individual characteristics. 
Anticipation effects therefore pose the major obstacle to redistributing 
wealth in the theoretical approach used here. 
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In view of the comments above, it seems that the ideal redistributive 
wealth tax is an unahticipated single date reorganisation of lifetime 
assets, operating on the same lines as a capital levy. In reality, despite 
the social benefits to be gained from secrecy, it is likely that any 
redistributive tax measure will be known beforehand, allawing individuals 
to make suitable tax avoidance arrangwmts. These are the only real 
disincentives encountered in the models above, and must be regarded as the 
main theoretical barrier to redistributing personal wealth. 
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CHAPTER 5: OPrIMAL UNEMPLOYMENT BSNEFITS 
(1) Introduction 
For the majority of people, wages received from employment are by 
far the largest component of their total earnings in any given period. 
The loss of this income through unemployment consequently has a serious 
effect on the welfare of the individuals concerned, and presents society 
with the problem of whether or not to take palliative action. Available 
policy responses can broadly be classified as preventive and curative. 
Preventive measures fall in the sphere of macroeconomics, and require inter- 
vention in the economy to prevent the occurrence of unemployment. As in 
medicine. prevention is liable to be better than cure, and ideally the successful 
inplerrentation of macroeconomic measures would greatly reduce unemployment 
as a problem. Unfortunately, total prevention has not in practice been 
accomplished, and recent years have seen a return of unemployment on a scale 
approaching that of the 1930's. In these circLmntances there is an evident 
need for curative measures, of which unemployrfent benefits are the central 
element. The assurrption made in the foll-owing discussion is that the employment 
situation is exogenously fixed, confining attention to the rimcroeconorrac 
aspects of the problem. This is not intended to imply that macroeconomic 
policies are ineffective, and, indeed, macroeconorrmc measures ought to be 
a high priority of any rational govenwent. 
Uiemployn-ent benefit schemes vary widely between countries, and 
can be quite corrplex in their structure. In Britain, for example, them 
has always been a distinction between unemployment benefit per so and means 
tested supplementary benefit, as well as various other payments ralated to 
an individual's particular circumstances. The analysis below does not attempt 
to model any particular benefit system, and assumes that a unifonn payments 
schedule applies to all individuals. Similarly, the models also abstract 
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from the intricacies of government finance, mostly assuming a unifonn luirp- 
sun tax levied on the employed (although this assumption can easily be relaxed). 
The aim is to concentrate on certain broad aspects of all benefit schemes, 
such as the level of benefit payments relative to employment earnings (the 
'replacement ratio) and the optimal time pattern of benefit payments. 
Mere are two arain alternative ways of viewing uneirployrient benefits, 
as either insurance or a redistributive tool: 
(a) Unenploymant benefit as insurance 
In this view an individual's career is seen as an intertenporal 
sequence of alternating errploymnt and unenployrrent spells. Uierrployrrent 
is a random event which cannot be fma%seerl, with corrplete accuracy, but can 
be assigned a probability in a similar way to other events covered by insurance 
schemes. 'Actuarially fair' insurance inplies that the expected premium 
payrrents for a given tirm period are equal to the expected insurance claim 
in that period, so that neither the insurer nor the insured makes a net 
return from the scheme. In theory this would be the outcone of privately 
supplied insurance provision under coapetitive conditions, with each insurer 
making zero profits. The first state insurance schems sought to emulate 
private insurance, and thus were also based on notions of 'actuarial fairness'. 
Ebr exanple, the initial U. K. scheaB in 1911 was careful to avoid any suggestion 
that the uneriployn-ent-prone were to be siibsidisec4 and enphasised the need 
for the schems to be self-financing. These ideas were effectively abandoned 
in the inter-war period, when it became clear that the growing nunbers of 
unerrployed could never finance their own claims (although the terminology 
of self-financing still survives in the present system, with the distinction 
between lunerrployrrent benefit' and Isupplermntary baefft'). It is difficult 
to imagine a practicable benefit schem3 run solely on insurance principles, 
and, 3n any case, the desirability of such an approach is unclear when seen 
in social welfare terms. 
IM 
Unemployrrent benefit as redistribution 
State unerrploynent insurance schems dif fer from (hypothetical) 
private ones in that they can caTpel individuals to participate, even when 
their premiun payments exceed their expected claim. This rmans that there 
is no need for schenes to break even over each individual's career separately, 
and that a single scherre can be inplermnted, with receipts and claims balancing 
over a cross-section of the population at any given time. Such a scheme 
introduces the possibility of redistribution between individuals, and a 
govemment basing its policy on cptimxUty considerations would generally 
wish for sarre redistribution to take place. The cutcorre is not insurance 
in the usual sense applied to individuals, and ought to be regarded either 
as a redistributive policy based on uneriployrrent-proneness or as a form 
of collective insurance for society as a whole. 
It is scrretirres argued that unenploymant benefits are not designed 
for redistributive purposes, and that redistribution should be limited to 
specific ad hoc measures (this point is nude, for exanple, in Disney (1980)). 
Viewed theoretically, unenployment benefits are lunp-sum paymants and therefore 
liave no drawbacks-on efficiency grounds - the only potential problem is 
an informational one, concerning whether or not uneaployrmnt benefits concentrate 
ai one particular dirTension of inequality to the emclusion of others. In 
the following analysis infon, tional difficulties are ruled out by restricting 
observable individual differences to enploymant status. Although informational 
questions are certainly relevant to unerrployirent benefits in their redistributive 
role, they are more pertinent to the subject matter of Chapter 2 than to 
the current chapter. 
Throughout the rest of this chapter, optinal unerrployn-ent benefits 
are derived on the basis of constrained mEmimisation of a social welfare 
function. Inevitably the procedure raises redistributive questions, and 
irrplies a rejection of the pure insurance view of unenploymnt benefits 
gzq 
The basic theoretical nudel is given in Section (2), and is in tenns 
of conventional utility theory. Later sections elaborate on the basic model 
by introducing additional relevant issues. 
Basic Theoretical Model 
The, model described here is the sinplest possible tirreless case, 
based on a given cross-secticn of errployed and uneriployed individuals. 
Uierrployrrent is taken to be exogamous and uninfluenced by govemrrent policy. 
Let the working population caTprise H individuals, with identical 
preferences known by the goverrmant. Of these, suppose that E are in errployrmnt 
and H-E are merrployed. AU ixidividuals have T hours of avallable working 
tirre, are paid an hourly wage, W, and receive no non-ernployrrent incorre. 
The Government pays a lurrp-sum benefit, B, to the unenployed, financed 
by a uniform lunp-sum payrmnt, b, charged to those in enployrmnt. If R 
is the revenue requirenent, then the goveninent Is revenue constraint is 
R+ (H-E) B= Eb. 
Individual preferences are represented by the standard neoclassical 
theory of labour supply, which treats leisure as an additional ccmnodity 
in the utility function (alternative approa--hes are considered below). 
With a free choice ofwor-king hours, the utility of the enployed is given 
by the indirect utility functions 
UI= U(p, W, Wr-b) 
whexe p is the vector of consuxer pricx3s. (If desired, a rationed function 
U(p, WT-b, T) could be used, whexe T<T is the nunber of leisure hours 
to which the individual is restricted. This would not significantly affect 
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the nature of the nxxlel). The unerrployed are constrained to undertake no 
errployrmnt, and therefore rrust consurre the fill IT hours per week as leisure. 
Applying standard rationing theory (as in Neary and Roberts (1980)), their 
uti-lities are expressible as 
U3= U(p, B, T) 
where 9 is the rationed indirect utility function corresponding to the preferences 
in U. 
An inportant consideration is the possibility of a disincentive effect, 
whereby the errployed can declare themselves unerrployed and claim benefits 
if it is in their interest to do so. This depends on the government's ability 
to distinguish between the 'bona fide' unenployed and those who are unerrployed 
by choice - if the distinction is observable, then such behaviour cannot 
occur. In reality there seems to be no foolproof way to identify the voluntarily 
unerrployed. and it is desirable to allcw for this in the model. The problem 
is akin to that of moral hazard in insurance markets, where the insured 
party can influence events without the knowledge of the insurer. To eliminate 
moral hazard at the optimxn, it is necessary to assume that all ezployed 
persons have a utility at least as great as that of the unemployed. This 
can be guaranteed in the present case by inposing the constraint U >- U. 
Social preferences are individualistic, described by the social 
welfare function V= V(U 11-1 U, H) I which becorves Vt= Z V(Uh) 
in the special 
case of utilitarianism (where 
av, 
>0 and 
a2 V/ h 
au 3U2 
<0 will generally hold 
true). Under the present assunption of a uniform enployed population these 
functions are expressible as V= V(U, 0) in the general case and 
v t= EV(U) + (H-E)V(5) under utilitarianism. The governaent's optinal policy 
problem is to choose B and b to maximise Vt _subject 
to the revenue constraint 
and the moral hazard conditicn. 
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The appropriate Tagrangian for utilitarian preferences is 
L= EV(U) + (H-E)V(b) + ý(Eb-R-M-E)B) + ý(U--U) 
with optinality conditicns 
3L 
- (H-E) !a -VU .aU-H -E) 
aU 
a 13 aB aB 
B 
«H-E) aV ab (H-E) -ý 
ab 0 
au ' 5-B -ý U-B 
)= 
3L E qv 22 
u 
+ ýE + 44, < 0 ab aU ab ab 
LV- 
. 
ý-U 
+ ýE + ýaU aU ab ab) = 
3L 
3ý =UU 
Firstly, note that if the rrioral hazard constraint is not inposed, the Cptirnum 
requires that 
av D'ü av au 
j-B «- 5-U * j-b 
This is sirrply a first-best redistribLtbn. of incorre between the enployed 
and unenployed. equating the rrean HSU of inccim for both groups. Such aa outa: xm 
would arise if the govenirrent could observe voluntary unenployment. 
Ebr rmst situations, how-ever, the presence of a maral hazard constraint 
will significantly alter this outcorm.. In particularý when leisum is a 
norrnal good the qptinm rrust occur at a comer solution satisfying U=U. 
To show this,, suppose that at the cptixrm UA Then from the cptimality 
condition, *=O. It is known that B, WO, since setting them to zero gives 
-3V /Bu * 
au /3b > 
av/30 35 /@B' which is a contradiction (given 
that, ) b=B=O i Icand U>U) Hencs, ý= 
'V/ 
85 * 
35 13B 0- 
3V/ 
au * 
au /Bb 
I as 
13Z 
at the first best. From standard rationing theory, U(p, B, T) = U(2, ý1, Rýým) 
where W is the 'virtual wage', at which individuals would voluntarily choose 
T hours of leisure (so that < W). The relation 3U/ (p, B, T) aB- 
au /aB(P' ý, BAWT) also holds true. Thus, in the present case 
-av au av Tu - Tb (P, W, WT-b) 
iU- (p, B, T) 
3V aU (p, ý1, B+-Wr) 3B -U*. TB "T 
and -au (p, W, WT-b) >, 
3U (p, ý1, B+k) 5-b - aB - 
given that U>b and 
32V 
U2 '<- 
0. 
Inverting gives 
ý-C (p, w, U), < 
ý-C 
au aU (p, ý1' U) 
Fccm the properties of cost functions, 
32 C lallaw - 
31 /BU# where 1 is the 
compensated denand for leisure. If leisure is a normal good, it rrust be 
true that 31/ > 04-, since ý4 <W and a2 
C/3L? 
>0 (for diminishing marginal au 
utility of income), the above condition on 3C/aU can then be satisfied only 
if U<I This contradicts the initial assumption, and the optimum occurs 
at the corner solution U=I 
The converse is also true, so that a comer solution occurs only 
if leisure is a norml good at the optinum To show this, suppose that 
them is a corner solution where U=5 and 
31 
/3U <0 apply sirrultaneously. 
au, > au From the optimality conditions it is known that ý>0 and hence /3B - /3 bI 
given that U=U. Inverting yields 
ac 
W, U) ac ac > YU (2, W, U) = T- (p, W, U) Wu 
for U=5. 
This is a contradiction, since by assunption 
a/ 
au =8 
C /auaw < 0, while 
it is known that R<W. Consequently, one can say that the corner solution 
U=5 occurs iff leisure is a nonral, good at the solution point (leisure 
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need not necessarily be noxnul at other incom, wage or price levels). 
The relationship is not guaranteed to hold for social preferences more couplex 
than the utilitarian form used bem. 
As leisure is usually regarded as a nonnal good, the main case of 
interest is the corner solution equating utilities. When U= U" does apply 
at the optimmrý the solution reduces to 
-au =( 
E ). 
ý and 
a5 
= 
H-E 
5-b Eav + 
-3-B (H-E) aV 
5-u -; u 
av av 
whexe ý is the MU of governaent revenue. Since aU= /35 (for U=U), 
it is evident that the MSU of incoms to the unemployed is greater than that 
to the employed. The government wishes to raise benefits above the optimal 
level, but is prevented frum doing so by the moral hazard constraint. This 
optimm is similar in nature to the one obtained in the wage taxation model 
of Dasgupta and HanuDnd (1980). In their case the disincentive constraint 
arises from the reporting of individual characteristics; here it depends 
on the ability of individuals to declare themselves unemployed. 
It remains conceivable that, contrary to the usual assumption of 
Ithour supply theory, leisure is not a normal good. Fbr exaWle, this might 
arise where the unenployed have such a surfeit of leisure that it nukes 
a negligible (or even negative) contribution to utility. If inferiority 
of leisure does happen to hold in the region of the optimim, then it will 
be a first-best incom redistribution, equating the MUI s of incom to the 
enployed and unenployed. 
The two main features of interest are the benefit level and the 
effects of changes in the emgemus errployrrent pararraters. These am considered 
below. 
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Optimal. Benefit Level 
At a comer solution, total expenditure on goods can be written 
in terms of cxxrpensated demmds as 
N 
W(T-1)-b pIx1 (2, W, U) 
for the euployed, and 
N 
pIxI (p, 
for the uneoployed, whexe U=U and W< ý4. It is known that 
N 
al al 
N ax. 
w 2-1 +EP. - =W-+EP. 
-I= 
aw j=I lap i aw i=1 I aw 
by the zero degree homogeneity of the den-and for leisure. and symTetry of 
cross-substitution effects. Hence 
N ax. al 
P. -LA =-W- 
i=l 3. aw 
ýw 
given the negative substitution effect for leisure. Applying this to the 
expression above yields 
NN 
W(T-1)-b =Z pixi(p, W, U) >Zp1x1 (Lpý, IR, U) 
i=l i=l 
since W<W and all else rp-mins, constant. If the replacerrent ratio is 
defined as 
B /W(T-1)-bl then this rrust be less than unity. 
The sams also applies when leisure is inferior. In this case an 
interior solution is obtained, such that 
5<U 
and marginal utilities of 
income are equated. Considering the expressions for W(T-1)-b and B above, 
the effect of W on them is unchanged, since the substititution tenn 
al 
/aw 
remains negative. The inpact of variation in U is such that 
ac 31 N ax 1 
au W 5-u + Z, -i au - 1: -- 
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With inferiority of leisure, however, it is known that 
a1aU<0, 
and hence 
ax. 
Pi ll 
i=l au 
Bearing in mind that V4 <W still holds, and that U<U, one can then write 
NN 
W(T-1)-b pixi (La, W, U) >y Pixi(LO6 B 
mixmring the relation that holds for the comer solutiori case. 
It follows that in the present nxxbl the optinul replacenent ratio 
is always less than unity. One can also note that it rrust in general be 
greater than zero, if the optinal J ty conditions are to hold. Otherwise 
the optimal value can potentially range anywhere between zero and unity, 
depending on the functional form of preferences. 
Sorre of the factors influencing the optimal meplacemant ratio can 
be illustrated by the exarrple of the CES utility function. 
Example Let preferences take the CES form, such that 
-1 
[6x +( 1--6 )1 U" o<s<1,6 el -1 
where x is consmption and 1 is leisure. Since leisure is a normal good, 
the cptkrum nust always occur at the corner solution equating U and 
ý (as 
shown above). 
Consider now the inpact on the optinal replacerrent ratio of changing 
the 'weighting' parameter, 6. The demand for leisure by the employed can 
be written as 
(Wr-b) 
P(ly-4)1+(, + W(1-6)p)=+O 
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which fal I unambiguously with 6, ceteris paribus. As S increases, the 
constraint on the unemployed becomes tighter, and their surplus of leisure 
over that of the employed increases. Fbr the U=b condition to hold, there 
must be a compensating increase in the consumption advantage of the employed 
over the unemployed, implying a fall in the replacement ratio. 
Generally, the higher is the MRS of leisure for consumption, the 
lower is the replacement ratio at a corner solution optimum for a given 
wage rate. This can be illustrated diagrammatically as below, setting 
p=1 so that consunption =- inccue: 
High MRS ix 
x x 
W(T-1)-b r-- 
W(T-l)b 
01T 
1 1 
The errployed and unerrployed are on the saffe indiffamoce. curve, at the tangency 
with the budget line and the intersection with 1--T respectively. Ebr a 
given W, the incorm of the effployed converges to that of the unenployed 
as the slope of the indifference curve decreases. A higher mirginal valuation 
of leisure therefore leads to a higher optinul replacenent ratio, and less 
divergence between the leisure consurrption of the two groups. 
Paturning to the CES case, suppose that the substittim, paramter, 
is allowed to vary. The inpact on the'leisure demnd function above 
Low MRS ix 
is such that 
1. T' 
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> =0 as 6w (1-6)p << 
Treating 6 as a constant, the inpact of () varies with tlx3 size of the 
real wage, 
w/ 
P* 
if w/p is sufficiently high, a rise in E) tightens the constraint 
on the unemployed and reduces the optiml replacerfent ratio, and vice versa. 
This can be explained in ten-ns of the effect of changes in 0 on the indifference 
curve, as below 
x 
- 
Ice1) 
I( O) 
0 
1 
A higher 0 (and lower elasticity of substitution) causes rmm 'pointed' 
indifference curves, raising the slope at one extremity and decreasing it 
at the other. The inpact on the MRS ix thus depends on an individua. 
A location 
on an indifference curve, which is determined by the real wage, 
W/p. Where 
W/p is high enough. the enployed have high consuaption relative to leisure. 
so that a rise in 6 decreases the ms ix and increases the replacenent ratio. 
Conversely, a sufficiently low 
W/p inplies a negative relation between 0 
and the replacerrent ratio. Hence the inpact of the elasticity of substitution 
is anbiguousý varying with the slope of the budget constaint faced by the 
eaployed. 
In general the optimxn relies on attitudes to leisure, such that a 
stronger denand for leisure tends to increase the optinul replacenent ratio. 
Apart from this observation, nothing -can be said about the cptimn without 
specifying preferences. 
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C2Mar:, ative Static Properties 
(a) A larger working population, H, ceteris paribus, results in a lower 
optirral benefit rate. 
To demonstrate this, suppose that H rises from H to H', and denote 
the -resulting changes in the optinal B and b likewise. Fran the revenue 
constraint b= 
(H-E)B /E + 
R/ 
E' and at a corner solution 
U(. p, W, WT - 
(H-E) BR= Ü(]2 +wr) B, T) = U(R, W, Bý 
(H'-E)B R Hanca U(p, W, WT- E F. 
)< U(p, 0, BiWT) 
At the new optim-im it mist be true that 
(H'-E)B' R 
U(p, W, wr -E R) = fJ(p, B', T) =U B'47W'T) 
and from the properties of the uti Ii ty function this can apply only if BI<B. 
A simi-b r argurrent shows that b wi 11 rise. 
Fbr an interior solution the situation is essentiaUy the sam, 
with 
_au (p W, WT - 
(H'-E) B-R)> lu (p. W, B+k) 
ab 
inplying that BI <B rrust hold. 
This outccrre is intuitively clear, because with E constant a larger 
H sinply means an increase in the nuaber of unenployed who have to be supported 
f ran an unchanged errployiTent level. 
(b) A higler errploynent level., E, ceteris paribus, increases the optirral 
benefit rate., 
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The situation is identical to that in (a), exoept that a rise in 
E serves to lower rather than increase the expression 
(H-E)B /E + 
R/E* By 
analogous argments it follows that B rrust rise and b fall. 
This also is intuitive, mepresenting a decrease in the nurrber of 
uneffployed to be sqpporte<Jý coupled with a rise in the nunber of enployed 
to be taxed. 
In reality the pararreters H and E are not generaUy freely variable 
in the short rLm. and they are liable to be closely interrelated. This 
makes the conparative static observations above a somewhat artificial eoxercise. 
unlikely to be relevant to real policy decisions. 
If variaticn in wage rates is pennitted, then the mxl--l is liable 
to have the property observed by Mirrlees (1971) in the context of optin-al 
taxation, where scrre individuals are better off not working at the cptimim. 
The utility of the uneffployed is then equated with that of a threshold group 
earning the reservation wage, Wt; those with (potential) wages below W 
will choose not to work, while those with wages above Wt will work and enjoy 
utilities in exoess of D. Mom ccnplex nudels with nany characteristics 
would produce an equivalent outccae, yielding a threshold boundary detern-dning 
whether or not individuals are willing to work at the optimm 
A couple of further issues are mlevant: 
Alternative §Mcificaticn-, of Preferences 
Ihe discussion above is based on utility function of the form U(x, l), 
where x is consunptiai of comiudities and 1 is consurrption of leisure. 
Since working tim does not appear in U, it is assurmd to have no positive 
or negative effect on an individual's welfare, and the state of being unerrployed 
also has no inpact. This can lead to sorre irrplausible outccms. In particular, 
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the positive view of leisure means that, for a given ccmnc)dity expenditure, 
unerrploynent raises utility. It is not obvious that this is always true 
in reality, and one can argue that the standard forrrat U=U(x. 1) overestimtes 
the value of leisure to the unerrployed. In practice unerrployrrent iq)oses 
social and psychological costs beyond the presence of excessive leisure 
(Sinfield (1981); Seabrook (, 1982)). Neglect of these factors rray give a 
misleading picture of the true social optinuTL 
If unenploynent has a direct effect on an individual's well-being, 
then this may be represented by a discontinuity in preferences at the point 
of unerrployrent. Ifi these circumstances them are two separate sets of 
preferencesý one for the employed and one for the iuieMloyed - the difference 
between them rray at its sirrplest be a fixed utility cost attached to unerrployrrent. 
or alternatively may be a ccuplete change of preferences affecting all consunption 
decisions. In general one would expect unenploynent to have a negative 
effect on utility (for given inconp- and prices), although its effect on 
itaryinal utilities is more debatable. 
A different response to the over-valuation of leisure in 0 is to 
reformlate the role played by tirm in the util-ity function. The rmst basic 
adaptation would be to make utility a function of working tint-, as well 
as leisure, with U=U(Y, 1, T-1). More generally. the nudel could be recast 
in term. of 'household production' theory, asý for exanple, in Atkinson 
and Stern (1980). In this framwork utility depends on a nunber of activities, 
which are in turn produced from inputs of goods. Time aust be an input 
into all activities. md in scne cases may be the only input - one possible 
fornulation is to define 'work' as an incana-bearing activity with tinne 
as its single input. and to regard the time inputs into all other activities 
as I leisure I. The resulting nxxlel reseffbles conventional uti IJ ty theoryý 
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except that tbere are now two constraints. in incorre and tirre. The mc)re 
sophisticated treatrrent of tirre provides two possible n-eans to downgrade 
the value of leisure: firstly., a positive utility valuation of work irrPlies 
that any net increase in leisure inposes a utility cost from the loss of 
the working activity; and secondly, a rise in leisure at the expense of 
work reduces errployrrent incorm and thus limits the opportunities to devote 
leisure tirm to those activities requiring expensive inputs of goods. 
In the present context the rrain concern is the effect of these 
ur)difications on the optinul benefit rate and the nxxbl' s conparative static 
properties. For the optirral benefit rate the consequences will depend heavily 
on the narginal utilities of incorre, 
au /am and 
ab / 
am .. One possibility is that 
unenployrrent nukes individuals relatively iqmrvious to pleasure. so that, 
ceteris paribus. their mn-ginal utility of inccrre is less than that of the 
errployed. This would tend to produce interior solutions with low replacerrent 
ratios - it is an exanple of the 'boor versus aesthete' problem, where 
uti Ii tarianism favours the latter, regardless of the extent of inequality 
in the population. The effect could be partly or wholly offset if the social 
welfare function displayed a degree of inequality aversion. Should unerrployrrent 
have this inpact on peoplz (as indeed may well be true), then the case for 
rra=econcnuc rreasures to reduce unerrployrrent would be correspondingly 
strengthened. On the other hand, by invoking the genetal principle that 
low utilities acccapany high itarginal utilit" it can be argued that unerrployrrent 
will raise the mn-ginal utility of incorre. This would encourage comer 
solutions, and given that uneuployrrent does lower utility, would result 
in high replacerrent ratios. Consequently, it seem that the optiml benefit 
rate will be highly sensitive to the particular specification, of preferences, 
and depends on features about which it is difficult to rmke any definite 
a priori assertions. The position with the nx)dell s couparative static properties 
is less uncertain - they should not be significantly influenced by changes 
in preferences, coinciding with those outlined above. 
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(ii) Direct Job onation Expenditures 
Although macroeconomic rreasures have been ruled out by assurrption, 
there is no particular reason why the goverment cannot create jobs by 
administrative fiat, financing them from tax revenue. It is of interest 
to consider the conditions under which this kind of activity is desirable. 
Let the theoretical mdel be unchanged from above, except that errployrrent, 
E, satisfies the functional relationship E= E(Q), El > 0, where Q is goverment 
expenditure on 'job creation'. Q may be interpreted either as the direct 
monetary outlay in financing new jobs (mainly the wage bill), or as an indirect 
rreans of fostering employrrent, for instance, by iriproving the institutions 
assisting job allocation. 
When Q is present the revenue constraint becorres E(Q)b = (H-E(Q))B +R +Q, 
and the Iagrangian is 
L= E(Q)v(U) + (H-E(Q))v(D) + ý(E(Q)b-(H-E(Q))B-R-Q)+ ý(U-O) 
The optimality conditions for B and b are identical to those above, while 
the condition for Q implies that 
3L aE aE 
. 
3E 3E 
3Q - TQ - v(U) - -ýQ-- v(rJ) + 4VQ -b+ ýTQ -B 
Q[ý E aE . 
aE aE 
V(U) - TQ v(D) + ýýaQ -b+ ýTQ B 
Hence either Q> 0 and the expression holds with equality, or Q=0 and 
3E 
, (U) Tv Q[- V(fJ) + ý(b+B)j <0 
Ra-arranging irrplies that optiffal expenditume on job azaticn is zero oaly if 
v(U) - v(U) + ý(b+B)< 3E /aQ 
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whexe ý is the MU of goverrur I ent revenue and 
3E / 
DQ 
is the marginal rate 
of job creation per unit of expenditure. The 2eft and right hand sides are 
therefore the marginal social welfare gain and loss from job creation respectively. 
When leisure is normal the optimum occurs at a comer solution satisfying 
U=U. In this case the expression above simplifies to 
b+ B4 
1=Q 
aE/aQ ý-E 
where 
3Q/ 
aE 
is the marginal cost'of creating one more job. Thus, Q=O only 
if the sum of the benefit rate and the uniform tax rate is less than the 
marginal monetary cost of job creation. This is intuitively appealing, 
since for U=Z job creation bears no utility return, and its only benefit 
is the revenue saving, Io + B, to be set against the marginal monetary cost, 
3Q / 
8E . 
When leisure is inferior U>b at the optimum and job creation also 
brings a utility return, as reflected in the full inequality condition abave. 
A nudel which ignores job creation rests on the implicit assuirption 
that the conditions given Ilere hold true - otherwise the government would 
not be acting rationally. It is by no rreans self-evident that the inequalities 
3Q 
are always satisfied, and if / 3E 
is reasonably close to the cost of net 
weekly wage payments, it is quite possible that Q>0 will hold at a Bill 
policy optinun. Moreover, there are two additional factors which tend to 
strengthen the case for intervention : firstly, the goverment in practice 
is probably able to choose the wage rates associated with new jobs (instead 
of merely replicating existing jobs, as hexe), which extends the nuriber 
of situations where job creation is desirable; and secondly, in a rracroeconcrrmc 
nxxlel job creation has expansionary demand effects, which are beneficial 
when unenployrrent is cyclical in nature. 
Henceforth no further reference is made to direct job creation by 
the govemyrent - it should be noted, 1xwever, that the onxission is justified 
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only by the satisfaction of inequality conditions equivalent to those above 
or by an arbitrary restriction placed on policy tools. 
In the next two sections the basic nudel is extended to incorporate 
job search, and to consider saTe policy issues related to search behaviour. 
Models Including Job Search 
Section (2) assumed that the unemployment rate is exogenously fixed, 
which means that the unemployed cannot influence their chance of finding 
errployrrent. This is a reasonably accurate description of many real situations, 
particularly when unemployrrent is cycl-ical in character. Mvertheless, 
at all times there is Likely to be a frictional component to unemployment, 
caused by the inability to reconcile available vacancies with job-seekers. 
A high degree of 'search' activity by the unemployed may well be able to 
reduce frictional unemployment and thereby influence the total unemployment 
rate. In this section job search is included in the model. rrýking the unemploy- 
ment rate partly endogenous (though the basic employment probabilities 
are still taken to be exogenoLn). Generally speaking, the relative importance 
of both frictional. unenployment and job search will tend to be greater at 
times of high economic activity (and low total unemploynent) than in a recession 
the emphasis placed on job search in this and the following section does 
not imply that it always has a mjor impact on unemployment relative to 
the total. Empirical work on the question is inconclusive. Examples of 
studies of U. K. data suggesting large search disinoentives are Gujarati 
(1972), Maki and Spindler (1975) (criticised by Cubbin and Foley (1977) 
and Sawyer (1979)), Benjamin and Kochin (1979) (see also symposium in 1982 
JPE), and Batchelor and Sheriff (1980). Studies of cross-section data have 
found either less significant disincentives (Nickell (1979a and b)), or 
no definite relationship (Atkinson et al. (1984)). 
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Ckice job search is incluckýd, a second type of disincentive arises, 
in addition to moral hazard. Specifically, a high benefit level raises 
the value of leisure, imposing a high cost of devoting leisure tine to search 
activities, as well as narrowing the gap between the utility levels of the 
employed and unemployed. The result is a fall in the net returns to job 
search, leading to a reduction in the amount of job search and an increase 
in the rate of unemployment. The optimal benefit rate must balance the 
desirability of a high benefit rate on social welfare grounds against its 
adverse effect on (frictional) unemployrTent. A similar job search framework 
has been used previously in the optimal unemployment insuar. ýce modeals of 
Baily (1978) and Flemning (1978), although search is there defined in term 
of monetary costs rather than work or leisure time. 
Mxblling noverrents between enploynent and urienploynent requires 
an intertenporal frarrework, with a sequence of different dates. Suppose 
therefore that tirre is discrete and that the population is constant, ccrrprising 
H identical individuals with an infinite work horizon (that is, no future 
retirerrent date). Ehployrrent conditions are represented by an exogeneous 
set of transition probabilities, reseabling those in Flejurdng (1978). At 
each tirm period there is a probability ji of an enployed individual becaning 
unenployed in the next period; conversely, an unerrployed indiviclial has 
a chance v (s) of re-entering errployrrent in the next period, where s is the 
nunber of hours devoted to job search. It follows that if 6 t-l is the probability 
of being unenployed at tirre t-1, then the probability of being unenployed 
at time t is given by 
6t= (1-v(s)) 6t-1 + 11(1-6t-1) = (1-P-V(S)) 6t-I + 11 
Owing to the infinite horizon, search tims are independent of the time 
period, and the expected rate of umTployrient is defined by the steady-state 
equation 6= (1-11-v(s)) 6+ 11, so that 
14-6' 
and 1-6= V(s) 
P+V(S) 
Goveninent policy is the s&m as in Section (1), with a constant benefit, 
B, paid to the unerrployed, financed by a uniform lurrp-su-n payment, b. rihe 
utility of the eriployed remains unchanged at U=U(p, W, Wr-b), while that 
of the unerrployed now becorries 
U= U(p, B, T-s) 
under the assurrption that job search conveys neither utility nor disutility, 
and influences preferences only through-the loss of leisure tirre (this assurrption 
could be dropped at the expense of a more sophisticated representation of 
tine allocation, on the lines of the 'household production' approach rrentioned 
in Section (2)). Individuals discount future utility at a rate p per period. 
Search behaviour involves choosing s to maxbnise the discounted 
sun of expected future utility over the infinite horizon. Let Ut and Ut 
cbncte this quantity for the eaployed and unenployed xespectively at date 
t. Then Ut nust satisfy 
u 
11 -* (1-11) * Ut =t+ -r+-p Ut+i + -T+-p Ut+i 
In a steady state the values are invariant over time, so that 
(1+p)U + mu 
11+p 
Analogously, Ut satisfibs 
+v+ (1-0 -* ut ý-- Ut 1+. p 
ut+l 1+p ut+i 
so that, in a steady state 
(, I+P)U + VU U= 
V+P 
1W 
Substituting for U* in the steady-state equation for U* yields 
(1+P) 
U 
P(11+v+p) [(P+P) u+ vul 
The optirral search tirre is detenrdned so as to rroximise U. Setting 
55* 
/aS =0 irrplies an optiml search condition 
-au 1.22 
. (u-ü) 7s (P+V+p) , as 
This is the standard fonrat for optimal search, where the left-hand side 
is the current cost of undertaking job search, and tle right-hand side is 
the expected future returns from job search. 
The optimal policy problem reserrbles that in Section (2), except 
for the presence of the search conditka as an additional constraint. Social 
welfare is expressible as sorre function of the enployrmnt probabilities 
11, V, and the utilities U, 
5; for example, utilitarian social preferences 
lead to the social welfare function 
II jj- + 
The revenue constraint is defined in tenns of expectatia. m% md, cannot be 
guaranteed to balance at any particular date; thus 
R+HH \) 
wtexe R is the revenue requireffent per period. The goverrirrent sets B and 
b so as to nuximise the social welfare function subject to the search condition 
and the revenue constraint above. A solution is obtainable by the Lagrangian 
rrethod, using B, b and s as iristnxmnts. Uilike Sectiori (2) it is not recessary 
to include the rroral hazard constraint separately, since it is irrplicit 
in the search condition (given as < 0) wherever this 
is binding. In 
cases with high search costs, -BU/ , arid/or low returns to search 
3V 
as S 
Vas 
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it rpay be optirral to have no job search - the nx)del then reduces to the 
fonn of Section (2), and can be dealt with in the sarre way. 
r1he following carrrents can be made about the optirrin: 
Optimal Benefit Level 
As before, little can be said in general about the optinul benefit 
level, which depends chiefly on the functimal. form of preferences. In 
fact, it is not even possible to retain Section (2)'s observation about 
the replacerrent ratio being less than unity. Fbr exanple, suppose that 
the optinal value of s is sufficiently Large that the leisure consmption, 
T-s, of the unerrployed is less than that of the enployed: in that 
the virtual wage of the unerrployed exceeds the wage rate of the eirployed 
N 
(ýi > w). It is known that cornTodity expenditure, p 3. x i' increases with 
w, ceteris paribus, as shown in Section (2). Cne can therefore have 
N 
px (p, ý7,15) >pxw, U) = w(T-1)-b 
at the optirrum, despite the fact that U>U. This neans that a zeplacerrent 
ratio exceeding unity cannot be ruled out in the present case, even if it 
is not particularly likely. 
C29mrative Statics 
Consideration of rroverrents in ji and v in isolation is not eEpecially 
interesting, but, 4S in Section (2), a worsening of errploynent conditions 
(a rise in 11 or fall in V) should be associated with a lower benefit level, 
and vice versa. 
It would be straightforward to extend the nrx3el above to include 
more elaborate forms of job search behaviour (as summarised in Lippman and 
VbCal 1 (1976)). Fbr exarrple, allowing for a finite work horizon or variation 
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in wages would not significantly alter the nature of the model; the latter 
case would give a job search framework similar to that in Pissarides (1983), 
and derivation of the policy optimum would proceed as in the model above, 
with the addition of the reservation wage as an extra policy instrument. 
In reality jobs also vary in their associated employmant probabi 1i ties, 
11 and v, and the view of individual behaviour could be extended to include 
search over these parameters (if individuals are aware of them; search over 
job security is included on this assurption in the model of Hey and Mavromaras 
(1981)). Another extension would be to permit job searchers to have a more 
specific attitude to job search, beyond the loss of leisure incurred. Flor 
instance, a negative view of job search in preferences presumably influences 
search efforts, although its net effect is anbiguous, since it increases 
both the current costs of search and the expected returns from securing 
euployrrent. Adding these various elaborations to the model of individual 
behaviour might be felt to increase its realism, but they would not yield 
any greater insights into the nature of the policy optinum, and they are 
not pursued any further hexe. 
A rmre central issue is the question of interaction between job 
searchers, as occurs when search externalities are present. 
Search Externalities 
Many discussions of search behaviour are based on models of a single 
individual, and therefore do not consider the interaction between job searchers. 
A nodal of optimal unemployrnant benefits has to be based on a population 
of many individuals, so the possibility of search externalities inevitably 
arises. In situations with a given nuaber of job vacancies, it is likely 
that greater seach efforts by one person reduce the eriployment probabi-ILit' s 
of others, creating a negative externality. Such effects have an inpact 
on the policy optimum, and ought to be included in the theoretical nodal. 
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Consider the basic homogeneous population search model described 
at the beginning of this section. The introduction of search externalities 
needs only a minor adjustment to the probability v,, to allow for the effects 
of search by other individuals. One possible situation is where the average 
probability in the population of finding a job is a fixed constant, v; this 
would, for exanple, arise when the total nunber of vacancies being filled 
in any period is fixed independently of search behaviour. 'Individual search 
efforts can then only succeed at the expense of others, leading to a case 
of pure 'congestion' in job allocation. Let r_(s) denote the marginal increase 
in an individual's errployment chances resulting from job search, given that 
other individuals do not alter their search tin-es (with c'(S) >0 and C(O) = 0). 
If only the first individual searches, then the resulting enploynr-nt probabilities 
are 
C(S 1) 
v+c (Si ) and vi =v -( 
where m is the nunber of unenployed. If the first two individuals search, 
then the probabilities are 
Vi "': \; ) + e(Si) -(c 
(S2) 
Im-1) 
V2 ý" v+ O(S2) -( 
O(sl) 
lm-l) 
ýSl) + r: (S2) 
iol, 2 Vi =; - 
sl)m+lo 
fience, in the general case 
Vi `ý C( S.. ) - i-i Vi 
where -c_, is the nean value of e for all individuals except i. Individuals 
therefore benefit from search to the extent that their search tirre exceeds 
the average for the rest of the population. 
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Fbr a I-xxnogeneous population it is clear the e (S i C-i wi II always 
hold. and that v V, Vi. Job search is consequently a self-defeating 
activity. serving only to diminish the utility level. The uneaployed face 
a game theoretic situation, in which the best possible outcorre is a co- 
cperative agreement for nobody to undertake job search. Under Nash assuaptions, 
however, such an agreement is unstable, as all individuals have an incentive 
to break it; the game is therefore of the 'prisoners' dilenrral variety. 
At the Nash equilibrium individuals choose s so as to maximise their sum 
of expected future utilities 
(1+p) [(Il+p)u + (v+c(S )-ýýjwl P 
au* 
on condition that e_i is fixed. Setting /as ý0 and rearranging yields 
au 1 (given that c(S E_i# Vi) as ý+=V+-P - 
(U-U) 
which is equivalent in form to the zero externality case, but with C substituted 
for a genuine return to search. The unenployed therefore persist in carrying 
out job search, despite its coaplete*futility. Behaviour of this nature 
may sew highly irrational, and yet it is unlikely that a group as large 
and disparate as the unenployed could ever achieve a co-operative outcome. 
The Nash equi-libriun is liable to be an accurate picture of what would happen 
in reality. 
From the goverment's point of view, job search in this nudel is 
merely a nuisance, inposing a utility cost without having any effect on 
unerrployrrent. As a result the policy attitude of conventional nx)dels is 
exactly reversed, with the govemTent now wishing to discourage job search. 
Since search t: Ures fall with higher benefits, them is no longer a policy 
conflict between the need to raise the inccrres of the uneMloyed and to 
avoid the search disincentive. The nx)del is constrained only by maral hazard 
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issues. so that the optinun for a hcmogeneous population is the sane as 
it would have been in a nx)d--l without job search, with U=-U and S=O (given 
nonmlity of leisure; otherwise it rray not be OPtinul to eliminate aU search). 
Constaricy of ý, as assuTed above, is ari extrem case, irrplying that 
the general level of search times in the population has no inpact on unerrployrrent. 
In practice a3arch is likely to ccrrprise both a direct effect, %t&h reduces 
frictional unerrployffent, and a corrpetitive effect. which merely diminishes 
the errploynent chances of other individuals. The general case may be represented 
by writing the errployrrent probab i1J ties as 
Vi ý, - Vi(sir s -i) 
vi 
where S 
-i 
is the v-n-ctor of search tims of the rest of the unmployed, and 
the functions vi, Vi, satisfy 
avi 
/as 
i>0 
and 
3V 
I /as 
i<0, 
jVi. In contrast 
with the mxbl above, it is now possible that uniform non-zero search by 
I 
identical individuals raises the general level of eriployment probabilities 
and reduces unerrployrrent. Search consequently has a positive direct effect 
to offset the adverse effects working through search externalities and the 
inpact on utility levels. Because externa-Uties depend on the extent of 
an individual's search relative to that of other individuals, the function 
V could well take a particular form 
S. 
V(si, '/§ 
-i 
) or vI= v(si, s1 -9 1 vi 
where S 
-1 
is the nean level of search amng the other uneuployed. As before, 
job search under Nash assumptions involves setting Si to maximise Ui subject 
to S-il being fixed; the first-order conditions yield a similar search equation 
avi Eu (Sjý s 
-i) - (U-0) 
vi asi U+V(SrE-i)+p - asi 
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With identical individuals it is known that SI =S 3, 
Vi, j, and so the conditions 
above reduce to a single condition in S (otherwise it would be a set of 
simultaneous equations). If a direct errployrrent effect is present, then 
it is no longer true that undertaking search is necessarily futile, and 
its net value depends on the size of the direct effects vis-a-vis utility 
and externality costs. Nevertheless. it remains valid that individuals 
wi 11 geneizlty search longer at the Nash equilibrium than they would have 
chosen to do had they taken externalities into account. The governm-ant Is 
problem is similar to the ones described above.. and becones identical in 
form to that in the basic nxxlel of this section when search is uniform in 
the population., It may or may not be desirable for the govenurent to discourage 
job search. depending on the relative importance of its positive and negative 
aspects. 
It is worth mentioning that other types of externality effect care 
also possible. Fbr exanple, them nay be efficiency returns arising from 
accurate 'job matching', whexe productivity is higher if jobs are filled 
by the n-ast suitable individuals from a heterogeneous population. Diamond 
(1981) examines this possibility, and argues that high unenploynent benefits 
could be justifiable as a subsidy to job search in order to irrprove job 
matching. Such an outccme does not immadiately translate to the current 
frame-work, because Diamond' s model does not include an individual choice 
of search tixms (so that the nuaber of errployer-unerrployed contacts depeads 
only on the unemployment rate). When choice of search times is included, 
a rise in benefits increases unemployment but simultaneously reduces search 
times, giving a more aribiguous effect on the nunber of contacts made. Mvertheless 
any productivity effects of job matching may potentially create a positive 
search externality, whereby increased search by one individual is of indirect 
benefit to others. 
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A further issue related to job search is the optinul. tin-e pattern 
of benefits. This is considered in the next section. 
(4) Optirral Benefits Varying with the Duration of Unerrployrrent 
The nx)dels considered so far have ax: bitrarily assunp-d that benefits 
should be paid at a constant rate, independently of the length of tirre that 
an individual has spent unerrployed. This neglects the possibility thiýt 
benefits varying over tiae may provide a policy optirnxn superior to that 
with a constant benefit level. There are two n-ain situations in which tin'e- 
varying benefits can inprove on. constant benefits. The first is in models 
with job search, where a tirre-varying rate of payments can be used to influence 
the amount of search by the unenployed. The second is in models with a 
heterogeneous population, where it is desirable to reflect changes in the 
cross-sectional conposition of the unenployed over tisre by appropriate moverrents 
in the benefit rate. Each of these two cases is discussed in rrr)re detail 
below. 
(i) Optimal Tim-avarying Benefits in Homogeneous Population Models 
The population is here taken to corrprise identical individuals, 
all of whan undertake job search when uneriployed. Such a nx)del has been 
considered previously by Shavell and Weiss (1979), and the initial case 
below derives their nuin resuli that the optin-al benefit schedule is uniformly 
declining (a finding which also errerges indirectly-from Sarrpson (1978)). 
Following Shavell and We" it is analytically convenient to restrict 
attention to the case of a single uneriployed person returning to erTploymnt; 
this modification does not significantly affect the qualitative nature of 
the outcome, and wi 11 not be retained in (JI) below. The individual in 
question is assurred to be unerrployed at the starting date, searches for 
Iss 
as many periods as necessary to find a job, and then keeps the job for all 
future t. Ure. Benefits are paid out at a varying rate, Bt. whre t denotes 
the nunber of previous discrete tine periods for which an individual has 
been unenployed. Notation is in all respects the same as in Section (3), 
with a subscript t denoting the relevant unenployrrent duration. 
A model in this form can be treated by dynamic programming argunents, 
with either a finite or infinite work horizon. At each duration 
-*+v (SO * (1-v(St)) -* Ut=Ut (Bt, St) J+p U t+j +- 1+ 
.p 
Ut+l 
where Ut+j depends * 
on future search decisions. After rearrEngirQ the first- 
order condition 
t/=0 inplies that as t 
Ot 
as t (1+p) ast 't+i )t+i) 
at the individual's search optijnm The govemnent pays out benefits, 
Bt. in such a way that the expected sum of benefit payments is equal to 
a predetennined positive constant, -R 0, where 
R0<0. Hance 
1 
CO 
(1-Vj-1) 
-R 0=Z 
(i 
=0 
iB 
(where Vj (S I) and V. - 
0) 
i=o (1+P) 
for an infinite horizon. Because only present and future payrrents are relevant 
to decisions at any particular tirre, the revenue constraint experienced 
at duration t is of tlv-- form 
co j- 1) 
=t+l 
I=t+l 
iB -Rt = Bt_+ iz 
(1, 
(1+p) -t 
) 
where -Rt takes sorre constant value. The optinal benefit schem is derived 
from a sequence of constrained optimisation problem in which the goverment 
can choose Bt. B and S to maximise U* subject to the individual optirral t+I tt 
search condition and the expected revenue constraint. In order to obtain 
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definite conclusions about the optirral. benefit schedule, it is necessary 
to inpose separability of D in B and S, so that 
B5 /3B is independent of 
S. The Lagrangian and first-order conditions are: 
- 
(1--i (S 
t» + L 
t= Ut i+P ut+i+ 
+ ýt 
( 
-Rt -B t -"Z 
0 
1 -t+l 
=t 
7r 
-1) j +l(1 B. (ý 
i-t x (l+ ) ' - P ,% 
+ ýt 
a üt 
a st (l+P) 
-*» av (* ast ut+i - Ut+i 
3Lt a ut 
aB t aB t 
ýt 0 
aLt ('-vt) e)ýJt+ 1 (1-\)t) ýt av 
ut+i 
aBt+, (l+»p) 93t+ , t 
+ (l+P) U+ýP) . is-t 
0 aB t+l 
aL t 3,0 
Bt Co 
1 
Tr 
a 2v (U 
**) ?0t 
t+l +1 -ut c 
s 7-t ast + l+P i=t+2 
Bi) + 
(l+P) 
ýt ý7s 
aS2 
2 
tt 
(l+P) 
(using the indivirlial optimal seamh condition) 
3L 
From /3B 
t=0 
it rrust be tnia that ýt > 0. Hence, as 
2 
ut a 2, j 
as 
2a2 
t St- 
> 
(from the second-order condition for the individual. search problem) it 
follows from 
aLt 
as t=0 
that *t < 0. fbarranging the first two equations 
yields the E 
allt+'/aBt+l 
a Bt 
I 
(*) 
lpt + T- 'j... , jt as t 
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Since < 0, (1-vt) >0 and 
av/as 
t>0, 
it is known that 
a lft+'/aBt+jL abt+l 
>a 
Zu t 
arjtlaBt - JL =; Po aBt+l aBt 
Given that au, 3B is independent of S and shows diminishing returns. it 
holds txue that 
aut+ 
3B 
i> au t 
=> B>B 
t+j aB tt t+l 
for all values of t. so that the optirral benefit scherre is uniformly 
declining over tin-e. This is the basic optinality result, arising from 
the fact that, for a given expected total of benefit payrrents, a declining 
benefit scherre elicits a higher level of job search than a constant one. 
That benefits asyrrptotically approach zero can be shown as follows. 
Suppose that as t approaches infinity, Bt approaches a finite positive 
limit, 1, that is, 
BM 
B=1,0 <1< oo . TheA, 
' 
because v (s )>0 for t" tt 
any St. the expression 
i 
7r (J-V 
00 B t+1 
+i 
j=t j-1 
B 1+P i--t+2 
( 
(1+p)j-t 
)I 
mist always exceed zero. Consequently, from 
3L /=0 and 
3L /=0 
lim 
aB t as t 
it is known that ýt >0 for any t and that t_,, ýt < 0. Using the expression 
above. this neans that 
ii. m 
allt+1/3Bt+l 
lim B t+l 
t-j", aut- /3B t4 t-*co Bt 
This contradicts the initial assurrption of convergence, however. and 
it cannot be true that benefits approach a positive limit. Whexe t-ýw 
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benefits wiU decline asyrrptoticaUy towards zero; whem the horizon 
is finite, - and t -* T for T<-, then the terminal benefit at T will be 
positive, and benefits will be declining at all durations up to T. 
The declining benefits result is not robustý and there are plausible 
circumstances in which it does rrt - perforce hold true. Within the present 
hcmogeneous population framework, the following three influences could 
potentiaUy overtum the result. 
(a) Non-separability of Indirect Utility Function 
As is noted by Shavell and Wbiss (1979), the declining benefits 
result is crucially dependent on the utility of the uneiTployed being 
separable in B and S. If non-separabil-ity is present, then the optinality 
conditions above are slightly nudified. yielding an expression 
aut+ I 
aBt+l t, 3t+lo, St+l) 
1+ 
*t av allt 
(Bt, St) - *t 
±Lt : 
Tl---%)t) * -Fst 3Bt aBtaSt 
Since *t <0 and 
a 2ut, 
3Bt3St >0 
(in general), the additional cross- 
derivative term counteracts the argument used above. Moreoverý even 
? at -- 
if / 
@Bt St 
is negligible and hence 
allt+l/ 
aBt+l 
> aut/ 
26t still 
holds 
true, it is quite conceivable for this to be satisfied by a rising benefit 
rate and fa1Jing search tirres. Consequently it is not possible to reach 
any definite conclusions under non-separable preferencesý and the outcome 
depends on the particular utility function in question. 
(b) Errployrmnt Probabilities Changing with the Duration of Unenployn-ent 
Errpirical work suggests that the long-term unerrployed have less cbanm 
of finding a job than those who have only been unerrployed for a short 
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tirre (1-bGregor (1978), Nickell (1979b)). To sorre extent this reflects 
the ncn-hcrmgeneity of the populatim with the more disadvantaged gro . UPS 
constituting a larger prcportion of the long-term unenployed (a situation 
discussed below). Nonetheless, even when the population is hamgeneous 
it renains possible that individuals who are jobless for a long period 
experience a diminishing probability of securing re-enployn-ent. An exanple 
is where enployers view prolonged unenploynent as indicative of scn-e 
undesirable characteristic possessed by the individual-, regardless of 
whether or not this is actually the case. 
Diminishing probabilities can be represented by rraking va function 
of t, so that vt= v(St, t), where 
3\)/ 
at < 
0. The key feature of the 
relationship is the effect of t on the returns to searcb, , and. ast 
since v declines with t, it is likely that as also 
declines with 
32\) t 
t. Accordingly it is assurmd that /as at < 0, and that at sorre point, 
t=i, 3\)/as 
t 
reaches a lower limit of zero 
t 
(av/ 
as t 
=a 
2 
V/ as tat 
=0 for 
t>i). In other wordsý, once an individual has been uneaployed for a 
sufficiently long tim (t>E), V becon-es fixed at sone, low constant value and 
job search ceases to have any effect. 
These assumptions do not significantly alter the analysis. and 
the first-order conditions are the sarre as those for the standard nudel. 
Hance 
3ut+'/ 
Bt+l 
3 t/ 3Bt 1+ av (s to t) 1-v(stot)- ý-S 
The argurrent given previously inplies a declining optin-al benefit rate 
up to tirre E; the-mafter 
3V/ 
as t 
beccrres zero, so that 
arjt+l 
/aB 
t+ 1 
ý- 
aut 
/aB 
t 
and benefits are constant. The optimal benefit scberre differs from the 
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standard case in that benefits can attain a limiting value within a finite 
tirre and need not decline to zero. Cn the other hand, the present case 
can never cn its own produce a rising optimal benefit scherre. 
(C) Preferences Changing with the Duration of Unerrploymnt 
Lherrployn-ent is known to have strong psychological effects on 
those concerned, which rray vary systematically with duration (Hayes and 
Nitman (1981), Jahoda (1982)). These effects are difficult to identify 
precisely, but it may nonetheless be desirable to allow for them by pennitting 
variation in individual preferences. Changing tastes are saTetines represented 
theoretically by an adaptive process, in which current utility is a function 
of consuaption levels in past periods (Raffmond (1976)). In the context 
of uneaployrrent. however. it is rmm appropriate to introduce the duration 
of unenployment directly as a parameter in the utility function. Suppose 
therefore that preferences take the form Ut U(Bt# Stj t), where t is 
the duration of unerrployrrent. The function is probably declining with 
t, altbough the effect rrELy be=rre less pronounced as t increases. Ebr 
the Optimal benefit scherre the most inportant -feature 
is the irrpact of 
t al 
au /3B , and theme is no conclusive a priori argunent as to whether t 
this is positive or negative: a sirrple discounting effect of t on U 
would leave it negative, but on the gax3al principle that low utility 
is associated with high mnginal utility, it would be positive. 
lhe cptimality conditions irrply that 
lut+i 
/@B 
t+l 
(B 
t+l' t+l) 
897 t/ 
3B t 
(Bto, t) +ýt av 
(1-V t ast 
and > 
au t 
3B t+l aB t 
(with ýt< 0) 
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if au ý is a decreasing function of t, then the outcom is rrerely 
to strengthen the previous conclusionsý and optinul benefits decline 
au 
over tirm. If, by contrastý /3B 
t 
rises with t, then increasing duration 
is conducive to the satisfaction of the inequality above. In cases where 
the inpact of t is large relative to that of a change in B, it is possible 
that the optinulity conditions are satisfied by benefits increasing over 
tiffe. It can thus no longer safely be concluded that cptirml benefits 
a declining. 
The effect of changing preferences is independent of job searcli., 
and is most apparent in a mxbl whexe no job search takes place. In 
that case the optirrality conditions reduce to an equating of marginal 
utilities over tim, so that 
aut 
(Bt, t) = 
au 
t+1 
3B - (B t+l) Vt t aB t+1 t+l, 
2- 
It foLlows that if U /3B3t < 0, then optimal benefits will be falling 
(i given 32 
fj 
/3 B2< 0), and vice versa; 
in other words the direction of 
movement of Bt is determined entirely by the effect of t on the marginal 
utility of inccme. Adding search behaviour means that a second dynamic 
element is superhyposed on the model, and, for the reasons given above, 
this acts in favour of declining optimal benefits., When 
au /8B 
t 
declines with 
t the dynamic influences are working in the same direction and optimal 
benefits are unequivocally declining; when 
0/3B 
rises with t they are 
working in opposite directions and optimal benefits nay rise or fall. 
depending on which influence predominates. 
The e=eptions to the uniformly declining benefits rule described 
so far are based on a single person model, but apply equally well to 
more general cases. Further doubts about the desirability of declining 
benefits arise within heterogeneous population models, and these are 
discussed below. 
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Optimal Tin-e-varying Benefits in Models with a Heterogeneous Population 
In reality the population's characteristics are almost certain 
to vary in ways that are relevant to the model. A particularly inportant 
feature is the fact that individuals do not share the sama enployment 
experiencesý and that some individuals are more prone to spells of unenployrrent 
than othexs (Disney (1979)). Such differences ixrply that the cross-sectional 
ccnposition of the uneaployedchayjes over tine, with the proportion of 
unenploymnt-prone increasing alongside the duration of uneuployffent. 
There is much enpirical evidence on the differing employment experiences 
of different groups in the population: expected duration can vary, for 
exanple, with age (Narendranathan, Nickell and Stem (1985)), occu pation 
(Nickell (1980)), raoe (Lynch (1983)) or location (Armstrong and Taylor 
(1985)). Allowing for this variation introduces an additional dynamic 
influence into the model, which may significantly modify the optinality 
results obtained for a homogeneous population. 
The heterogeneous case is not susoeptible to a recursive treatment 
(as in (i)), because the population caTposition is always dependent on 
past benefit levels. The analysis is therefore in terms of the Section (3) 
form of model, with movements occurring between employed and unerrployed 
states. It is analytical1y convenient to assunne that neither individuals 
nor the govenirrmt discount utility over the infinite future horizon. 
Two particular cases are distinguished, according to the presence or 
absence of groups who undertake no job search. 
Case 1: Disadvantaged groups do not undertake job s 
Suppose that the population is divided into two groups, differentiated 
by their enploynent conditions (generalising to aLLcw rmm than two groups 
or variation in other characteristics is straightforward). A proportion 
I ý3 
a of the population faces the employment conditions of Section (3), with 
a probability v(s) of finding a job when unemployed; the remaining 1-a 
of the population c-tre 'disadvantaged' facing the same chance V of losing 
a job. but having a chance Vt of finding a job, where vt < v(s) for any 
value of s. Hance the disadvantaged have a relatively low probability 
of obtaining a job and are unable to influence this probabi-lity by undertaking 
job search. The reasons for such a population structure are left unspecified, 
and are irrelevant to the model's outcome: the position of the disadvantaged 
could be due to exogenous institutional circumstances, or alternatively 
could be explained by their a4n personal characteristics. The disadvanted 
will not search for no return, and their utility when unemployed takes the 
6t = U(B, T) compared with 6= O(B, T-S) for the non-disadvantaged. 
As simplifying assumptions 6 is separable in B and S, and includes 
a utility penalty relative to U sufficient to rule, out moral hazard 
considerations. 
In order to iirplemnt policy the govenurent nust either have- 
full knowledge of the population groups, or at least be aware of their 
distribution (assigm-ent uncertainty). Under complete information it 
would in general be desirable to operate a separate benefit scheme for 
each group, but this approach is ruled out by assumption in the analysis 
below. In reality the very large nunber of groups within the population 
makes it impossible to segregate all the groups, leading to the inclusion 
of more than one type of individual- within the sama benefit schedule. 
The duration of unenploynmt is denoted by t, which can range 
from zero to infinity. The chance of being unenployed for exactly t 
periods decLines with t for the non-disadvantaged at a varying discount rate 
per period of I-V(s t ). Thus, if 
9 is the probability of being uneaployed. 
for all durations, it follows that the chance of being uneaployed for 
t periods is given by 
I £4 
t 
7r j-1 j=o 
(where vi denotes v(S i) and v_l = 0) 
The steady-state equation defining T is then 
Co 1 
7F 
ý* 
= 11 ( 1-T) 
,zI= 
(I-vj-l )l 
i=O j0 
so that 
00 i 
T= 11 iEo [j, =, O( "i-i )I ,I co c 7r (1-Vj-l) co i=O .I 
1+11 z -ff 
J-Vj_j 
j=oli =0( )I 
00 
where C -= 
1+P 7r 1-vj-j) ccnstant) 
Ibnoe the steady-state probability of being enployed is 
1-T=1 
c 
and the steady-state probability of being unerrployed for duration t is 
t 
Tr 
The situation for the disadvantaged is analogous, with the changing discount 
rates 1-vj, j =-- 0,..., -, replaced by the constant rate 1-vt. if St is 
the probability of the disadvantaged being uneriployed for any duration, 
it nust satisfy 
Z (1-v ) 
j=O 
Similarly, the probability of the disadvantaged being errployed. is 
vt 
11+vt 
and their probability of being unerrployed for exactly t periods is 
t 
t (1-v 
t+ 
N) 
t 
14S 
Govenurent policy reseables that in previous models, involving a tine- 
varying benefit Bt financed by a unifonn lunp-sun paymnt. 
Individual optimisation behaviour - In the present frarrework job search 
is only undertaken by the non-disadvantaged. The infinite horizon and 
no discounting assurrpttcns irrply that the expected sum of future utilities 
is infinite, so that optimisation instead involves the steady-state utility 
at any given date. This quantity is independent of whether or not the 
individual is unerrployed, and is equal to 
Tr ( 1-V 
i= =0 
i lu 
+ 11 coo [j: L I Dil 
Taking Bt. t=0,..., -, to be a known benefit schedule, the search optinum 
can be obtained by a conventional unconstrained maximisation, using the 
values St. t=0,..., -, as instnzrents. At the optimm 
00 1 
E 7T (1-vj-, ) 
au* -1 . i=t+llj=o 
I 
-av -S -C. U 
ast C2 t 
00 
t-l a- 
Tr (1-vl_, ) U. u i=t+ 1 
li 
=0 
3- av, 
7T (1-V FS +11 Tsf 
=0 
jt 
Co 
After rearrangement and sinplification this irrplies the optirral search condition 
-3ý 1 av 
Oo 
i[ii 
(1-vj 
as t as 7r -1) 
(U* 
7r ( 1-v j)t 
i--t+ =0 
t=0, .. o 'Go 
When benefits are constant, the condition above reduces to that of Section (3). 
Goverment Optimisation. Behaviour - Using the probabilities derived above, 
the expected revenue constraint takes the form 
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co it co [b 
- 1, z Tr ( 1-V )B + -4- 
[b 
- ji Z 
11, 
f 
i=o j=o il "V i=O 
where R denotes the per capita revenue requirenent in each period. Social 
welfare is some function of the utilities and enployment prnbabilities, 
and under utilitarian social preferences (assurred in the analysis below) 
is expressible as 
Co i 
Z5 Z Tr ( 1--v 3-1 )+ ji Z( 1--v )ü1 
IU 
i=O j =O ýil 11 
+V 
IU 
i=O 
The govenurent wishes to naximise V subject to the zevenue coristraint 
arid the individual optinul search conditions at all dates. Solution 
is by the Lagrangian rrethod, with a Lagrangian of the form 
V+ý 
(2-[b-, 
i 
c" i 
_1)Bil+ 
[b-ii 
(1-V )jBi]- R) c i=O j=O i i=O 
co co jil u1 av 
Tr ( 1-N) (U*- u sk j-1 3. k=O 
- 
ýak 
Tr (1-v 
as k i=k+ =0 
j=o 
using Bt. b and St. t=O,..., - as instrurmnts. The first-order conditions 
are: 
3L 
t 
aB 11 7r j-1 
t 
ISC 
i =0 P+v 
ýk av Co it au 
0k aSk i--k+l j=O 
i- c j=O j-i aB t 
ir (1--v i) j=O 
t-1 ýk av t al) 
=0 Zk. a( 1--vj-1) - lg-B-t 
k=O 
7r 
Sk * jl=r0 
j=O 
(noting that 
ýU-t 
= 
2LU 
, frum separability of t= 0'. 0., Co 
t 
aB 
t 
3B 
t 
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3L 
= 
(g.. 
+ 
(1-0i)2t 
ll+v 
t) 
. L, 
( 
ýu 
+ ab 
)- 
zk, a a k=O Sk 
Tr 
j=o 
Co i 
Z 7r (1-V--1) . i=k+ 1j --0 
1 au 
(The conditions for St. t=0,..., co are omitted). 
Initially it is helpful to identify the signs of the Iagrange 
rrultipliers ý and ý k, k=0,..., co .A rise in the revenue requimffent, R, 
would unequivocally reduce social welfare at the cptimmL irrplying that 
3L 
/3R ý-ý<0 and ý>0. In a similar way, an upward shift in the 
utility cost of searclý, -3U /aSk' ce 
. 
teris paribus. for any duration k 
would certainly reduce social welfare at the optimxr6 so that *k "ý 0, 
k=0,..., co. These inequalities correspond to those obtained for the 
model of part (i). 
The expLession 
00 co i 
-k ýs z Tr ( 1-v j-1 
k=O 
I 
1T ( 1-v 
k, i=k+l j=O 
i=o 
appearing in a. U the first-order conditions given above, is invariant 
with respect to t and can therefore be represented by a positive constant, 
D (since ýk < 01 Vk) 
For the purposes of corrparison, suppose firstly that a=1 and 
that the population is homogeneous, as in the previous nx)del 
In this case 
3L 
/=0 redaces to aB 
t 
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aL 1.1 t au 
t 
au 
aB -Z5 7f (1-vj-1) ýa-Bt -+c li Tr 
( 1-v j-1) aB 
j =O 
j=O 
t-1 & 
zk 
k=O Sk 
j=o 
t 
Tr ( 1-v lu- =0 j=o j-1 @B t 
t 
Dividing by Tr (1-vj_, ) and rearranging yields 
j=o 
11 (1+D) +t 
ýk IL- ol 
c k=O k at aB c 
1- 3-0 
+ve +ve +ve 
t= 
where the individual terms can be signed as above. The only expressions 
varying with t are the summation and 
au /3B 
t 
(which changes as Bt changes). 
Given that *k<0, vk, then the summation is decreasing with t (rising 
3n magnitude), and the positive square-bracketed expression is also decreasing. 
Consequently, for the equation to hold at all durations 
au 
/ 3B 
t 
nust be 
risingwith t, so that Bt is falling (if D is separable in B and S, and 
satisfies 
U/ 
3B 24 
0). Hence the uniformly declining benefits result 
carries forward to this nxxlel when the population is horvogeneous. 
ra-i---01 A second special case is the opposite extrerre to a=1, 
with a homogeneous population of non-searching individuals. The first- 
order conditions for this situation inply that 
au au 
aB t 
äb =ý 
so that the optimm involves a constant benefit rate. The outccrm is 
similar to the basic nx)del of Section (2), with moral hazard ruled out if 
U is sufficiently low relative to. U. 
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The main focus of interest is the effect of relaxing the hcmogeneity 
assuirption, by setting 0<a<1. 
3L t 10 <a<II Dividing the condition 0 by IT (1-, Bt j=0 
and rearranging yields 
Z 
[a t 
35 ID, t-1 *k 
++ 3B Eo k aB t0 t k- 
7T ( 1-Vj )kI j=o j=o 
(++) 
Consider firstly the position as t Fý: xn the assunption that Vý <V 
tt Vs, it is known that the expression (1-vt) /n (1-V j-1 ) is increasing j=0 
with t. The tenn 
t ýk 
k=O k 3s k 
j=o 
also increases in magnitude with t, but must be dominated asymptotically 
tt lim C-ýL by (1-vt) (1-v.. (otherwise =0 would imply that J-1 t-*w 3B 
BU/ 
j=0 
au t 
BBc, = 01 which 
is a contradiction if / aB > 
0, VB). 
It then follows that lim 3U 
t-+- TBt 
Now consider the situation for a finite uneaploynent duration, t< 
In the equation (++) above, the first squam-bracketed term is known to be 
positive. The sign of the second square-bracketed term depends on the 
relative size of the two elements ý 
co co Dp k aNj EI ck as 71 (1-V 
-1) 
4 and k--o 
IT (1-v j-1) 
=k+l j=o j 
, j=o - 
00 i 
+pE 7r ( 1-v j-1 
i--o j=o 
t *k 
k=o k TS 
IT (1-V j-1) j=o 
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Co i 
gZ Tr(1-v . 
Noting-that 
i=k+l j=O 3- 
<1 for k=O,... , Co 1 
i+P Z Tr j-i 
i--0 j =O 
it follows that as t. --ý- the limit of the right-hand (negative) expression 
must exceed the left-band expression in magnitude. Consequently, for 
t sufficiently large, the second square-bracketed expression in 
3L 
=0 
3L ' 
13B 
t 
mast beccrre negative. If =0 is to hold true for all, t. it is then 3B 
t 
apparent that for t sufficiently large 
azr 
- 3B 
t 
and 
aU 
8B 
t 
Thus, for sorre finite t, sufficiently large, 
au 
> 
lim 3u 
@B 
t t+- 
@Bt 
and hence B< 
lim 
-B t t+- t 
given the assumptions made about preferences. This shows that optimal 
benefits must eventually start to increase with unerrployn-ent duration, 
approaching their asyrrptotic limit from below. The previous uniformly 
declining benefits result no longer holds true, although it remains the 
case that optimal benefits wi 11 be declining at earlier unenployrrent 
durations. 
To see the latter point, consider the equation (++) above. At t=O 
this be=rres 
a 1-a ý)v au + 
Dýl 
+ aC* ýBo =0 ll+v 
Iý0 
Sinoe aU > 0, it foLlows that c a% 
<0 and 
au 
<ý 3D 
( au ;B 
0- 
TIC 
171 
Consequently, the initial benefit level B0 is higher than the terminal 
level B., which itself is higher than benefits at finite duration Bt. 
for t sufficiently large. Benefits rrust be decreasing at earlier durations, 
but ultimtely start to increase over the final approach to Bco . 
The outcare can be explaimad intuitively in terms of the expected 
cross-sectional carposition of the unemployed population. Among the 
newly unemployed (duration zero), the proportions are the same as in 
the entire population, with 1-a disadvantaged and a non-disadvantaged. 
As unemployrrent duration increases. however, relatively more of the non- 
disadvantaged succeed in finding work, so that the proportions alter 
in favour of the disadv&i taged. FornuUy, the expected conposition 
of the population unerrployed for duration t is given by 
Expected proportion of non-disadvantaged = 
aS t 
a6 t(l--a)at a+ vtc (1-vt t tt 
01+, Vt) 
t 
i=O 
Expected proportion of disadvantaged = 
(1-a)6t 
It 
adt+(l-a)6 
t 
t 
I-a 
(1-a) + ki +vt) 
vtc 
t 
7T ( 1- v j-1 
(I-V t)t 
(-o- as t -) 
(-)-l as t-ý-) 
A governmant which could identify the two groups would ideally like to 
inplenent a separate benefit schema for each :a constant rate for the 
non-searching disadvantaged, and a uniformly declining rate for the non- 
disadvantaged (declining because they undertake job search). In practice 
benefit schems have to cater for heterogeneous populations, as was assuned 
in the foregoing analysis. The position may be illustrated diagranTmUcally 
as below: 
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Separate scherres 
Nm-&sadvanfagad 
Beoefit 
rate, Bt 
a 
Uneryployn-ent duration, 
Lhified scherre at 
Disadvantaoed 
-- El.,, 
Broadly speaking, the unified scheme is a 'weighted average' of two separate 
scherres, in which the weights vary with uneriploymnt duration. As t 
increases, the disadvantaged form a relatively rmre irTportant corTponent 
of the unerrployed. and the unified scherre approaches the tim-invariant 
fonn associated with a hcmogeneous non-searching population. The urmployrrent 
duration is therefore being used as a source of information on population 
ccaposition, and as an inperfect rreans of identifying the disadvantaged 
individuals. 
Case 2: All groups undertake job search 
Suppose that the population is still divided into disadvantaged 
and non-disadvantaged qrcups, but that the disadvantaged are now able to 
influence their chance of finding work by undertaking job search. Let 
0 1; 0t 
0 1: 
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Vt(St) denote the re-errployffent probability for the disadvantaged, where 
Vt (S 
t)< 
v(S) for all values of St and S. The analysis goes ahead in 
a similar way to case 1, except that there are now two separate optinul. 
search conditions. 
3L t On dividing the first-order condition /aBt =0 by 
. 
IT (1-vj-, ) 
3=0 
and rearranging, one obtains 
t 
j, o I 
t+ 
3U 
T-B-t c 
j=o 
tt 
IT( 1--\) . 
t-1 
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&. 
9 au 
kýo )Z-- 
j- 
3B 
7r ( 
j=o 
+3 =() - 
LP 
+t2: 
1 el 
k. av t au = tGf -i -B- ' k 
Tr k=O ir (1-vý) 
ct 
j=O j-o 1 
t-'ýO, 
... 00 
where 6*k, k=O;...,,, , are the Lagrange rrultipliers on the search constraints 
of the disadvantaged, and F, G are the equivalent expressions to C, D, 
ttt 
with vt substituted for v t* 
As before the explosive term I (1-Vt- 1V 7r 
(I-Vj-l) 
3=0 I j-0 
daninates as t-ooo , but in this case it is also attached to the final 
expression related to the searr-h condition for the disadvantaged. Hence 
asyrrptotically there errerges an equation 
Co 0k 
avt 1 aü = ýll(1-a) l! -- k asý aBt k=O 
ff (jýVý) 
which is identical in form to that in case 1 where a=1, and irrplies benefits 
declining to zero. Thus, unlike case 1, the eventual dominance of the 
search effect for the disadvantaged will cause benefits to decline 
asyaptotically towards zero. 
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This outcaTe is intuitively appealing, since job search effects 
never disappear fran the model, even as t-iw. The cross-section of the 
unemployed is approaching a homogeneous disadvantaged population, which, 
given that it undertakes job search, would still give rise to declining 
optimal benefits. Nonetheless, it remains possible that at earlier unemployment 
durations optimal benefits nay rise over tine, owing to the population 
composition effects which are absent from the homogeneous population 
case. 
A nx)del ain-dng to represent reality closely would have to include 
many different groups of unemployed people facing different search probabilities. 
It is also likely that one or more disadvantaged groups experience employment 
probabilities largely outside their control. A more extensive nudel 
would amalgamate cases one and two above, and could easily produce a 
very complex cptimm. In these circumstances it is difficult to generalise 
about the optimal time pattern of benefits, a problem further compounded 
if (plausible) features like a non-separable indirect utility function 
are introduced. 
Other Relevant Issues 
Macroemnomic Conditions 
The assurrption of a fixed, exogenous rrecroeconanic situation 
is not necessarily appropriate, and errployrrent conditions may be dependent 
on policy decisions. This issue is considered within an explicitly nacroeconomic 
model in Chapter 6. 
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Insurance Premia 
In a state-run system of unenploymnt insurance there is no obvious 
distinction between corrpulsory contributions to the insurance scheme 
and other form of public finance (such as direct taxes). Hance it is 
not really possible to talk about insurw. ce premia. in the usual sense 
of the tenn. This notwiths tanding, one can still. pose the question of 
whether or not the state's n-ethod of financing should make use of infornution 
on an individual's errployment experiences. The discussion below considers 
this issue, and contrasts the outcome with that under a hypothetical 
private insurance policy. 
(a) Private Insurance 
Despite the non-existence of private unerrployrmnt insurance, it 
is of interest briefly to consider the likely features of such schenes 
if they were to be inplenented. The sam points can also apply to state 
schemes, wherever they seek to knitate =cnpetitive private insurance. 
Fbr a private insurance policy to operate, it nust be tnie that 
the expected returns to both insurer and insured are (or are believed 
to be) at least as good as the no policy situation. When individual 
risk patterns are observable by both parties, it is possible to tailor 
separate insurance schemes for each individual, and there is no theoretical 
reason why private insurance is not feasible. Under conpetitive conditions 
such schemes should just break even, and there would be no cross-subsidisation 
between different groups of the insured. In practice it is frequently 
the case that the insurer cannot observe the risk characteristics of 
the insured, leading to the problern of 'adverse selection'. As shown 
in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), the inability to distinguish different 
risk categories may result in the non-existence of a scherre which both 
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breaks even and insures the whole population. The standard explanation 
of the absence of private unenployment insurance is in terms of such 
rrarket failures. 
The me obvious source of infornation on the risk of unerrployffent 
is an individual's previous enployrrent record. As the current employmant 
spell proceeds, this is continually being updated in a favourable direction, 
so that it becomes increasingly less likely that an individual is unerrployrrent- 
prone. Thus, if private insurance was to operate (for, say, a subset 
of the population) it would generally be desirable for premia to be adjusted 
dowrwards with the current employmnt spell (from a starting point determined 
by past employment-experience). This is what happens in other types 
of private insurance, where individuals with a history of making no previous 
claims are offered discounts, 'no claims bonuses', and so on. It is 
also the idea behind the 'experience rating' in the U. S. (Becker (1972)), 
where a firm's insurance contributions increase with the nuaber of recent 
lay-offs it has imposed. 
State Insurance 
State unenploynent insurance schen-es are generally conpulsory, 
and can be financed by the imposition of taxes or other mandatory payments. 
Individuals with a low risk of unemploynent nay well nuke a net loss 
from the scheme, but are nevertheless forced to participate in it; conversely, 
unemployrrent-prone individuals are likely to make a net gain. Given 
that redistribution is taking place, it is rational to set the benefit 
rate on social welfare principles, as has been done throughout the models 
discussed in this chapter. On the whole the result should be superior 
to individualised private scheaes (if these were feasible), since actuarially 
fair insurance preserves the initial income distribution and is desirable in 
social welfare terms only to the extent that the initial position is 
desirable. 
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The aim of the discussion below is to consider the optimal time 
pattern of ccnpulsory state insurance contributions, in cases where they 
may be varied to take account of the current euployn-ent spell. It is 
assun-ed that the govenment cannot directly observe an individual's risk 
of job loss, but can use recent eaployment experience as an indicator 
of this. 
I., et the model take a discrete tima form, with a similar preference 
andprobability structure to those in Sections (3) and (4). Since job 
search is not gennane to this particular issue, it is excluded for sinplicity's 
sake. UTezploynrent benefits are paid out at the constant rate, B, but 
premiuTt payrrents, bt, can vary with the duration of the current period 
of eriploynent. Utilities are therefore expressible as 
Ut = U(p, w, wT-b t) 
for those enployed for duration t 
U= U(p, B, T) for the unenployed 
with notation as in previous nudels. includes a utility penalty 
sufficient to rule out moral hazard. Let. U* t and Ut denote the expected 
sums of future utilities for those eirployed for t periods and thase 
unexrployed respectively. Then U* t satisfies 
u+u+ (1-0) U t t+l 1+ 1) 
where Ii is the chance of job loss in any period, and p is the per period 
discount rate on utility. Repeatedly substituting for Ut+11 Ut+2 etc. yields 
1+1 
(X) 1 Go 
+P 0( 
+P) 
U U 411-1 Ut -- P) ut+i + 1=4175 Ut+i + f-11 V+P 
U rrust satisfy t-2 0 ... 11 CO 
U++U 
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where V is the fixed probability of obtaining a job in the next period. 
Substituting for U0 from the equation above and rearranging gives 
00 
Uil 
11+P 
U 
P, (P-fv+P) 
l+P) U+ \) z+P 1( i=o 
while substituting for U in the expression for Ut yields 
Oo I 
u=E (1-1ý: L * IN -2 (1+p) t Ut+i + P(11+v+p) -z 140) uI+ (11+v+ 10) u ) t=o, 
... co 
The last two equations are in terms of current utilities, and can therefore 
be used for optimisation. 
Me heterogeneous population is divided into two groups, differing 
both in their wage rates, W1 and W2, and their degree of job security, 
11 1 and 11 2* Without loss of generality, suppose that group one has th-- 
more secure enployrrent, so that 11 1< 11 2* Population ccuposition 
is such 
that a proportion aI axe Jn group one and a2 are in group two, where 
a1+a2=1. These values are known to the government, but there is 
assigrment uncertainty preventing the direct identification of the group 
to which an individual belongs. 
Social welfare is assumed to be utilitarian, and is dependent 
on the steady-state enployment and unenployfrent probabilities. Analogously 
to previous nudels, the probabilities are such that 
Ilk 
steady-state probability of being unerrployed, k=1,2 
k 
- V(1-U)j = steady-state probability of being eaployed for j Pk+V 
periods, k=1,2 
The social welfare fLncticn can therefore be written as 
17q , 
2k 
+ 
Iýk co i Uk Vak 
k=l, 21 
ýý 
1=0 
p co -11ý, 1 ak 11+ + Uk 
k=l, 2kPk +V 
10P 
i--o i+ TPJ 
co cc ý'-'IkY Uk +VZZj 
j+i j =0 i=o 
substituting for and UI from the equations above. In 
a similar WaY the exPected revenue constraint takes the fon-n 
Za __Lk 
j, 
V(1-11 bR+E 
Ilk 
B 
k=l, 2k lllý+V 
(i=O 
k i) k=1, Z k p, ý+v 
* 
whexe R is the revenue requireaent in each period. Solution is by the 
lagrangian nethod with bt, t=O,..., Oo, and B as instrLments: 
Pic 00 'b 
RE 
"k 
Ir, pI 'o 
('-Pk) ik lik+v 
[. 
k=l, Z kýý) i=O k=l, 2 
3L 0 => 
(1+p) aFJ 
TB p -3-B 
I 1_4 t U2 3L 
0 => 
(1+p) 111,11 
a utl 
+2 
at t 
t 
Tb-t p Ill +V - -Fb 
t, 
-71 
a 1111 
(1-11 At a2112 
11 +V T-- 11 +V 1 1,, 
) 
2 
(after dividing by (1-il t and rearranging) 
Let the large expressiai equated with 4 be denoted by A(t, bt). if 
A rises with t for a given value of b, then bt rrust be increasing with 
t in order to ensure that A=-ý holds (noting that A and 
BU 
/ab are 
negative, and 
32 U/a2<0 from the assunption of diminishing marginal 
utility of incon-e); conversely, if A falls with t for a given b, then 
bt rrust be declining with t. 
180 
The direction, of rrovenent of A with t is given by the partial 
DA 
derivative at, which satisfies 
1 
a lp Ia 2412 
ln 1- 
112 t3ui 
_jA 
(1+p) 
-* 
2ý 
- 3b 
t) 
3ttt p 
aP. 
+ 
/1-112ý ta 
2ý2 
ý2 
11 J+v 
ý1ý1 ) iýý) 
3A 
Ibnce ý-t has the sarre sign as 
in 
ý1-i-IA U, 
- 
aut, t 
t 
'g-bt 
By assurrption V2 > 111 . so that In <0 
3U2 1 
and 
3A >0 
as t 
au 
t 
'Yb-t 7b-t 
Provided that leisure is a nornul good. 
aut 
is increasing 
. 
with the /3bt ** 
wage rate for all t. 
3A >< ConsExpently rt =0 as W=W <2>1 
which ffeans that at the optimm (for 1.1 2> 
11 
1), 
W2 > Wl decreasing 
W2 Wl => premia conkant 
W2 W 
fincreasing 
In other words, if W and ji are positively correlated, prwda rise with 
and vice versa. 
Setting t to 0 and - in the first-order condition yields 
a5 r131,11 ý; 
au' a2 il 2 aý 1 a ul 
+rz l * a7o 112 ab 0 
As t-ý-, the proportion of group two individuals anmg the enployed approacbes 
zero (given that 11 2> 11 1 ), and b approaches the level appropriate to 
a hcnx>geneous group one populaticn. 
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This outcorre arises from straightforward redistributive considerations, 
md is intuitively quite obvious. On uti-litarim grounds the goverment 
would like to b-rpose higher contributions on individuals with a higher 
wage rate (and thus a lower n-arginal utility of incorm). But if b is 
restricted to be a function of t alone, then there can be redistribution 
among the errployed only if job security is systerratically related to 
the wage rate. In that event the expected proportion of the errployed 
with a high wage rate rises or falls with tý allowing bt to be adjusted 
accordingly. The case for moving premia is entirely motivated by the 
desire to make income transfers between the employed. and has little 
directly to do with insurance matters. It should be noted that simultaneous 
variation in W and 11 is the only situation in this model giving rise 
to non-constant premia. - for variations in any other parameters or in 
W and 11 individually the optimal premia, are constant (as there is no 
sense in which employment duration conveys useful information). 
rhe nxxlel bas close parallels both with the characteristics nndels 
of Chapter 2 and the varying uneuployment benefits nxxbl of Section (4) 
above. In the latter case it is almost the reverse of the earlier mdel, 
with benefits now held constant and contributions allx: )wed to vary in 
line with changing population caTposition. The following furtlx-x coments 
can also be nude. 
Firstly. the nx)del is highly sinplified in its assunption of 
two groups and perfect correlation between 11 and W. In reality them 
would be mny differmt values of 11 and W, and less than perfect correlation 
between them. Generally speaking, the lower is the correlation involved, 
the less will be the case for premia moving with t. 
secondly, if ji and W are directly observable, then the policy 
cptimn inplies a separate cor. Vzu. t payrrent cbarged to each f1j. Wj group 
l9z 
(essentially, a first-best incare transfer). Equivalently, if P. alone 
is directly observable, the model reduces to a special case of the optimal 
taxation of a fixed characteristic. For non-constant premia to be justified 
it must be true that direct contributions cannot be levied - the most 
likely reason for this is assignment uncertainty, but other forms of 
exogenous constraint are also possible. 
Thirdly, casual empiricism suggests that the best paid employment 
also has greater job security, so that Ii and W are negatively correlated. 
This implies that optimal premia rise over time, in contrast with the 
outcome of a hypothetical private scheme. 
(iii) Saving Behaviour 
In the models above it has been assmed that consurrption is always 
equal to current incorre, so that there is no saving or borrowing taking 
place. The possibility that -individuals anticipate unerTploymnt and 
try to nuke their own provisions for it is consequently ruled out, and 
the unenployed are totally reliant on their benefit receipts. This view 
is not especially inplausible, as individuals in lowly paid, insecure 
jobs do not usually accumlate large savings, and have no easy access 
to borrowing. Nevertheless, in situations with zero or negligible unenployment 
benefits there would be a strong incentive for individuals to save part 
of their incom, and it is therefore of sorre interest to consider this 
issue. 
The role played by savings is a central concern of the papers 
by Baily (1978) and Flemning (1978). As Flem-ning points out, in an infinite 
horizon model with identical individuals, a perfect capital market and 
a zero interest rate, there is no need for uneuployn-ent benefits. This 
follows sinply frcm the fact that under these conditions individuals 
Iss 
can fleely and costlessly transfer inccme between effployed and unerrployed 
states, and do so in a way which maximises their expected utility, giving 
the same result as obtained through optimal unemployffent benefits (with 
no rroral hazard). The observation does not extend to populations varying 
in the wage rate and job security, as unerrployment benefits can then, 
be justified by redistributive considerations. Where thiere are perfect 
capital markets with positive interest rates, individual saving/borrowing 
decisions do not necessarily coincide with the gove=m7ent's, and therefore 
inpose an additional constraint on the government's optimisation problem. 
This case is awkward to analyse in a general theoretical manner, but 
Flemming's numerical exanples suggest that the optimal benefit level 
is lower when saving and borrowing is present. Such an outcoffe is intuitively 
appealing, since individual saving at the optimLzn is liable to reduce 
the need for benefits, even if it is not a particularly desirable feature 
from the government's viewpoint. 
In relating models with rational savings to actual behaviour, 
there are two mdn points to be made: 
(a) It is certainly not true that individuals face a perfect capital 
market, and the abi-lity of unerrployn-ent-prone individuals to borrow is 
severely restricted. This irrplies that individuals cannot fully plan 
their future consurrption, even if they wish to do so. 
(b) The assurrption of rational saving behaviour seems to overstate 
both the willingriess and capacity of individuals to make such long-term 
decisions. People are likely to differ in this respect, but even the 
mst 'responsible' and well-infonned would not find it easy to make accurate 
planning decisions related to job security. Individuals MErywell be . 
contEnt to transfer their provision for unemployment collectively to the 
government. 
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In zeýity there does exist a certain an-aunt of workers' saving 
and borrowing, and a truly comprehensive theoretical discussion would 
have to include them. These aspects are not necessarily well depicted 
by a perfect capital market and rational saving behaviour, however, and 
to extend the nx)del in that way is not obviously to improve it. The 
problem of adequately representing workers' savings is difficult, and 
no attempt is made here to solve it, in the presumption that it is not 
of critical importance in the present context. Nonetheless, one should 
acknowledge that the presence of savings can potentially influence the 
welfare optimzn. 
Variable Size of Labour Force 
It is sometimes argued that uneffploynent benefits have an krpact 
on the size of the labour force, with high benefits encouraging scrre 
individuals to register as uneaployed who would not otherwise have done 
so. The previous models in this chapter have taken the labour force 
to be independent of the benefit level, and have thezefore excluded this 
effect; in practice its importance is not clear, although it probably 
exists to some degree. A sinple variable labour force model is considered 
below. 
Fbr labour force variability to occur at all, the model nust 
have two features: 
(a) A significant group of individuals rrust have suf ficient non- 
errploynent inccrre to be able to subsist without employment or receipt 
of benefits. Otherwise people sinply have no choice but to register 
as part of the working population, and thereby guarantee at least a minimm 
incon-e. In reality most households have relatively low levels of unearned 
income, leaving little question that at least one nimber nust seek enploynent. 
F Iss. 
The participation issue is therefore largely influenced by the behaviour 
of secondary workers in households. 
(b) The population rrust have varying degrees of reluctance to join 
the labour force. If there is no cost attached to registering as unemployed, 
then all individuals have an incentive to claim urAmployirent benefits, 
even if they have no intention of finding erTploymnt. Fbr this not to 
happen there must be scrre disutility attached to signing on, for example, 
the stigma of being unerrployed or the physical inconvenience of claiming. 
Given that individuals differ in these attitudes, there nay then be a 
gradual inflow into the labour force, as benefits increase sufficiently 
to overcome the reluctance of various groups to claim them. 
By including these two properties, the following model allows 
for a labour force of varying size. Suppose that the basic structure 
is that of Section (2), with a single date and no job search. The total 
population is H, and enployment is fixed at E, so that the rerraining 
H-E individuals have to decide whether or not to register as unenployed. 
All individuals are assuTed to have the sanre unearned incom, M(>O), 
but they differ in their attitude to being unenployed. This is represented 
as a fixed monetary cost, k, to be set against the benefit receipt, B, 
inplying that 
U= UJ(P, M+B-k, T) 
Preferences are therefore discontinuous at the point of meWloyment, 
and k is the caTpensating variation rreasure of the disutil-ity of being 
unerrployed. Values of k varying between 0 and k, and are distributed 
according to the density function f(k), satisfying 
f(k) dk = H-E 
JR 
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(there are no negative k1s, so nobody actually enjoys being unenployed). 
The E enployed individuals are not included in f(k), and are assumed 
to have a value k=O when considering whether or not to declzm themselves 
unenployed - this maximisess the incidence of rmral hazard. and allows 
it to be inposed as a prior constraint. 
Within the frarrework above, a person not enployed will register 
as officially unerrployed if B>k, that is, if the benefit payrrents exceed 
the monetary disutility of being on the dole. Given the distribution 
of k it follows that for any particular value of B, a total of F(B) individuals 
register as unenployed, where F is the cunilative distribution function 
associated with the density function f. By definition F(B) = f(B) >0, 
so that a rise in the benefit rate increases the size of the labour force, 
equal to E+F(B). Benefits are financed by a uniform luiTp sum, b, charged 
only to those in enploynent (the model could alternatively be defined 
with b paid by all individuals not registered as unenployed, thus increasing 
the inoentive to enter the labour force). Population structure and preferences 
are such that 
E= nunber of enployed, with a single wage rate and utilities 
U(p, w, wT+M-b) 
F(B) = total nuTher of registered unemployed, comprising f (k) individuals 
in each group 0<k<B, with uti IJ ties U(2, M+B-k, T) 
H-E-F(B) = nurTber of non-participants in labour force, with utilities 
U(2, M, T) 
where 0 is the rationed version of U. The uti IJ tarim social welfare finction 
is given by 
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V= EU(p, 
- 
w, w-T+M-b) + 
0 
(H-E-F(B)) O(p, M, T) 
U(p, M+B-k, T) f (k) dk 
and the government's revenue constraint by 
R+ BF(B) = Eb 
To avoid the presence of moral bazard, one also has to impose U >, 6(p, M+B, T). 
The Lagrangian and first-order conditions are 
L=V+ý (Eb-BF(B)-R) + ý(U-O(p, M+B, T)) 
B 
3L C(p, M, T) f (B) + 
La 
(p, M+B-k, T) f (k) dk TB 3B - 
0 
U(p, M, T) f (B) - ýF(B) - (B) (p, M+B, T) @B 
a5 (p, M+B-k, T) f (k) dK (F(B) +Ef (B) 5-B - 
0 
3u (p, M+B, T) = - ý) 7B 
- 
K=E 
-Lu + ýE + 4kaatu =0 Tb ab 
aL 
aý U-U >, 0 
Vu-u) 
These differ frcm the standard case only in the condition 
@L /3B = 0, 
where B appears as the upper limit of the integral and there is the additional 
tem -ýBf(B). Thus, a rise in benefits increases the size of the labour 
force, extending the marginal utility effect via the 
au /3B terms but also 
incurring an extra revenue cost ýBf(B). As previously, the outcCme is 
likely to be at the corner solution U=5(p, M+B, T) if leisure is a nonral 
good, although the presence of the term ýBf(B) can potentially give an 
interior solution. 
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There is no particular reason to suppose that a variable labour 
force model produces a dramatically different and less favourable outcane 
than the static case. In social welfare terms it can even have a beneficial 
effect, as it widens the range of individuals over which redistribution 
takes place - from this perspective the fact that it may lower the optimal 
benefit rate and increase the rate of registered uneuploymeant is irrelevant. 
On the other hand, the outccnv-- might be less favourable when there is 
wide variation in unearned incmv--s (unlike the constant M above) and society 
is inequality averse. An inflow of more prosperous non-working individuals 
into registered unemployment as benefits increased might then constitute 
a genuine burden on the 'bona fide' unemployed and on social welfare. 
The decision on whether or not to include labour force variation 
as a major influence in the models depends on its prominence in reality. 
Actual unearned inccmes are not very high in most cases, and this will 
tend to reduce the relative costs involved in being uneirployed. For exanple, 
in the model above the worst thing that can happen to an individual is 
to be on the unemployment register with a benefit rate of zero, thus facing 
the cost k but receiving no benefit to ccrrpensate - if net incm-e- equivalents 
never beccm negative (as seerm reasonable), this means that T: <M and 
that the general level of k values tends to decrease with M. Where M 
is insignificant, there is-a probability that k is also mall, and that 
the extent of labour force variation is limited. On this basis one can 
say that models with a varying labour force are more general than the 
fixed case (since the latter is included as a special case of the former), 
but that their additional ccnplexity is not necessarily capturing an in-portant 
part of the problem. There are same situations in which labour force 
movements can play a much more praninent role. For example, the Harris-Todaro 
model of developing econcmies (Todaro (1969)) is formally similar to the 
case considered above, and represents a situation where rises in urban 
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incomes provoke a large scale inflow into the urban labour force from 
rural areas. The effects may be large enough to nullify any attempts 
to improve urban conditions, and are thus of an entirely different magnitude 
from those pertaining to a developed economy. 
(V) Worksharing 
One final issue is noteworthy. Given an exogenous; macroeconomic 
situation with a fixed total number of working hours in each occupation, 
the optimal policy response is to share out the work available over the 
entire group eligible to do it. At the optimum the marginal social utility 
of extra working time is equated for all individuals within a particular 
occupation, an example of the quantity allocation of Section (3). Worksharing 
of this sort does not take place in reality, and unemployment is concentrated 
among a small group of individuals who are completely idle. Such an arrangen-ent 
is the least efficient possible in social welfare terms, whence the need 
for merrployxent benef its. 
Worksharing would be practicable only in situations of long-term 
unemployment, caused by chronic demand deficiency or structural problem 
(and the former case ought to be avoidable by rational intervention). 
Its absence from the foregoing optimality models can therefore be justified 
if they are supposed to be representing short-term frictional unemployment. 
For other situations worksharing is in theory preferable to redistribution 
by unerrployment benefits, so the optimisation fra-rework does not itself 
explain the use of a benefit system: benefits only arise as the result 
of an exogenous fixity of existing work patterns. As with the question 
of macroeconomic conditions, this demonstrates the partial nature of the 
models being considered. 
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(6) Conclusion 
There is no single conclusion, but the following points merit 
re-eiTphasis 
M Even in the very simplest models, little can be said about optimal 
benefit levels without specifying the functional forms of individual preferences. 
Such an outcome is a common feature of optimal policy models, encountered, 
for exanple, in optimal taxation theory. 
(ii) The discussion has sought to indicate the wide range of features 
which way influence optimal unemployment benefits (and the coverage is 
probably not comprehensive). To include them all simultaneously in a 
unified theoretical model would be well nigh impossible, so one is left 
with several alternative simplif ied cases highlighting different aspects 
of the problem. In trying to represent an actual economy, it would be 
necessary to make an empirically based judgement on which are the most 
important influences. 
(iii) The format of optimisation used is not necessarily appropriate 
to all unemployment situations. In particular, positions with chronic 
demand deficient or structural unemployment generally need additional 
policy tools, whose inclusion may significantly alter the nature of the 
policy optimum. Models of optimal unemployment benefits are most easily 
carpatible with the presence of only frictional unemployment, and to depict 
positions which do not fall into this category a different theoretical 
approach may be preferable. 
II 
CHAPTER 6: MACK)ECONOMICS, THE UNEMPLOYED AND UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
(1) Introduction 
Macroeconamics had its origins in a single policy issue, the 
chronic unerrployment of the nineteen-twenties and thirties. Keynes's 
'General Theory' was written as the formalisation of certain (already 
existing) policy beliefs in a way that would be acceptable to the economics 
profession (Keynes (1936), Chapter 1); it did not arise from a spontaneous 
desire to refornulate economics, but from the wish to further a particular 
view of policy. The structure of macroeconomic theory reflects these 
beginnings, in that it depends on a nurber of casual enpirical observations 
and is not constructed on axiomatic lines. To the extent that it preserves 
its original identity, macroeconomics is still chiefly geared to the 
probleno of chronic uneirployrrent and excess capacity. 
In view of this background it is a little surprising that unemployment 
does not feature more strongly in Keynesian models. The original neoclassical 
approach to macroeconomics believed in an - equilibritrn tendency towards full 
eiTployrrent, and understandably bad little to say about the unerriployed. 
But Keynesian theory rests on the idea that there is no such tendency, and 
that unenployrrent is a ccranon occurrence in unregulated capitalist economies. 
Consequently it might well be expected that Keynesian modelling has 
unerrployment as a major elezent, and incorporates the unerrployed as a 
significant group within the population. This is not the case, however, and 
me looks in vain for any ny, --ntion of the uneirployed in the conventional 
forrrvilation of macroeconomics. 
The discussion below has a siriple and limited objective : to 
introduce the uneirployed into a Keynesian income-expenditure model, thereby 
ilz 
highlighting their central role in national incorre adjustrrents. Section (2) 
describes the reasoning behind this, and sets out the basic model. 
Section (3) considers the inpact of uneirploymnt benefits, both directly 
and through job search effects. Section (5) discusses the long run position, 
and Section (6) concludes. 
(2) A Sinple Keynesian Model with Unenployrrent 
Keynesian economics is largely a model of national income, 
explaining how the level of national income (and thus economic activity) is 
determined in the short run. At any given tirre total income must be equated 
with total expenditure, and any injections to or withdrawals from the 
circular flow of income must balance. In the sinplest closed econorny with 
no government, investmeant expenditure, I, is the only injection and savings, 
S, the only withdrawal, yielding an ex post requirement that I=S. 
Expenditure is usually divided between consumption and investment, with the 
latter assumed to be determined exogenously by businessmen and inherently 
volatile in nature. Consumption, C, is systematically related to national 
income, Y, in such a way that 
3C 
/ 
ay < 
1; their relationship can be summarised 
by the linear consurrption function, C= a+bY, where b(<l) is the marginal 
propensity to consurre. Because I is fixed exogenously the equality of 
incorre and expenditure is brought about by adjustment of the other two 
linked variables, Y and C. The system is as follows: 
C+S :-C+I 
,C=a+ bY 
a+I 
1-b 
National incon-e settles at the level above, irrplying that any rise in I has 
an effect on Y that is magnified by the 'multiplier' 
1 /1-b (>l). There is 
no reason to believe that Y represents full employment, which is assimed 
to occur at some predetermined income level. 
The derivation of national income outlined in preceding paragraph 
rests on two main foundations; the notion of the consuiption function 
and the idea that national income adjusts to equate savings and investment. 
Consider firstly the consunption function. As utilised in macroeconomic 
analysis this is defined in aggregate terms, relating national income to 
total consumption expenditure in the economy. The same is not true of the 
reasoning behind the function, which is usually expressed in terms of 
individual behaviour. Keynes's preferred functional form (derived in 
Chapter 8 of the 'General Theory) depends on a corrbination of introspection 
and casual observation, and is not formally related to any theory of choice 
behaviour; the resulting 'psychological law' states that consunption rises 
with income, but in a lesser proportion. This seems to be a reasonably 
accurate view of reality based on plausible premises. To move to an aggregate 
formulation it is necessary to take account of the distribution of income; 
Keynes was aware of this, but assumed that the aggregate curve would display 
characteristics similar to the individual curves. For a given income 
distribution this should generally be true. When employment is varying, 
however, the income distribution does not remain static. 
The other main feature of the Keynesian model is variations in 
national income. Unlike expenditure, incorre is not disaggregated in Keynes-s 
fornulation of wacroeconomics and is depicted as the single variable, Y. 
When Y changes, the inccnr-s of different nembers of the population must also 
be changing, mostly in the same direction. One is prcnpted to ask how this 
happens. Whose income changes when the economy faces cyclical booms and 
recessions? It is easier to start by identifying whose inccrre is not 
Wt 
changing. A wage earner who remains errployed through a recession does not 
face a major fluctuation in income; life just continues as normal, doing 
the same job for the same wage. Sirrple Keynesian models usually assume 
constant prices and money wages, but even if these are moving they are 
likely to do so together, in such a way that real wages do not show much 
short run variation. This fact is a familiar property of recessions. Those 
who kept their jobs in the nineteen-thirties did not face falling real 
inccrres or living standards; average real wages rose slightly, and there was 
little sign of hardship among the en-ployed (Mowat (1955), Chapter 9). 
Casual observation suggests that the same is true in the current recession, 
and that the majority of the employed have not faced significant changes 
in living standards. The experience of the unenployed is strikingly 
different. A person laid off during a recession loses all wage income and 
becomes dependent on social security receipts. The fall in income sustained 
depends on the generosity of unenployment benefits, as sumiarised in the 
average replacement ratio; at current and historical U. K. benefit levels 
the income loss is substantial. Statistics and effpirical studies have 
generally confirmed that unemployment significantly increases income inequality: 
see, for exarrple, Lydall (1959), Blinder and Esaki (1978), and Gramlich (1974). 
The fortunes of the working population are therefore sharply divided 
according to employment status, and income adjustments are concentrated 
among the jobless. Since a large majority of the population is dependent on 
wage income, this division defines the position of most people during a 
recession; it also accounts for the largest part (albeit a smaller proportion) 
of national income. The other main income source is profits, which can 
also be expected to vary over the business cycle. Keynes said little about 
profits, and they do not appear in conventional macroeconomic models. more 
attention is given to them in Kalecki's version of macroeconamics (Kalecki 
IqS 
(197.1)), where they account for a roughly f ixed proportion of national 
inccrre, determined by the 'degree of monopoly'. Other things equal profit 
inccrre can be expected to rrave procyclically, increasing in a boa-n and 
fal I ing in a recession. One is left with a wel I def ined picture of how 
cyclical variations in national incoffe affect individuals. Those who rerr)ain 
eirployed car-ry on more or less as normal, and adjustrrents in inccrre are 
shared between the unenployed and recipients of prof it. 
The divergence in experience is concealed by conventional Keynesian 
theory, which is def ined in terms of the aggregated variable, Y. By using 
Y in a consumption function based on notions of individual behaviaur, the 
implication is that it accurately reflects the income changes faced by 
individuals. In other words, the distribution of income is assumed to 
remain unchanged, so that all individuals face equivalent income adjustments 
and the aggregate consumption function is defined by similar behavioural 
parameters to individual consumption functions. This is a long way from 
reality. Changes in national income are closely linked to predictable 
variations in the distribution of income and to movements in the employment 
level. There is no such thing as a general fal I in incomes; national income 
falls through the income losses of those becoming unemployed and through 
reductions in profit. It follows that fluctuations in national income are 
inextricably bound up with changes in the en-ployment level, and that the two 
should be considered together. EiTployment is, in fact, the agency by which 
movements in national income are accomplished. 
In order to allow for the points made above, enployrTent changes must be 
integrated with the usual Keynesian analysis -of national inccrre determination. 
This can be done quite straightforwardly, as below. 
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(i) Basic Model 
In the following discussion national income varies through changes 
in enployment income, which in turn adjusts by changes in the nurber of 
people employed. Profit inccffes are ignored, although introducing them 
would alter little if they are a constant proportion of income, on Kaleckian 
lines. The fixed working population of L individuals is divided between 
the enployed receiving wage income and the unenployed receiving social 
security payments. For sinplicity's sake these are taken to be hcmgeneous 
groups, represented by an 'average' wage and a uniform unemploymeant benefit. 
The wage rate does not have to be identical for all the employed but 
unemployment has to affect all individuals with the same probability, 
regardless of their wage. In that case the wage distribution is independent 
of the enployrrent rate, and erTployment changes can be discussed in terms 
of the nean wage in the distribution. The inplications of dropping this 
assumption on wages are considered below. Two steps are required to set 
up the model, looking firstly at the composition of aggregate income and 
then at the composition of aggregate expenditure. 
The initial step is to set out the relationship between errployrrent 
and the level of national inccrre. Under the assuription in the preceding 
paragraph this takes its sirrplest possible form. Let E denote the 
errPloyment level (so that L-E individuals are unerrployed) and M the average 
gross income in the invariant wage distribution. National inccire is then 
the sun of enployrmnt incomes in the population. In other words 
Y= EM 
where Y is national inccrre. Income receipts by the unenployed are counted 
as transfer payments and do not appear in the national inccme assessment. 
For a given M, aggregate inccrre can thus be treated as directly propor-tional. 
to enployment. 
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It remains to specify the nature of aggregate expenditure. 
Follawing Keynes, individual consuniption is based on the 'psychological 
law' that expenditure rises with income but at a lesser rate. Consuaption 
adheres to the pattern 
C=a+ bD 
for all individuals, where b(<l) is the marginal propensity to consume, 
a is a positive constant, and D is the individual's disposable income. 
If the eriployed are taxed at the rate t, then their rrean disposable income 
is given by (1-t)M. The L-E unenployed individuals receive a uniform 
social security payment of R, expressible as ýM, where ý(<l) is the average 
(gross inccm) replacement ratio. To assume a broadly uniform benefit is 
a reasonable approximation to reality, although iý can alternatively be 
interpreted as the iman of a range of benefit payments. This makes no 
difference to the niodel's outcome, and the fact that ý is less than unity 
is beyond any doubt. Total consunption expenditure is the sum of the 
expenditure of the enployed and unenployed, so that 
E(a+b(l-t)M) + (L-E) (a+b7M) 
= E(a+b(l-t)M) + (L-E)(a+býM) 
= L(a+býM) + (1-t- ý)bEM 
This relation is equivalent to the aggregate consumption function in the 
usual formulation, writing EM as Y. It differs in one important respect, 
narrely that aggregate consumption depends explicitly on enployrrent as well 
as on the level of disposable incomes. It is interesting in this regard to 
note Keynes's comment on p. 90 of the 'General Theory I, to the ef fect that 
the consumption function should really be defined in terrrs of enployment. 
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This was not pursued further because Keynes felt that the distribution 
of employment between industries could be assumed approximately constant, 
which implies a unique relation between Y and E. The same assumption is made 
here, since M does not alter with E, but there is also the presence of the 
unemployed, who enter as another I industry I into aggregate expenditure. 
Unlike the situation within the employed population, the distribution of 
expenditure between the enployed and uneirployed cannot reasonably be assumed 
invariant, hence the need for the revised model suggested here. Other 
expenditures are divided between investment, I, and governirent spending, G; 
the econany is assumed to be closed to foreign trade to sirrplify the model. 
In the usual manner these expenditures are autoncmous, with investirent as 
the most volatile component of aggregate demnd. 
The national incorre level is derived as in the standard Keynesian 
model. At any tine aggregate inccme must be equated with aggregate 
expenditure, and their identity is achieved through variation in the income 
level. In this case, however, income variations are specifically associated 
with changes in the en-ployrrent rate. The full model and solution are 
as below: 
IncaTe Y= EM 
Expenditure X=C+I+G 
= L(a+býM) + (1-t-flbEM +I+G 
L, M, ý and t are assuned constant in the period considered. 
Incare = Expenditure 
=; ý CI+G 
4 EM = L(a+b4M) + (1-t-flbEM +I+G 
H 
Solving for Y and E yields 
y= L(a+býM)+I+G 1"(l-t-ý)b E= 
L(a+b4M)+I+G 
M(l-(1-t-flb) 
Y satisfies an equation similar to that in conventional models; in this 
case E is also defined by the n-odel, such that E=y /M. The outcorre can 
be illustrated diagrammatically as below: 
Inocrre/ 
- -I.. - t. -q)erbaiuire Incare (Y=ME) 
Expenditure (X=C+I+G) 
y 
(1-t-flbM 
m 
0L 
Eirployed Unenployed 
Instead of plotting income against itself and -using the 450 line as an income 
curve, it is now possible to plot income directly against enployrrent. The 
income curve shows the positive relation between income and eirployrrent, and 
has a slope equal to the nean exrployrrent income. The expenditure function 
is akin to the standard consurrption function, with a slope dependent on 
the inarginal propensity to consume. Y and E are determined at the intersection 
of the two curves; in the usual Keynesian fashion there is no guarantee 
that E is at the full enployment level, giving rise to unenployment L-E 
on the bottom axis. 
An increase in either I or G shifts the expenditure curve upwards 
by the anount involved. Y then rises in greater proportion, subject to the 
nultiplier relation 
F wo i 
ay 
ai -T--( -1- t-Qb 
The eirployment multiplier can be defined as M 
! E-, 
relating the number of 31 
jobs implicit in the initial investment expenditure to the total number of 
jobs created. This takes the same value as the income multiplier, owing 
to the linear relationship between Y and E. 
In other respects the m)del reproduces the conclusions of the simple 
Keynesian analysis. A rise in G has the same impact as a rise in I, 
implying that increased government expenditure is a possible way of preventing 
chronic cyclical unemployment. Reductions in t also have an expansionary 
effect, and can be seen as a potential policy tool. The impact of ý is 
discussed in Section (3). 
The diagram above resenbles the aggregate supply/demand analysis 
of Weintraub (1958), Davidson (1962) and Davidson and Smolensky (1964), 
although its interpretation is rather different. In particular, the incorre 
curve is not tied to any behavioural. view of the labour market, and nerely 
represents the variation of incorre through eirployrrent changes. One would not 
expect this relationship always to be linear in reality, but the exact nature 
of its curvature is not innediately apparent. Two main alternative views can 
be put forward: 
(a) Inccrre and Expenditure Curves Concave 
In practice job losses are unlikely to be representative of average 
wages in the econany. Casual empiricism indicates that most redundancies 
occur among low paid, unskilled workers, whereas senior positions are 
relatively more secure. This view is formalised in hierarchical or 
organisational theories of the firm (Simon (1957), Williamson (1975)), which 
see both remuneration and job security increasing as the summit of the 
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hierarchy is approached. Similar conclusions are implicit in dual labour 
market theories (Gordon (1972) , Doeringer and Piore 
(1971)), which contrast 
the secure jobs in the 'internal' labour market with unskilled ones in the 
secondary labour market. Alternatively, one can appeal to purely 
neoclassical theory, based on diminishing marginal productivity in 
technical production. Either way round the Xediction is that average 
wages and incomes increase as national inccme falls, because of the loss of 
below average incomes. The result is a 'batting average' effect: removing 
the tail-enders increases the team's batting average but decreases its 
aggregate score. Such arguments were used by Keynes to suggest that real 
wages move counter-cyclically (Keynes (1939)). Keynes's analysis is based 
on marginal productivity considerations, although similar conclusions can 
also follow fran alternative approaches to the labour market. 
(b) Inccme and F-xr)enditure Curves Convex 
Empirical work does not always confirm that real wages Move 
counter-cyclically, as was pointed out soon after the 'General Theory' 
was published (Dunlop (1938), Tarshis (1939)). The effects in (a), while 
still present, inay be outweighed by other factors working in the opposite 
direction. M-o-- chief possibility here is the impact of the business cycle 
on wage bargaining. If a recession impairs the bargaining power of employees, 
it is possible that real wages and earnings tend to fall in a recession and 
rise in a boorn. 
Cases (a) and (b) merely alter the curvature of the inccrre and 
expenditure curves, without changing the basic format of the model. In 
(a) the en-ployrrent multiplier exceeds the incam multiplier, and vice versa 
in (b). The central point ren-ains the interdependence of inccim and employment 
adjustments : this can be generalised to allow for alternative arrangeimnts, 
as in (ii) below. 
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(ii) Alternative Form of Employment Adjustrrent 
Errployrre-nt changes are not necessarily acccrrplished by recruitment 
and redundancies. For a small change in output firms may prefer to alter 
the working hours of their existing labour force, by overtime or short- 
time working. This often true, for example, when labour has firm-specific 
skills involving prior training. Newly recruited labour then has to acquire 
these skills, implying the presence of a fixed cost discouraging variation 
in the level of employment. In the terminology of labour economics, 
labour beccmes a 'quasi-fixed factor' (Oi (1962)), with scme of the 
characteristics of investment rather than consumption. Whatever the reason 
behind it, a reluctance of firms to vary enployme-nt must influence the 
relation between employment and national income. The model below makes no 
assumptions as to why scme firms do not vary their labour force, and is 
compatible with a range of interpretations. 
Any adjustmenit of working hours rreans that M is no longer constant, 
and that Y is not uniquely related to E. There are several possible 
corrbinations of M and E which satisfy the incorre-expenditure identity. To 
show this diagrammtically, suppose that unemploymnt benefits rerrain fixed 
at R. If investment rises from I to V, the set of potential end points 
is given by 
yl = L(a+bM)+I'+G bM Em >m 1-(l-t)b 1-(l-t)b E >E 
The relation between Y' and E' is obtained by holding E' constant, and allowing 
niovements in M to equate income and expenditure; the inequalities inpose 
the assumption that a rise in expenditure reduces neither M nor E. Hence 
there is a negative linear relationship between Y' and E', bounded by the 
extrerres of constant E or M. Diagrarrmatically one obtains 
Z03 
Inccn-e/ 
Expenditure 
yl 
Overtirre 
min 
Y=M IE 
, X=C 
I 
lriax+I'+G 
Y=ME 
- X--C'+I'+G 
- X--C+I+G 
Recruitrrent 
ý= 
Enployrrent 
(=E'min) 
where the line segrv--nt AB is the set of possible outcomes. Adjustment by 
overtirm alone causes a vertical moverrent to point A, with no change in E 
and the maximn possible increase in Y. Conversely, adjustment by recruitment 
alone produces a shift along the income curve to B, giving a lesser increase 
in Y and the largest possible rise in E. Between these cases any point on 
the line AB can be the outcome of the rise in I, depending on haw enployment 
changes occur. The more adjustrrent that takes place through recruitment, 
the closer the end result will be to point B, and vice versa. The final 
values Y' and El can fall anywhere in the rangeslYlmax, Ylmirj and JE'rrex, Elminj 
above, and there is no unique outccrre until the nature of errployrrent changes 
is specified. Much the sarre applies for a fall in investment, which is 
I' 
illustrated below: 
204- 
Inccrre/ 
Expenditure Redundancies 
X---C+I+G 
y 
Short-tim 
Y"Max working 
Y"min F 
0 E" 
min 
E(=E"max) Errployment 
The set of possible outcomes is bounded by points D and F, corresponding to 
adjustment by redundancies and short-tirre working respectively. National 
income and employment can settle anywhere in the Y" and E" ranges given in 
the diagram. The result again depends on haw the expenditure shift is 
accom, nodated in term of errployment changes. Adjustment is not necessarily 
synnetrical, so a rise in incorm way be accomplished differently from a 
reduction. 
The model above is a slightly rearranged version of the 'Keynesian 
cross I. Traditional Keynesian models depend on a partial disaggregation 
of expenditure (into consumption, investment, etc. ) but leave incorre as a 
single pararreter, Y. Such an approach implies that the income distribution 
is stable and independent of the general level of economic activity. Post- 
Keynesian critics of conventional theory stress the importance of the incorre 
distribution through arguments about differential propensities to consums 
(Kregel (1973), Eichner (1979)). Their case is strengthened when 
unemployment is taken into account. It is possible to imagine an incoma 
distribution between wages and profit that is stable over the business 
cycle (an assumption often made). It is not possible for the distribution 
of income between the employed and unemployed to remain constant as 
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unenployment varies. In this case the distribution of inccffe and enploymnt 
is built into the workings of the system and cannot reasonably be neglected. 
Conventional formulations of the consurTption function have to allow for 
this, even if they do not mention it explicitly. It seems preferable to 
have a genuine income curve to set alongside the expenditure relation, 
instead of the device of a 450 line : with the luxury of a spare axis it is 
sensible to use it. The outcaTe helps to en*phasise the roots of macroeconomic 
analysis in the national incon'e accounting identities. 
The Role of Unerrployment Benefits 
The model of Section (2) has the virtue of including the replacement 
ratio, ý, explicitly in expressions for the multiplier. This rectifies the 
imbalance with the taxation parameter, t, which is seen much more frequently 
in multiplier expressions; it also enphasises the central position of 
uneriployrrent benefits, instead of luTping them together with other (less 
variable) transfer payments. The discussion below considers the macroeconomic 
impact of unenployment benefits, both directly and through possible effects 
on job search. 
Direct Impact of Varying the Replacement Ratio 
Suppose that income variations occur mainly through changes in 
eirployrrent, as in the basic model of Section (2). A change in unenployrrent 
benefits is described by a variation in the replacement ratio ý, ceteris 
paribus, so that the effect on Y and E is given by the derivatives of their 
steady state values with respect to ý, that is 
ay 
-M 
b(M(1-(l-t)b)-aL-I-G) 
4 (1- (1-tZF)-bW 
Z06 
The sign of the drivatives depends on the bracketed expression in the 
nuTerator, which can be rearranged as 
ML - L(a +(l-t)bM) -I-G= Deflationary Gap >0 
Since ML is total inccn-e at the full enployrrent position (E=L) and 
L(a+(l-t)bM) +I+G is total expenditure, the expression is equal to the 
deflationary gap at erTployrrent level E. This must always be positive, 
since unenployrrent benefits are only received when E<L: hence raising 
benefits is always expansionary. The size of the inpact depends on the 
size of the deflationary gap and the nu-nber of unenployed, diminishing as 
full enployrrent is approached. On the inccme-errployrrent diagram the 
position is as below: 
Inccrre/ 
Expenditure 
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The replacerrent ratio is raised from ý to ý', producing a new expenditure 
curve X' with a higher intercept and lower slope than X. Raising benefits 
therefore produces a higher 'base' expenditure of the unenployed, but 
reduces the responsiveness of total expenditure to changes in employment. 
The expenditure curves for different ý values always intersect where E=L, 
so varying ý has the effect of rotating the expenditure curve about this 
point. It can be seen that a lower slope for the X curve always increases 
Y and E, with the rate of increase diminishing as the curve approaches the 
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horizontal. The upper limit to the replacerrent ratio can be viewed as 
#= 1-t, at which point the net average incan"es of the eriployed and 
unenployed are equated and there is no monetary incentive to work. When 
prevails the corresponding Xt curve is horizontal and errployrrent attains 
a level of Et, the maximum obtainable from raising the expenditures of the 
unerrployed. This shows that although raising ý can increase E, it cannot on 
its own restore full enployrrent. The reason is that shifts in unenployrrent 
benefits can never remove the deflationary gap present at E-L. Et depends 
directly on the size of the gap, so the expansionary impact of unerrployrrent 
benefits is circumscribed by the general demand deficiency in the economy. 
As well as directly influencing enployrmnt, the replacerrr-, nt ratio 
also affects the economy's stability in the face of shifts in exogenous 
expenditures. Unemployment benefits are often seen as an lautomatic 
stabiliser', given that a higher ý reduces the multipler. Such a role 
encourages relatively high benefits, and gains in importance as autonot'nous 
expenditures becorre more volatile. 
The interaction between unenploymeant benefits and taxes is less 
straightforward. Variation in t influences Y in the manner below 
ay 
M -b[L(a+býM)+I+G] <0 at (1-(l-t - ý)b )2 
As ý changes, the effect is such that 
a2y=m2? E 
-b 
2 [(ML-L(a+(l-t)bM)-I-G) - (L(a+býM)+I+G)] aQý k4 - (1-(l-t-ý)b)3 
7he sign depends on the square-bracketed expression whose first tem is the 
deflationary gap at E=L and second term is expenditure at E=O. Raising ý 
therefore enhances. the inpact of tax changes when the deflationary gap exceeds 
minirrun expenditure, and vice versa. The position is as below 
208 
Y, X 
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Eirployrmnt 
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In general the left-hand case can be taken to represent lower income and 
expenditure levels, so that ý starts by strengthening the inpact of taxation 
but eventually comes to weaken it as Y and E increase. If the economy is 
fairly close to full employrrent, ý has a stabilising effect on taxation 
changes, as well as on autonomous expenditure movements. This is a good 
thing where taxes are aimed at raising revenue with a minimm possible 
disturbance to the national incorre level. It does reduce the impact of taxes 
as a means of altering national income, although the effects of autonomous 
expenditure variations are scaled down in a similar way. 
(ii) The Impact of Job Search 
Much discussion of unerrployrrent benefits concerns their possible 
adverse effect on job allocation and frictional unenployment. The issue 
is considered below within an explicitly macroeconomic framework. 
To introduce frictional unenployment into the model, a distinction 
between enployrrent and job availability is required. If job vacancies are 
Y, X 
flationary 
y 
Lnirmn 
ipendit- 
ure 
0 
high relative to the number of unemployed, then unemployment can be 
EL 
Errployrrent 
zoq 
classified as mainly frictional : the nuTber of jobs in existence is 
apparently sufficient to acccnmdate most of those seeking emoployment. In 
such circu-nstances a superior process of job allocation proffers hope of 
alleviating unen-ployment. These considerations can be allowed for by 
defining the total number of jobs in existence, J, as distinct from the 
level of employment, E. When E<J there exist J-E unfilled vacancies, which 
can be interpreted as the extent of frictional unemployment. Let the parameter 
k denote the ratio of employment to jobs, so that E=kJ and k indicates the 
inportance of frictional unerTployrrent. For each level of E and J it is 
possible to define 'potential' national incorre, Yp, as Yp = MJ = (M/ k)E, - 
this is the incorre level that would ensue if all vacancies were f illed and 
frictional unerrployment were reduced to zero. The situation can be depicted 
as below: 
Incare / 
Expenditure 
yp 
y 
Potential Income 
Expenditure 
0E-,, J -,, 
L 
Frictional Cyclical 
Unerrployrrent Unenployrrent 
As usual, Y and E are detennined by the intersection of the inccrm and 
expenditure curves. The extent of frictional unerTploymeant is summarised by 
k, producing a potential inccrre curve with slope 
m /k (steeper than the incaTe 
curve, since k<l). At employment level E, Yp can be read off the potential 
incare curve, and the number of jobs is given by the intersection of Y=Yp 
with the actual incare curve. On the lines stated above, the extent of 
Incam 
frictional unenployrrent is then equal to J-E, while cyclical unenployrrent 
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accounts for the remaining L-J. A fall in k leads to a higher slope for 
the Yp curve, raising the values of Yp and J and increasing frictional 
unerrployrrent relative to cyclical. 
The disincentive effects of unemployment benefits can be represented 
by variations in the value of k. If the replacement ratio is high, the 
unenployed have a reduced incentive to accept employment, implying that 
scme vacancies remain unfilled and k takes a relatively low value. Conversely, 
if the replacement ratio is low, most vacancies will be filled and k will 
be close to unity. These effects can be represented by making ka decreasing 
function of ý, that is, k=k(fl, k' ( ý) < 0. Frcm. observing the E=k(ý) J 
relation, this would seem to suggest that a direct disincentive effect of 
tends to raise the unenployrrent rate. But before reaching any conclusions 
one has to consider the macroeconcmic position. 
TWo cases can be distinguished, depending on what is happening to 
aggregate expenditure: 
(a) Direct Filling of Vacancies 
It is here assumed that everything else is held constant as changes 
in ý and k occur. To allow for macroeconomic effects the level of potential 
expenditure as well as potential income nust be included; as vacancies are 
filled by reducing frictional unenployment, the economy finishes at a 
point where potential income and expenditure are equated. The situation is 
such that 
Potential Incorre Yp ý-- MJ m. E 
k(ý) 
Potential Expencliture Xp = L(a+býM) + (l-t-flbJM +I+G 
L(a+býM) + (1-t-ý)b-E-- E+I 
k(fl 
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Y= xp L(a+býM)+I+G =y p YP = 1-(l-t-ý)b 
Ep = 
Yp 
=Y=E F- 7 
Hence, when aggregate demand effects are allowed for, the potential inccme 
obtainable from filling vacancies is identical to the current income level, 
and the same goes for employment. The outcome is entirely independent of k, 
so there is nothing to be gained by improving job allocation by reducing k. 
A lower ý would have a direct deflationary effect on Y, but would produce 
no net gain from any increase in k. The only effect of raising k is to 
influence the classification of the unemployed towards cyclical rather than 
frictional, while leaving the total nuTber unchanged. Diagranuatically the 
position is as below: 
Inccrre/ 
Expenditure 
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It is convenient here to consider changes in k on their own, without the 
associated change in ý. At employment level E the potential incare from 
filling vacancies exceeds the potential expenditure. The 'potential' of 
Yp=Y /k, E=J cannot be fulfilled, and raising k has a deflationary inpact 
on income and employment. As k increases the YP and Xp curves rotate 
downwards, always crossing on the Y=Yp line so that total employffent never 
zlz 
varies from E. In the limit, when k=l, the curves coincide with the Y and X 
curves, and the removal of all frictional unemployment has left total 
unemployment unchanged. Thus, the positive impact of reducing k for given 
demand conditions is exactly offset by the negative macroeconomic effects. 
All that is achieved is that the value of J converges to E, reducing the 
nuTber of unemployed classified as frictional. Although the J initially 
vacant jobs appear to be a potential net gain, the process of filling them, 
oeteris paribus, requires an equivalent number of jobs to be lost. 
This demonstrates a point often overlooked in discussions of 
unenployment: filling job vacancies is deflationary. Econcmic models based 
on search disincentives tend to assure that an improvement in job allocation 
must reduce total unemployment. As far as frictional unemployment goes 
that should always be true, but an adverse impact on cyclical unerrployment 
can also be anticipated. The grounds for this are intuitively clear. 
When a person takes a vacant job, recorded national income rises by 
appropriate discrete c-munt; a parallel shift occurs in national expenditure, 
but to a lesser degree because of the incidence of savings and taxes and 
because the person was earlier receiving uneirployn-ent benefits. If repeated 
on a large scale, this will lead to national income exceeding expenditure 
and consequently to deflationary pressure. In other words new enployment 
incomes have to be received as some type of expenditure, and the spending 
of particular workers is not enough to justify their own jobs. The 
implication, is not that filling jobs directly causes unemployment - causality 
need not be interpreted that way. But one can say that when jobs are being 
filled there must be some acccnucdating changes if income and expenditure 
are to balance. For example, some other people may be losing their jobs 
at the same time to counteract the effect, or there way be increases in 
autoncmus expenditures that serve to maintain the expenditure level. 
The latter is the best way out of the impasse, and is considered as the second 
main possibility. 
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(b) Vacancies 'Justified' by Autoncnious Expenditure Changes 
In view of the outcome of (a), it is relevant to ask how vacancies 
arise in the first place. The key question is whether or not they are linked 
with changes in autoncmous expenditure that permit net increases in employment. 
It is quite easy to imagine such changes happening. Errployers way be 
wishing to undertake investment projects, but are unable to find suitable 
labour. This would lead to vacancies which remain unfilled and appear as 
frictional unemployment. An improverrent in job allocation might then enable 
the investment to go ahead, so that filling vacancies autcmatically releases 
autoncmous expenditures which were waiting to be wade. In this situation 
a filled vacancy is 'justified' by investment, and reflects planned future 
spending at least equal to the inccme attached to the job (and probably 
exceeding it). Not all vacancies can be placed in this category (as, for 
example, when people are simply changing jobs), but a certain proportion 
can probably be viewed as 'new' jobs backed by planned new expenditures. 
Such ef fects can be included in the model of (a) by allowing 
investment to increase as vacancies are filled. Let investment now be 
written as I(k(fl), where II(k)< 0. A reduction in k produces a rise in I, 
resulting fran expenditures which are able to proceed when vacancies are filled. 
The strength of the relation is left indeterminate, and could be anything 
from virtually zero to quite a strong stimulus to demand. If most filled 
vacancies are already existing jobs, then the extent of new investment will 
be small, and k will have little impact on I. On the other hand, if 
most vacancies are tied to planned new investment, the associated rise in 
expenditure could easily exceed the inccnes directly attached to the jobs; 
together with subsequent multiplier effects, this could produce a substantial 
expansion in demand. The nature of the model consequently depends on the 
particular circumstances in question, and the relation between I and k is 
in no way a general one. Bearing this in mind, analysis can proceed as in 
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(a). Equating potential incorre and expenditure gives an outcorre as below: 
Potential Incorm 
Potential Ex-pNe-nditure 
Yp= xp 
yp 
Xp = L(a+býM) + (1-t-flbM + I(k(fl) +G 
= L(a+býM) + (1-t-fl 
m+ I(k(ý)) +G ': )ý( F) E 
L(a+býM) + I(k(fl) +G yp ý 1- (1-t-flb , 
Ep =m 
The inportant difference frcxn (a) is that Yp and Ep now depend on k, so 
that a rise in k can produce a genuine increase in enployrrent. 
Diagrammatically the situation is as below: 
Inccrre/ 
Expenditure 
yp 
y 
AIT 
0 
y 
x 
ml, Cyclical (k=k) 
E Ep JL 
Errploymnt 
Cyclinal (k=O) 
The Y, X and Yp curves have similar interpretations to the previous case; the 
only difference is that a reduction in k now entails a vertical shift in 
the Xp curve arising fran changes in I. This neans that the potential 
expenditure from filling current vacancies is increased by the awount of 
investmnt brought forth by a shift in k frcm its initial value, k=R, to k--O. 
The Xp curve plotted therefore has the sarre slope as in (a), but is 
translated upwards by the additional investwent resulting from removing all 
vacancies. Intersection with the Yp curve occurs above the previous level, 
so that Yp >Y and Ep >E now hold true. There is consequently a net inam-e- 
and aTployrrent gain to be made from inproving job allocation, with Yp and EP 
Z15 
representing the wzmiman levels attainable. It is possible for Ep to be 
less than, equal to, or greater than J. In the case illustrated Ep is less 
than J, implying that the rise in expenditure is insufficient to offset fully 
the deflationary impact of filling job vacancies. A larger stimulus to 
investment could potentially raise Ep above 3, so that the total employment 
return from increasing k is greater than the initial number of jobs observed 
to be available. Ep and J will be equated only by accident , and there is 
no particular reason to view them as being approximately the sane thing. This 
perhaps runs counter to one's immediate impression, which sees declared 
vacancies as the employment 'lost' by failures of job allocation. In practice 
the elimination of vacancies is certain to be linked with changing demand 
conditions (one way or the other), producing a rwre fluid situation than is 
suggested by static job and vacancy figures. 
An increase in k is in this model unambiguously desirable, raising 
both national income and enployment. Measures that seek to influence k 
directly (improving information, etc. ) are therefore potentially useful, 
provided they have no adverse effects, derived, say, from the way they are 
financed. The situation with the replacement ratio is less clear. If search 
disincentives are important a reduction in ý could serve to raise k and 
thereby produce an expansionary effect on national income and enployrrent; 
at the same time, however, it also has a deflationary impact on the lines of 
M above when M is held constant (as well as reducing the living standards 
of the unemployed). A government wishing to decide on the best level of 
ý faces a trade-off between the positive distributional and dexnand effects 
of a high replacenent ratio and its possible adverse impact on job 
allocation. This can be used to obtain a policy optimisation in the manner 
of Chapter 5, albeit with a much different set of constraints and variables. 
For example, Y and E are iTaximised where 
ay 9Y 3k 
3ý Tý 3k 
ay 
Ik 
constant+ 
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The direct effect of ý is positive and declines with ý, while the impact 
through k is negative and (possibly) increasing with k; it is consequently 
quite feasible for an interior solution to exist. Where a value is placed 
on equality between the employed and unemployed, the objective would differ 
frm a simple maximisation of income and would encourage a higher level of 
It should be said here that policy optimisation is not easily carpatible 
with the macro model being used, since autonomous expenditures are subject 
to continuous change. There is no'single 'optimal' value of ý which is the 
best possible choice in all situations. It remains true, however, that a 
decision has to be made on benefits, and that the type of considerations out- 
lined here are relevant. The government has to decide on what seems the 
best 'average' value, bearing in mind the different effects that can be 
associated with benefits. 
Under the conditions assumed here the arguments about an excessive 
replacement ratio increasing unemployment can potentially have scrre substance. 
To get such conclusions, however, it is necessary to link an irrproverrent in 
job allocation with changes in autonamous expenditure. If unemployment is 
reduced by lowering ý, it is not the superior job allocation that is 
responsible for the change, but the associated rise in expenditures. There 
are consequently no grounds for the idea that sinply filling jobs is a way 
to increasing enployment; scne other expansionary changes are required to 
guarantee that the level of national inc-cme is maintained. This enphasises 
why autonomous expenditures play such a central role in detexndning econcrnic 
activity. Even views based on linicroeconanic' analysis of job allocation 
depend on increased autoncrnous expenditures if they are to hold water. 
It should also be noted that a reduction in ý need not be identified 
with a reduction in benefits. A rise in real wages with constant benefits 
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can have the same effect without reducing the living standards of the 
working population. This may even happen spontaneously in the conditions 
depicted here. Disincentives only bite when they are preventing autonanous 
expenditures frcm taking place, so that planned expansion is being obstructed. 
If firms are unable to recruit labour for investment projects, there may be 
upward pressure on real wages, while benefits remain fixed. The assumption 
made above of fixed employment incames is not then appropriate and the 
need to reduce unemployment benefits is correspondingly reduced. Should a 
rise in real employment incomes fail to occur, it is still possible for the 
government to try to impose it, as is straightforward if disincentives apply 
to net rather than gross wages. Hence, even when disincentive arguments 
have scrre plausibility, they do not necessarily lead to a case for cutting 
unemployment benefits. An increase in real wages is an alternative response. 
This section has considered the position of unemployment benefits in 
a simple macroeconomic model. Raising the replacement ratio is expansionary, 
providing a possible rationale for higher benefits when cyclical unemployment 
is present (although other means are available for raising demand). 7he 
importance of disincentives is less obvious in a macroeconomic than 
microeconomic approach. To be of any significance they have to be linked with 
expenditure changes; this can happen, but it puts a different complexion on 
the discussion. A valid disincentive has to be 'blocking' expenditure 
increases, so that investment or other injections are unable to take place. 
In this sense all unemployment is due to demand deficiency; there may be 
'frictional' reasons for the deficiency, but a deficiency is necessary all 
the same. 
The Long Run Position 
Discussion has so far concerned short run incare fluctuations 
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determined by shifts in aggregate expenditures. Over a longer period one 
would expect other forces to operate. In particular technical progress 
should lead to a rising long-term trend in real incorres, on which the short 
run inccire movements are centred. It is straightforward to depict this 
in term of the models of Sections (2) and (3). 
Technology has not played a-central part of the consideration of 
short term inccme and employment detexn-Lination above. This is in the nature 
of the model, rooted in the circular flow of national inccrre defined in 
aggregated monetary terms. Inccrre and expenditure are partially disaggregated 
in the course of macro analysis, but the model is never reduced to a discussion 
of physical quantities. Technical production, although always occurring, 
is not a major influence on cyclical fluctuations. The same cannot be said 
of the long run, where tirre-series statistics usually show a chronic rise 
in real national inccme and the average wages of the employed. These trends 
are normally explained by technical progress, which produces a parallel 
increase in all forms of inccme. This contrasts markedly with the 
selective impact of short run incaTe variations. One cannot expect Bowley's 
Law to hold exactly, but long-run inccrre movements should be more neutral 
distributively than short-run ones. The discussion below is based on two 
postulates: 
(i) In the long run the effects of shifts in autonomous expenditure 
are dominated by the impact of technical change. It is therefore 
preferable to base the model on an exogenous real income trend 
rather than demand variations. 
(ii) Long-run incaTe changes are distributively relatively even. 
7hey are not closely associated with enployrwnt changes, and 
therefore do not incur the distributional consequences of 
unenployffent. 
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LTposing these properties does not in any way change the model's basic 
nature. The intention is merely to show what will be observed in the long 
run under the conditions just described. 
Let the model take the form of Section (2), with the-sarre notation. 
Consider f irstly the form of the traditional aggregate consumption function 
(relating aggregate consumption expenditure to aggregate incorre-) in the 
short run. Consumption satisfies the equations 
C= L(a+býM) + (1-t-fl bEM 
= L(a+b4M) + (1-t-fl bY 
where the lower relation corresponds to the usual notion of the consumption 
function. This has the conventional form of a positive intercept and positive 
slope less than unity. It is not quite an inflated version of the individual 
function C= a+bM because of the presence of taxes (lowering the slope) 
and unemployment benefits (lowering the slope and raising the intercept). 
Implicit in the form of the function is the fact that M remains approximately 
constant and that variations in Y are linked with variations in E. In the 
long run Y is on an upward trend arising mainly from an exogenous rise in 
real inccmes, M, rather than shifts in E. It can be assumed that employment 
fluctuates about some non-zero long-run average, denoted by E; this value 
will be treated as a constant, so that employment variation is ironed out 
over the period being considered. L, ý and t are also held constant. Under 
these conditions the long-run consumption function can be written as 
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C= L(a+býM) + (1-t-fl WE 
y L(a+bý=) + (1-t--ý) bY E 
= aL + 
(, 
-t+ 
ý iý 
- 1)) bY 
= aL + (1-t+ ýy) bY 
-E where y= 
L- 
= long-run ratio of unerrployed to eirployed. 
E 
The function is derived from the fixity of E, which allows M to be written 
as 
Y /- . It follows that 
E enters into the final expression for the E 
consurrption function, although it is convenient to def ine the paraneter -y 
representing the ratio of uneirployed to enployed in the long run. Depicting 
the short and long run functions diagranyratically, one obtains 
Short rm 
C 
Long run 
C 
L(a+býM) 
0 
aL 
0 Y 
For the same set of behavioural paraneters, the long-run consuiption function 
has a lower intercept and greater slope than the short-run version. The 
difference arises because of the role of unenployrrent in incorm changes. 
In the short run inccrm moverrents are linked with enployrrent variation, so 
that their irrpact on expenditure is lessened by the presence of uneirployrrent 
benefits; those nuving in and out of enployment have a net change in 
inccrre receipts which is less than the associated variation in national 
incone, the difference depending on the extent of unenployrmnt benefits. 
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In the long run a national incorre rise goes straight into disposable 
inccms with no significant changes in employrmnt patterns. This contrast 
is illustrated by the effect of the replaoenent ratio, ý, on the two curves. 
Raising ý causes a flattening of the short-run consumption function, 
increasing the intercept and decreasing the slope. The opposite is true 
in the long run, where the slope depends positively on ý (since higher 
menployment benefits do not affect Y, but still raise expenditure). The 
greater the replacement ratio, the greater the divergence between the two 
curves; when ý=O they coincide. The slope of the long-run function increases 
with the level of unemployment, as represented by y. Setting y to zero makes 
the long-run curve identical in form to individual behaviour, such that 
C= aL + (1-t) bY = aL + b(l-t) ML = L(a+bD) 
The long-run curve is consequently a closer representation of individual 
behaviour than the short-run version : the difference when -#0 occurs only 
because the expenditures of the uneiTployed are from receipts which are not 
included in national incarTe assessments. 
Suppose now that the replacement ratio does not remain constant in 
the long run, and that the unemployed receive a standard 'subsistence' 
payment irrespective of the national income level. In this case a steady 
upward trend in M leads to a rising Y, while unemployed inccms remain 
fixed at R. The long-run consumption function can then be derived from the 
short-run curve as follows 
C= L(a+bR) + b((l-t)M-f4)E 
L(a+bM) - WE + b(l-t)kýE- 
= [aL + bR(L-E) I+ b(l-t)Y 
Instead of rising parallel to M, the R components remain static and are 
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included in the intercept. Graphically the resulting function is such that 
C 
aL+bri(L-E) 
0 
Long-run consurrption 
function (M invariant) 
Y 
Carparison with the two curves above shows that this case falls between them. 
The function is steeper than the short-run curve, with a lower intercept; 
on the other hand, it is flatter than the previous long-run curve, with a 
higher intercept. Unlike the previous curves, the slope is independent of 
unemployment benefits, representing individual behaviour directly. The 
situation is therefore 'neutral', in the sense that unerrployrrent benefits are 
constant (E, R fixed) and have neither a positive nor negative inf luence on the 
slope of the consurrption function. In practice it does. not seem iikely that 
unemployment benefits will remain absolutely fixed in a period of economic 
growth. A position between the limiting cases is possible, where benefits 
increase at a rate lower than the growth rate of employment incorres. 
This can be represented by assuming that the replacenv--nt ratio decreases as 
Y and M rise over tinne, that is, ý= flY), ý'(Y) < 0. In that case the 
long-run consurrption function will be non-linear, with a diminishing slope 
as Y rises. If unemployment benefits approach an upper limit of 
then the situation is as below 
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c 
aL+bM(L-E) 
aL 
0 Y 
Long-r-un consurrption 
function (ý variable) 
The resulting curve is a hybrid of the ý constant and R constant cases; 
it starts with the lower intercept of the ý constant curve, and its slope 
gradually decreases (asymptotically) to that of the M constant curve. An 
outcorm of this kind, somewhere between the two extrenv--s, appears to be the 
rmst probable situation. 
A further possibility is for the work force, L, to show long-run 
variation, probably as the result of demographic factors. The situation most 
frequently encountered is a chronic increase in population, which is 
reproduced in the size of the labour force. Where population is rising 
significantly, an increase in national income does not necessarily mean rising 
average real incomes; growth in national income is needed merely to maintain 
the same average living standards. If real incomes are to increase over 
tirre, national income growth must exceed that of population. In order to 
relate these factors to the aggregate consumption function, consider-the 
extreme case where all national income growth is watched by changes in the 
labour force. Average real incomes therefore remain constant, and rising 
national income is absorbed by maintaining the new population at the 
customary income levels. It is assured that the employment rate is roughly 
constant, equal to a given proportion 6 of the labour force (so E= 6L). 
The replacement ratio is also taken to remain approximately fixed in the 
long run. National income and the labour force are linked in such a way that 
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ME =M 6L 
y 
6m 
Hence the long-run consurrption function can be derived as below 
L(a+býM) + (1-t-flbY 
Y (a+býM) + (1-t-ý) bY 6m 
[-ý 
a+ (1-t+ýy) b]Y m 
vd-p-re -y 
S/ 
6. Graphically this irrplies 
C 
Long-run consmption. 
function (M constant, 
L varying) 
0 Y 
The curve no longer has a p. ositive intercept, and passes through the origin. 
It also has a steeper slope than any of the previous versions, differing 
from the L constant, M variable case by the term 
a /6M* Consequently 
there is a greater divergence, the higher is the long-term rate of unerrployrrent. 
In reality it can be expected that simultaneous movermnts (generally increases) 
in M and L will occur. The outcorre is then a carrbination of the two limiting 
cases considered here, with a slope steeper than when L is constant but 
flatter than when M is constant. As more income variation is accounted for 
by population change, the long-run consu-rption function becomes increasingly 
steep. 
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Several long-run consumption functions are possible, depending 
on the precise fonn of income changes. Their common feature is a lower 
intercept and greater slope than the short-run function defined in terms 
of changes in en-ployment. This accords with expectations based on enpirical 
findings. The accepted pattern of aggregate consumptionjunction (as 
originally found in Kuznets (1946)) is that long-run tine-series data give 
curves through the origin, while short-run (or cross-section) data lead to 
curves with a positive intercept and lower slope. Such findings are 
potentially explicable on the lines set out above, although the analyses 
usually offered are somewhat different. It is worth briefly caTparing the 
present model with the conventional explanations. 
Three carpeting explanations are ccamnly put forward : the 'Relative 
Incorre Hypothesis' (Duesenberry (1949)), the 'Permanent Income Hypothesis' 
(Friedman (1957)) and the 'Life Cycle Hypothesis' (Modigliani and BruTberg 
(1954)). 
_ 
These share the characteristic that they are based on individual 
behaviour. Consumption depends on some reference point or long-run incorre 
concept, which remains invariant in the short run. Consequently the MPC 
of individuals is higher in the long run than in a cross-section or in a short 
run time-series. This may well be true, and the reasoning on which the 
theories are based seems plausible enough. It is not strictly necessary, 
however, to appeal to individual behaviour to explain aggregate consumption 
functions. In the model used here differences in aggregate consumption 
functions arise directly from the way that the economy operates, even when 
individual behaviour is identical in the short and long run. Differential 
responses to short and long-run income changes would increase the difference 
between the consumption functions, but are not essential. If a theory based 
solely on individual behaviour is adopted, it remains to explain why 
individual incorres are varying in the short run. The example par excellence 
of a short-run incom fluctuation is unemployment. In a sense the individual 
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based theories rely on varying macroeconomic conditions to generate the 
short-term incon-e moverrents on which they depend. It seems preferable to 
have an explanation centred directly on macroeconomic principles, rather 
than on a magnification of individual behavioural. responses; variations in 
individual behaviour can then be appended to the model if they are felt to 
be appropriate. After all, the aggregate consurrption function is supposed 
to be a macroeconomic relationship, and as such represents more than just 
individual behaviour patterns. 
The discussion of this section has not atterrpted to set out a full 
long run analysis that can explain economic trends. All underlying changes 
have been assumd exogenous and the causes behind varying technology or 
population have not been considered. The objective has been more limited, 
to carpare the different patterns of income variation that are likely to be 
found in the long run and the short run. 
Conclusion 
One suspects that in practice short-term national incorre variations 
are accanplished mainly by the incorre changes of the unen-ployed. If that is 
the case, then it may be desirable to construct macroeconanic madels on 
corresponding lines, as above. The adjustrient is easy, and leaves the basic 
Keynesian conclusions unchanged. It does have a couple of implications, 
however: 
(i) The simultaneous determination of employrrent and incam 
downgrades productivity considerations. No technical 
production function is required to obtain the enployment 
associated with observed national income. 
(ii) If workers save at all, then they always create an aggregate 
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demand deficiency for their own services. This can only be 
rectified by the various forms of non-errployrrent demand, 
especially investment. Increased job search is futile unless 
it can call forth new autonorrious expenditures. 
To repeat the point made in the introduction : if we are trying to explain 
unenployrrent perhaps ue ought to mention the unenployed in our model. 
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CHAPTER 7: OPTIMAL PENSION AND RETIREMENT PRACTICES 
(1) Introduction 
Pension and retirement policies are ccrrplicated in nature, broaching 
redistributive and other issues. A formal pension or retirement policy 
is a constraint on individuals, so there is an inrnediate question of whether 
the benefits justify the costs. As a redistributive tool pensions are not 
the ideal choice, and other methods might well be preferred. This leaves 
no imTediate theoretical case for formal state pensions or retirement, 
and a consequent scope for further analysis. If pensions are justified, 
there arises the additional problem of their optimal design. The discussion 
below addresses these matters. 
The method reseirbles that in previous chapters. A goverruent has 
the power to introduce a state pension schen-e and formal retirement practices, 
and wishes to irrplenent the best possible scheme. Ilie objective is to 
choose a pension policy which noximises social welfare, subject to a given 
revenue constraint. Several interpretations of pension policies are possible. 
The usual distinction is between pensions financed on insurance principles 
and those permitting intergenerational incon-e redistribution; it is 
convenient here to subdivide the first category, giving three cases: 
Insurance-based Pensions 
The traditional view of pensions is as insurance, financed by 
contributions made during enployment. Individuals are expected to claim 
in retiren-ent a su-n which, when discounted, is equal to the discounted sun 
of their contributions. Each person thus accumulates a separate fund 
which is enough to cover the requirexmnts anticipated during retirement. 
Although the account for each individual does not in general balance exactly, 
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total revenue is equated on average with total expenditure and the scheme 
breaks even (given accurate knowledge of the actuarial probabilities 
involved). Similarly, despite the fact that scme individuals draw pensions 
exceeding their contributions and others less, depending on life span, the 
schem is expected to be non-redistributive with no systematic inccme 
redistribution taking place. The -result resembles private saving, where 
each individual makes an independent provision for future consunption during 
retirement. Formal insurance-based pensions (state or private) are largely 
paternalistic in spirit, with some outside agency acting as custodian 
of at least part of an individual's savings. Issues relevant to such pension 
schezes are considered in Section (3) below. 
Redistribution within a Generation 
The goverrumnt may not in practice have the informtion required 
to achieve non-redistributive pensions : paying the same pension to people 
with different characteristics inevitably introduces redistribution. 
Moreover, if the initial inccae distribution is seen as inequitable, the 
government may wish to treat pensions as an instruTent of redistributive 
policy. Viewing each generation separately, an appropriate corrbination of 
pensions and their associated contributions can bring about income 
redistribution. The result is then 'collective insurance' with each 
generation financing its own pension, but in a way felt to be socially 
equitable. Sorm individuals can expect to make a net gain fran their 
pension revenues, subsidised by the expected losses of others. 7he outcome 
is more general than (i), sanctioning the redistribution of incorm within 
a single generation, while stopping short of redistribution between 
generations. Pensions schemes involving intragenerational redistribution 
are considered in Section (4). 
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(iii) Redistribution between Generations 
The final possibility is that the pension receipts of one generation 
depend on the contributions of other generations. Redistribution can then 
occur between individuals of different ages, as well as those of the sam 
age. Finance on intergenerational lines takes more than one possible form. 
For exarTple, a requirexmnt that the revenue constraint must balance at each 
separate date limits the range of redistribution to people with overlapping 
life spans. If, on the other hand, revenue restrictions are less stringent 
and do not require a balanced budget at all dates, it is possible to transfer 
inccms over a much longer time span. The latter case is equivalent to a 
Isociall pension fund, to which each generation contributes part of its 
inccme and from which they all draw their pension receipts. These two 
possibilities are ccapared and contrasted in Section (5). 
The analysis of optimal pension practices can be based on any of the 
three structures described above, although the most general approach would 
be to allaw full redistribution within and between age groups. None of 
these cases yields simple conclusions, and they share a nuTber of features 
which inevitably cc[Tplicate the discussion. 
Firstly, all pension models have to be interterrporal, covering at 
least a single life span and possibly much longer. Decisions made at one 
date have an impact on future welfare, and must be based on forecasts of 
future events. Such predictions cannot be made in reality with ccrrplete 
accuracy, and both uncertainty and miscalculation play a part in actual 
policy decisions. Neither is easy to incorporate in n-cdels of decision 
making, nor readily ccupatible with optimality. No attenpt is made to 
include them in the models below, and individuals are throughout assumed to 
have known fixed life spans and inccrre patterns. That is not to say that 
the full range of necessary information is available in actual policy making, 
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as is almost certainly not the case. But there rezain substantial policy 
questions to be resolved even with fill I information, and it is as well to 
consider initially what the government would like to do under ideal 
conditions. 
Secondly, the range of policy tools iTrpinging on pensions is 
exceedingly wide. Underlying the whole question is individual retirement 
behaviour, and in particular the timing and speed of retirement (if it occurs 
at all). The population does not necessarily want a fixed universal 
retirement date, and any constraints in-posed centrally should be justifiable 
in some way. This question is raised in Section (2), but is not carried 
over into the rest of the chapter. The remaining sections assume a fixed 
retirement date in line with current practice, although it is quite possible 
that a full social optinm would allow for individual choice over the timing 
and nature of retirenent. Pension finance is another significant issue. 
Besides the insurance /intergenerational finance division, pension revenue 
can be raised by virtually any form of taxation. The models below largely 
assume a uniform lurrp-sum tax on the enployed, but the results are not 
necessarily inTm-me to changing the method of finance. Pensions themselves 
can also take a variety of form (for instance, constant or moving over 
time, earnings-related or otherwise), in addition to differences in the 
pension level. A fully general model would have to permit simultaneous 
variation in all the possible policy parameters. The models below are 
more limited in scope, but serve to consider a numbý-x of the relevant issues 
in isolation. 
Another feature of pensions policies is that they are confronted 
with individual saving behaviour, raising the problem of disincentives. 
In practice individual savings are a small and diminishing part of retirement 
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inccrrr-s (Kay (1985)), but this may itself be due to the disincentive effects 
of widespread state pension. A number of empirical studies suggest that 
state provision replaces private savings to some extent (Munnell (1974), 
Feldstein (1974,1977)). The possible inpact of disincentives is considered 
in the discussion below; in the extreme case it calls into question the 
rationale for state pensions, and otherwise may significantly influence the 
nature of the optimum. It is also possible that strong disincentives lead 
to the spreading of state provision in situations where it is not strictly 
necessary. Hence, while the low current level of private savings does not 
point to their having overriding importance, it is still worth including 
private saving in the various models. 
Much debate on pensions has centred on the question of public as 
against private provision. The post-war period has seen a rapid growth of 
private occupational pensions in the U. K. and elsewhere, particularly an-ang 
the wre prosperous sections of the population. Recipients of such pensions 
are able to opt out of the state schene, although their retiremnt practices 
and pension receipts are similar to state provision in rmny ways (at a 
scn-ewhat higher level). It has been argued that private pensions are superior 
to state provision and that an extension of the private pension sector is 
desirable (Buchanan (1968)); the opposing case can also be made (Bosanquet 
(1983), Chapter 10). The discussion below is on the assuiTption that 
pensions are state-providedand does not directly investigate the public versus 
private sector debate. Many of the questions considered are ccnmn to 
public or private pension scherms, and the precise nature of the scherm is 
inmaterial to the points made. The major exception is incon-e redistribution, 
which is outside the scope of insurance-based private pensions. 
A final aspect of pension design is the administration needed to 
operate the system. This also is likely to be large ccnpared with sorre 
other forms of governuent policy. In ccnTmn with the approach of previous 
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chapters no administrative or institutional detail is included in the 
rmdels below. It is possible that in practice administrative issues are 
sufficiently inportant to influence the nature of the policy optinyan. 
All these considerations make pensions a weighty policy problem. 
It is not even clear that fonmal pensions and retirement have a watertight 
justification, let alone a well-defined optirral structure. This chapter aim 
only to assess scim of the salient issues. 
Retiren-ent and the Individual 
Most lives in developed countries are divided into three distinct 
stages, with an initial period of childhood and education followed by a 
working career and then retirement. The ages of transition between the 
stages are usually predictable to within a few years, and are frequently 
influenced by legislation on school leaving ages and pension entitlements. 
Individual choice can be exercised only to a limited extent at the transition 
points, with a number of people prolonging their education beyond the legal 
minimum or choosing to retire a few years before or after the statutory 
retirement age. Choice rarely extends to avoiding the tripartite education/ 
work/retirement pattern, despite the freedcm, of any person not to enter the 
labour force. Participation is a real decision only for secondary workers 
in a household or for the minority of individuals whose unearned inccnie is 
sufficient to support themselves without working. Rising female labour 
force participation since the Second World War (Joseph (1983)) implies that 
the three-stage life cycle is increasingly common and moving towards 
universality. Most individuals now enter the labour force at scme point in 
their lives, and later retire from it. 
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The question arises of whether this is a spontaneous outccme of 
individual choice. On the basic issue of working against not working, 
the need for people to work is governed by the general level of labour 
productivity in a society relative to the society's total wants. Current 
productivity is nowhere near enough to'supply total wants without major 
inputs of labour, and most of the population must consequently work to 
maintain the custcmary standard of living. Society's need to undertake 
productive activity is conveyed to individuals by their lack of non- 
errployment earnings, leaving little choice but to participate in the labour 
force. Higher labour productivity should permit an increase in the general 
level of enployment inccmes (provided that the benefits are evenly 
distributed), allowing a decrease in total working hours; at the extreme of 
a fully autcmated society we could all afford to be rentiers and live off the 
returns to our collective investments. The need to work is therefore 
a fact of econcmic life, and the ren-aining question is how best to organise 
a working existence. 
A major element in any career structure is the timing of departure 
from the labour force, and the manner in which this is effected. Workers 
ought presuiiably to have strong opinions on this issue, given that it has 
a major inpact on the later years of their life span. The discussion 
below concentrates on the implications of conventional labour supply 
models for the retirement question and for the notion of an loptizrall 
retirement policy. 
Neoclassical theory treats labour supply as a decision by the worker, 
and analyses it in the same way as decisions on consumption. Labour supply 
at any time depends on individual preferences over leisure and consumption 
goods, and responds to changes in the wage rate and other exogenous 
variables. In practice individuals way not be at liberty to adjust their 
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labour supply, facing a fixed working week and a conrtitment: in the nurber 
of hours they work. Against this apparent obstacle, individual choice 
can be claimed to occur in the long run (being responsible for the secular 
decline in working hours) or indirectly (by the initial choice of job or 
by changing jobs). Much effort has been devoted to estimating the size of 
labour supply effects, as sum-arised in Killingsworth (1983). Despite 
saiTe doubts, there is a belief arising from conventional theory that work 
patterns are influenced by individual choice. 
Labour supply models are most com-nonly addressed to the short-term 
problem of the working week, and are also scrretirres used to account for 
the decision on labour force participation. They appear less often in 
discussions of retirement, although if the individual is influencing labour 
supply at all parts of the life cycle it follows that the retirement decision 
is also governed by the same theory. It is consequently of interest to 
consider what neoclassical labour supply theory irrplies about retirement, 
and the following discussion does this within a life-cycle model. Several 
cases can be distinguished, according to the presence or absence of saving 
or investment in human capital. 
(i) Models with Zero Savin 
Savings are usually omitted from the simple labour supply models 
found in textbooks on labour economics (such as Harrenresh and Rees (1984), 
Chapter 2, or Addison and Siebert (1979), Chapter 3). Leisure, . 1, is 
treated as a good like any other, with a demand function dependent on other 
prices, p, the wage rate, w, and non-ernployn-ent incorre, M. Participation 
decisions are governed by the 'reservation wage' ý, defined such that 
1(2, ý7, M) = L, where L is the available number of hours per week. An 
individual takes up employwent only if a job is available such thatw: ý; ý; 
conversely, voluntary retirement occurs when the wage rate falls belowýi. 
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With zero saving, it can safely be assumed that non-enployrrent inccrm 
is at a low level, showing -little variation over the life cycle. The sole 
exogenous factor determining retiren-ent is then movements of the wage 
rate over time, as suTmarised by an individual's age-earnings profile. 
Manual workers are normally assumed to face a 'hurrp-shaped' profile, while 
non-manual workers receive continuously rising wages and earnings (Welford 
(1958), Gordon and Blinder (1980)). In both cases the standard explanation 
is that wages respond to the individual's 'human capital', that is, the 
general degree of skill and working capacity (Mincer (1958,1974)). Manual 
workers gain little from work experience and face declining physical strength, 
whereas non-manual workers can benefit from accumulated knowledge throughout 
their careers. In the following discussion the time pattern of wage rates 
is taken to be exogenous, although relaxing these assumptions would not 
alter the conclusions of this section. 
With zero savings and preferences separable over tirre there is 
no link between different time periods, and life-cycle labour supply can be 
treated as a sequence of separate single period decisions. Over a known 
life span tc[O, T], labour supply at time t will be determined by the 
prevailing wage rate w(t), %tva-re w(t), tc [0, T], describes the exogenous 
time- path of wages. Voluntary retirement will occur only if w(t)<ý; 
otherwise the individual still wishes to work for a certain number of hours, 
even though working time way be declining. The position can be depicted 
as below: 
Current 
wage 
W(t) ýrvation wage 
Age, t 
f It 
Labour force entry Retirement 
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In the absence of changes in preferences or non-eaployrrent incaTe, w (t) 
rrust decrease over time before individuals choose to retire voluntarily. 
The fact that many workers do not experience falling wages is not easily 
carpatible with voluntary retirement on the lines of this model. A smooth 
function w(t) also inplies that the approach to retiremnt is gradual, 
displaying a steady fall in working hours until the point of retirement is 
reached. The situation is as below 
Labour 
supply 
at 
Age 
where the earlier path of labour supply could take any form (according to the 
balance of inccae and substitution effects), but the final approach to 
retirement is a continuous downward trend. Sudden movements from full-time 
working to retirement (frequently observed in practice) can only occur in 
this model if there is a discontinuous change in individual preferences or 
unearned income. 
Once can conclude that existing retirerrent practices do not 
coincide with the retirerrent predicted by sirrple labour supply models. 
Non-gradual retirerrent is chosen only if induced by scire outside agency, 
for exarrple, by the provision of pension inccme beyond a certain age 
(especially when conditional on ceasing work). In these models single date 
retirement has to be inposed by the structure of pensions, and does not arise 
spontaneously frcm individual L-3bour supply. 
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(ii) Models with Non-Zero Saving 
A possible deficiency of the model in (a) is the absence of saving 
behaviour, which can generally be expected to have scrre influence on 
retirement choices. If rational saving is introduced, the outcome is a 
model of dynamic Labour supply (Weiss (1972), Ghez and Becker (1975)). 
The effect of this on retirement is considered below. 
A dynamic rwdel is soluble in a similar way to optimal saving 
models. The individual maximses intertemporal utility, expressible as 
f -Pt U(C . -It) 
dt + ý(KT) 
o t, 
where Ct, lt, Kt are consurrption, leisure and wealth at date t, and 
(KT) is the value placed on the terminal wealth holding. Leisure and 
consumption are chosen over the life cycle to waximise U* subject to 
the constraints 
kt + Ct = wt (L-1t) + rKt Vt 
where wt is the exogenous wage rate at tirre t, L is the maximun work/ 
leisure hours available at any time, r is the interest rate, and the dot 
denotes differentiation with respect to tirrv--. Leisure cannot exceed 
the maximun L hours available (so that 1t4L, Vt) and all other tirre is 
spent working, inplying a labour supply of L-1 t' There 
is a fixed initial 
wealth of ýO units. The problem is soluble by optimal control rrethods, 
with Ct and lt as instruments and Kt as a state variable. The Hamiltonian 
and optimality conditions are 
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H= e-pt U(Ct. 1 t)+ e- 
Pt Xt(wt (L-1t) + rKt - Ct) + e-pt Pt (L-1t) 
Hc= 
H1= 
au 
t- Ät = 
ac 
t 
au t 
alt 
-Pt .-- Pt xt =- pt =>. Hk -e ), t pe erXt it = (r- p) Xt 
with a transversality condition UI(CT) = ý'(Kt). Combining the first 
and third equations yields a standard optimal saving condition of the form 
au 
8 
zc 
t (r-p) 
tý a2U/ aC2 
Vt 
t 
Similarly, where the leisure constraint is not binding, the second and 
third equations imply the condition 
-au/ it 
= 
a2U 
t (r-p- 
2 1ý 
which has the saw form as the condition for consumption except for the 
presence of %ýt. Leisure demand therefore resenbles the demand for an 
ordinary comnodity, subject to a variable price, wt. and an upper bound, L. 
Retirement in this model occurs when the constraint on Lt becorres 
binding, leaving a labour supply of zero. As in the previous case, the 
retirexrent date (if any) depends on the tirre path of wt, and virtually any 
life time pattern of work can be obtained from the model. The main 
difference frcm the zero saving model is in the relation between the wage 
rate and retiren-ent, where the previous model suggested that retiren-ent 
can only arise when the wage rate is declining over time. This is also 
true in the present case when r=p , since 
it then has the opposite sign to 
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ýt and labour supply falls only when the wage rate is also falling. Making 
the asstrption r=p rules out intertenporal effects (and incCWe effects are 
eliminated by the ability to transfer income across periods) so labour 
supply reacts in the expected way to changes in the wage rate, yielding 
the sarre outccn"e as previously. In practice, however, it may well be that 
r>p, producing positive net returns to saving. This rmans that som value 
is placed on working early in the life cycle to accumulate wealth, and that 
a rising wage rate is compatible with falling labour supply (where r-p >wt 
The n-odel can therefore produce voluntary retirenrent without decreasing wage 
rates, which overccrms one of the obstacles to depicting existing retirement 
practices as the outccire of individual choice. 
The other obstacle remains : that is, a retirement decision will 
in general be preceded by a gradual reduction in working hours. Given 
smooth movements in wt and other variables the typical pattern is for 1t 
to increase (and labour supply to fall) until the point lt=L is reached, 
beyond which the constraint on 1t is binding and retirement can be said 
to have occurred. A junp from positive labour supply to zero requires a 
jump in one of the other variables, for exarrple, in the wage rate or 
non-en-ployment inccme. This could well apply to some individuals, but it' 
is not going to arise in the same way and at the sarre tirre for all 
individuals (unless it stems from an exogenously inposed pension scheme 
raising non-enployrrent income at a given date). The sarre caTtrents can be 
made as in (a), namely that the model does not yield a voluntary pattern of 
retirerrent akin to the retiremeant practices prevalent in reality. 
Further elaborations of the labour supply model are also possible. 
One such is to introduce human capital into the analysis, making wages an 
endogenous return to earlier investments (Blinder and Weiss (1976)or 
Heckran (1976)). Another possibility is to extend the utility function 
from the sirpiest two variable cases to a more general form, on the 
lines mentioned in Chapter 5, Section (2). These changes might perhaps be 
regarded as desirable, but they do not in general alter the main point node 
above. Under normal assumptions models of life-cycle labour supply 
produce a steady reduction in hours worked towards zero, not a single date 
retirement. 
There are two alternative responses to this divergence between 
retirerrent in theory and practice. One is to try to narrow the gap by 
enphasising that actual retirerrent does possess sarre of the features predicted 
by the theory. The other is to conclude that there is no strong link 
between individual choice and work patterns, and that working practices are 
largely determined by institutional structures outside the danain of 
individual preferences. Such a view is the one preferred here, and does not 
necessarily diminish the value of labour supply theory. In fact, the theory 
probably does give a reasonable account of people's preferences about 
their working lives; it is probably true that most people would prefer a 
gradual reduction in working hours to a sudden withdrawal from work. if 
one accepts these conclusions, then it follows that somthing else is 
determining retirenpant behaviour. Rather than playing its usual role as a 
self-contained explanation of working practices, labour supply theory can 
serve to enphasise the differences between what individuals would choose 
to do and what happens in practice. 
A desire for gradual retirement exacerbates the government's 
policy problem, which cannot even be characterised as a straight choice 
between single date retirement policies and uniform graduated retirement 
schaies. Any uniform scheme constrains scre individuals, so the initial 
question is whether or not individuals should be given a free hand in 
their retirement decisions. The case for flexible retirement has often 
been put (Sauvy (1969), de Beauvoir (1970), Palmore (1972), Walker (1980), 
Parker (1982)), and it seems convincing enough on purely individualistic 
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grounds. The matter is not in the conventional mould, and involves a decision 
whether or not to constrain individuals, instead of the setting of existing 
policy parameters. To impose a common retirement scheme on rational 
individuals must always reduce social welfare below the no policy position, 
since it merely constrains individual behaviour. Whatever the reason for 
having formal retirement and pensions, it must lie outside the realm of 
utility-maximising individuals with perfect foresight. A full theoretical 
analysis of this problem is probably not feasible, but it is undeniably 
important as a policy issue. The following sections are based on a fixed 
formal retirement date, as is usually observed in practice. This assumes 
ixrplicitly that any advantages of formal retirement are sufficient to justify 
the constraints imposed on a large number of individuals. 
Pensions and the Individual 
Pensions can be seen variously as income maintenance, social 
insurance or a redistributive tool. Perhaps the ccmmonest idea is that they 
are a social security measure, designed to guarantee an acceptable living 
standard for the aged. This accords with their central role in the 
welfare state, although it is saTetimes argued that state pensions induce 
people to leave employment and accept a lower inccme level, thus actually 
increasing poverty (Townsend (1981), Walker (1980)). An alternative 
rationale for pensions is as social insurance, geared specifically to disability 
in old age rather than old age itself. Pensions would then be paid to those 
unable to work, and would happen to be received by the elderly only because 
old age is highly correlated with disability. Schemes operating on this 
basis are best treated as a special case of general social insurance, as 
in DiamondandMirrlees (1978). A further possibility is that pensions serve 
a redistributive function both within and between generations. Discussion 
of this aspect is deferred until Sections (4) and (5). 
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The current section adopts the incarre maintenance interpretation, in 
that it sees pensions as part of the individual's life-cycle pattern of 
inccrre receipts. Nevertheless, the yardstick ernployed is the rrIaXimisation 
of life-cycle utility, not the Isatisficing' implicit in maintaining 
minknan income standards. There is no real insurance in the face of 
uncertainty, and individuals are taken to have a fixed life span and knowledge 
of their future retirement date. 
Two central questions need to be considered. Initially ccries the 
decision on whether state pensions are justified at all, or whether 
individuals should be left alone to make their own provision for old age. 
If pensions are to be advocated, there occurs the further question of the 
form they should take and their relationship with retirement practices. The 
discussion below looks at these issues, using sirrple models of individual 
life-cycle saving. 
It is convenient to distinguish three main cases, a single 
individual with optimal savings, a single individual with suboptimal saving, 
and the presence of many individuals. 
Optimal Individual Saving 
In a world of perfect foresight and rational agents, individuals 
plan their future consurrption optimally. Any goverment policies on pensions 
or retirerrent are incorporated in this assessuent, and result in an 
appropriate adjustment of individual behaviour. 
Mie- most basic case, inWsing the mininm number of arbitrary 
constraints on the individual, is the dynamic labour supply n-adel outlined 
in Section (2), part (a). Allowing a free choice of retirement date rreans 
that complete retireiment may or may not occur, according to individual 
preference, and that working hours are liable to be reduced gradually. 
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Fully flexible provision of pensions can be represented by allowing the 
government to make a net lunp-sun payrnent bt at any date t, where bt 
corresponds to taxation when negative and to a pension when positive. 
One may assume that the government's payments satisfy 
T -rt eb dt =0 0t 
as there is no income redistribution taking place. A pension policy of this 
type has nothing to offer the rational individual, and leaves the final 
consumption path unchanged. In particular, because the taxes have a luTp-sun 
form they do not interfere with the optimality conditions for consumption 
and labour supply, limiting their effect to any change in lifetime inccrre. 
The requirement that payments and receipts must balance over the life cycle 
news that the net impact on lifetime income is zero, so there is nothing 
to be gained from introducing the pension scheme-. Any taxation displaces 
the same amount of private savings, and results in later consumption being 
financed out of pension receipts instead of savings. The individual is 
indifferent to the form taken by the bt payments (fran the infinite number 
of possibilities), and there is no sense in which any particular structure 
of payments is superior to the others. Indeed, if government policy 
involves any administrative costs, or if individuals prefer to manage their 
own affairs, then the optimal position is to do without pensions. A 
similar outccme occurs when individual decisions are limited to saving, 
subject to a known pattern of retirement and labour supply. 
The position resembles that in the permanent income or life-cycle 
models (Friedman (1957), Ando and Modigliani (1963)), where consurption 
responds to changes in lifetime income. Under optimal saving a pension 
scheme only influences individual utility and consumption levels to the 
extent that it alters lifetime income; if the individual's total 
contribution and receipts balance over the life cycle, then there is no net 
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effect, and the individual's utility remains unaltered. Even when pensions 
do raise lifetime inccrm, their impact wi. 11 tend to be an upward shift in 
the whole of the consumption path, rather than an increase during the 
period of high pension receipts. Paying pensions to the elderly would not 
necessarily have much impact on either their consumption or labour supply. 
Under optimal saving the specific structure of any state pension beccrms 
irrelevant. 
if the government happens to disagree with individual preferences, 
then its ideal optimal saving path will differ from the individual's 
optimal saving plan. Pension policies are not much help in this case, 
because whatever pension structure the government chooses to impose, 
individuals can always adjust their saving to return to their own preferred 
consumption path. The government can only use pensions to influence 
individual behaviour by either dictating the level of all personal savings 
or by threatening constantly to adjust pensions as a counter-response to 
adjustments in individual saving. Neither of these are attractive policy 
options, so there is no real rationale for state pensions. A better means 
of influencing individual saving would be to use interest rate taxation 
to vary the net returns on personal wealth (see Chapter (4)). 
The general conclusion is that fonnal pensions are not easily 
compatible with individual rationality. 
(ii) Suboptin-al Individual Saving 
Suppose now that optimality is defined by the government's preferences, 
and that individual saving fails to reach the optimal path. The government 
may wish to implement a pension scheme to try to achieve its preferred 
saving pattern. Its success is governed by the nature of the individual 
reaction. There are three main possibilities: 
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(a) Fixed ex ante plans 
In this case the individual has a fixed plan for private saving, 
determined before government policy is introduced and adhered to. An 
example would be the classical assumption of zero saving, holding regardless 
of the level of taxation. There are no resulting difficulties for government 
policy, - since the passive individual behaviour creates no disincentive effects 
and allows the optimal consumption path to be reached. Taxes and pensions 
will be set equal to the difference between the individual's initial saving 
plans and the optimal saving plan. 
(b) Plans responsive to policy 
A second case is where individual saving plans are dependent in scm 
way on the government's pension scheme. This can be represented by making 
individual consurrption or savings a function of government policy measures, 
that is, C= C(bl# bT), Vt where Ct is individual consu-rption at time t 
and bt denotes the government's pension/tax policy (as in (i) above). The 
function C forms a genuine constraint on the policy optimisation problem, t 
and will have to be taken into account if utility is to be maximised. It 
is possible that the unconstrained optimal saving path will still be 
attained (for example, if individual savings are a fixed proportion of the 
goverment Is forced savings), but in general the presence of the disincentive 
will prevent a fully optimal savings pattern being attained. Nevertheless, 
it will usually be true that goverment intervention can improve on the- 
original savings plan. 
(c) Fixed ex post plans 
Individuals here have a given saving plan which they rraintain in the 
face of formal pension provision. If pensions are introduced, then 
individuals rrerely adjust their plans so that consuiption and net saving 
correspond to their preferred life-cycle pattern. The situation reserTbles 
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that with rational saving when individual preferences diverge from those 
of the government, involving a set of pension plans which are independent 
of the government's policy. Given that individuals can always choose to 
return to their own suboptimal plans, there is little that the government 
can acccrrplish by introducing pensions (short of dictating saving behaviour 
or using the threat of pension changes to bargain with individuals). 
This is the only case in which state pensions are not clearly justifiable 
when individual saving behaviour is suboptimal. 
Hence, under the conditions assumed, there is a corrective role for 
state pensions as a means of bringing suboptimal individual saving back on 
to the optimal path. One way, of course, question the state's right to 
override individual choices and determine loptimlityl : paternalism is a 
controversial topic, and the general pros and cons carry over to this 
particular case. 
(iii) Many Individuals 
In practice, a formal pension scheme usually applies to many 
individuals of diverse circunstances and preferences. This way lead to 
redistribution (see Section (4)), and raises several other issues. Two of 
them, the creation of *pension dependence and the impact on aggregate output, 
are considered below. 
The Creation of Pension Dependenoe 
Given rational individual saving and a goverment without 
redistributive ambitions, there is little to be gained from formal pension 
schemes. One might then wonder why state pensions are so widespread, as 
they are rarely defended explicitly on the grounds of correcting individual 
irrationality or as a redistributive measure. Mie- usual reasoning behind 
pensions is as income maintenance for the aged, and yet such a role would 
248 
suggest a more limited pension incidence than is in fact the case. The 
question arises of whether any other factors have influenced the spread 
of pensions. 
When saving is rational, pensions or other social security should 
generally discourage private savings. Arguments have been put forward that 
this has indeed occurred, resulting in'a decrease in aggregate capital 
accumulation (Feldstein (1974)). C)thers have maintained that the effect 
is not particularly important enpirically (Green (1981)). Whatever the 
truth in practice, in economic theory the rational response of individuals 
to social security schemes would be to reduce the extent of saving. The 
implication is that non-redistributive pensions contribute little to economic 
welfare and should be reduced in extent. There is something of a paradox 
here, however. Where many individuals are present, strong saving 
disincentives are liable to encourage the spread of state pension provision, 
despite its undesirability. A society which dabbles in social security for 
the aged way easily find itself with a population universally reliant on 
state 'pensions'. 
The creation of pension dependence can be illustrated by a sirrple 
two period model of life-cycle saving. Suppose that there is a single 
generation of identical individuals who all work in the first period 
and are retired in the second. Utility is 
U(C + 
U(C2) 
1+P 
where ClIC2 are consumption in the first and second periods and p is the 
discount rate on future utility. Income received from working in the first 
period is given by M, so individuals choose C1 and C2 to maximise V subject 
to a budget constraint 
ZO 
+c2 
1+r 
where r is the interest rate. Rational individual saving in-plies the condition 
U-(C 1+r UI(C 1+pý 
which, along with the budget constraint, defines the individual's choice of 
the optimal C1*, C2*., These values provide the socially optimal outcome, and 
cannot be improved on by government intervention in pension provision. Now 
assure that the government introduces a limited income maintenance scheme, 
guaranteeing a mininm current income of m. If m<C2*, then the initial 
optimal saving plan would not qualify for state assistance. Nevertheless, 
rational individual behaviour could still lead to saving disincentives, 
since individuals may deliberately run down their savings in order to claim 
the benefit. The government might not be aware of such responses, but even 
if it was, it would find it difficult to refuse the provision of a subsistence 
incarre on humanitarian grounds. Individuals therefore have a choice between 
maintaining their initial position C1*, C2* or reducing their savings to 
zero and claiming the full benefit m (there being no point in retaining a 
small positive saving level and claiming less than the full benefit). If 
each individual ignores the behaviour of others, the benefit is claimed when 
the condition 
U(m -M+ U(M) > U(C + 
U(C 2 *) 
H YT -p 1+ p 
holds true, assurrdng that benefits are finanoed by luTp-sm taxes, m/ HI 
where H is the size of the population. For a large H the effect of one person 
claiming benefits on the level of taxation is negligible, and can be ignored 
by the individual in making a decision :a possible inccme gain of m units 
is then being weighed against the inconvenience of rearranging the 
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intertenporal consumption pattern. Even an income maintenance level 
considerably below observed income levels can potentially lead to a substantial 
decrease in private savings. Any ex post benefit from this behaviour 
depends whether the others respond in the same way. If scme have scruples 
about claiming benefits, then the non-savers way end up prospering at their 
expense. Purely economic rationality demands that all individuals behave 
in the same way, so private saving in the economy would collapse and the 
benefit m would become a universal state pension. The net outcome would be 
inferior to the initial position, unless it so happens that m=C2* 
The difficulties experienced are similar in nature to 'free rider' 
problems in the financing of public goods by voluntary contributions. To 
illustrate this, consider a numerical exanple with two identical individuals. 
Preferences are U= Cý in both periods, and it is assumed for sijrplicity's 
sake that p=r=O. Income arbitrarily takes the value M=200. With no 
policy intervention, consuTption will be split equally between periods, so 
that C1*=C2*= 100 and V= 20 for both individuals. Suppose now that a 
minimxn incorre guarantee of m is introduced. The threshold value of m 
governing saving disincentives is given by 
[200 
-Eý+ mý = 20 21 
and solving this yields m Pz 44.44. If m> 44.44, then individuals are 
better off not saving and claiming the benefit, given the assmPtion that 
others do not react likewise; if mK 44.44 individuals continue to save 
as before. Let m be sufficiently generous to fall in the range above 44.44, 
and assure that, say, m= 50. The possible range of outcorres can be 
depicted in gam theoretical texms, producing a set of utility payoffs as 
below: 
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Individual B 
Save 
Individual A 
Save Not Save 
V= 20 VA = 18.71 A 
vB = 2o VB = 20.30 
I- -- ---- -I V= 20M : VA = 19.32 
Not save I VB = 18471 :VB= 19.32 
I- ---- --j 
The daninant strategy for both players is to reduce savings to zero and 
claim the benefit, producing a Nash equilibrium in the bottom right-hand 
corner. This is a standard case of the I Prisoners I DilenTna I, in which a 
superior result can be obtained if the players agree to maintain their 
original saving patterns. The co-operative solution is unstable, however, 
given that the individuals always have an incentive to break it and profit 
at the expense of the other player. Society is liable to end up with state 
'pensions' which are not designed for that role and cause a reduction in 
social welfare. In contrast to the usual kind of policy problem, a 
co-operative agreement is here required to avoid the spread of public 
provision. Without restraint in the claiming of state benefits, the social 
security system will becom universal, producing results inferior to an 
absence of pension provision. It is therefore conceivable that state pensions 
grow spontaneously in circumstances where they have no social value. The 
effect could be avoided by setting mat a sufficiently low level, reducing 
the generosity of the social security system. 
This arguTent becarres rather stronger when the population is allowed 
to differ in its initial incorm levels. Let the incorm distribution be 
depicted by the continuous function f(M), such that 
PMf 
(M)dM =Y 
m 
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where M, M are the maximum. and minimum levels of individual income and Y 
is the aggregate inccrre of the population. The model otherwise remains as 
before, with the same two-period structure of saving and retirement. Income 
maintenance again takes the form of a minimum guaranteed current income, 
m, raised from taxing employment earnings, M. In order to abstract from 
redistributive questions it is assumed that taxes are proportional to income, 
thus maintaining the initial pattern of inccnn levels. If Mý denotes the 
threshold income below which saving falls to zero and the benefit is claimed, 
then the number of claixmnts will be 
f (M) dM 
m 
where F(M) is the cumulative distribution function associated with the density 
f(m). The proportional rate of taxation is then equal to 
mF(, Mt) 
y 
that is, to the total level of benefit payments divided by aggregate inccrre. 
A range of different income levels makes the inccme maintenance policy 
rather more credible than in the identical population case above, and it 
can be assumed that the benefit is claimed by at least the lowest inccire 
group in the population : social security is redundant if it does not cover 
even the poorest members of society. Benefits are claimed if the condition 
below applies 
(tl(, 
_ 
MF(M) 
)+ U(m) U(21* + 
U(22*) 
y 1+ p 1+ p 
where 21*, 22* are the optimal consurrption levels associated with inccrre M. 
Consider now what happens as individuals decide, whether or not to claim the 
benefit. If there exists a threshold income, 0, at which an individual 
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is indifferent between saving and not saving, then it must satisfy 
U 
(Mt 
(1 _ 
mF(Mt) + 
U(M) 
= U(Clt + 
U(C 2 t*) 
y 1+p 1+p 
where C1 t*, C2 t* are consurrption levels chosen with the net incam 
mt = Mt 
(1 
_ 
mF(Mt) m 
t(, 
-t) net y 
7bis condition can never be stable, however, because one group's decision 
to claim the benefit always means that those with a marginally higher inccme 
level will wish to follow suit. Specifically, as individuals at an inCC`me 
Mt decide to claim benefits, the tax rate will rise and the effect on after- 
tax inccme is 
dM t=- Mt2-t dM t MIM yf 
(MI) dMt o 
net amt 
In terrrr. of the threshold condition the fall in the left-band side 
is UI(Mt ) dMt , while the fall in the : right-hand side is net net 
t* U, (C t*) act* 
cl*) 
211 2 
-2 
-1 
- 1+p Tm 
(U 
alet ý; t 
ul (C t*) 
( aclt* 
+1 
! C2t 
amt 1+r 3r# 
net net 
dMf 
net 
dffý t= U'(C dffý he net 
using the optinul saving condition and the adding-up property. 
Sinc& C<Mt and U" < 0, it follows that net 
UI(Mt dMt < U-(Ct) dMt and the left-band side now exceeds the 
net net 1 net 
right-hand side. Individuals with a slightly higher inccme than Mt 
are induced to claim the benefit as'well, so that Mt cannot be a stable 
threshold income level. The sc-um argument applies right up to 
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M, so in the end the whole population decides not to save and 
to claim the minimum inccae, m. In others words, given non-redistributive 
taxes and a continuous income distribution, any operational inccrm 
maintenance scherre (regardless of how low m is) leads to a collapse of all 
private saving and a universal reliance on the minimun 'pension' level. The 
only real exception within the model's own terms is if there is a gap in 
the inccue distribution sufficiently large for the richer group to be better 
off not claiming the benefit (though in practice inccne distributions are 
virtually continuous until very high income levels). Thus optimal saving 
behaviour in this model is not easily ccnpatible with a limited scale 
of state welfare provision. Introducing income support measures causes a 
spreading of benefit claims which is not liable to produce a socially 
optimal outcome and leads to an extensive and systematic redistribution of 
inccup- between individuals. 
Two possible solutions can be identified. One would be for the 
government (which is content with the initial income distribution) to 
withdraw the income maintenance schemes and let individuals do their own 
saving. Scm people would be left at low income levels, but a wholesale 
dependence on social security benefits during old age would be avoided. 
While potentially a desirable solution within the model, it is difficult to 
see this response occurring in reality; even the most conmitted libertarians 
support some kind of inccrre maintenance (for example, Friedman (1962), 
Chapter 12). The alternative is to adopt a more full-blooded redistributive 
policy, designing both taxation and pensions on the basis of a more explicit 
notion of social welfare. Effects as above can be prevented if revenue is 
raised by progressive taxes which apply only to the higher incom earners 
in society. For once the rich might actually do better when paying higher 
taxes, since they are the major losers from a general spread of social 
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security dependence throughout the population (even a first-best inccm 
redistribution might be better for then than the outcome above). There is 
a sense in which the goverment must decide whether or not to intervene in 
a decisive way. To implexrent limited income maintenance suggests some 
concern for income redistribution without a full com-nitment to it; the 
government is satisficing rather than optimising. On the lines of the 
example above the measures could spread further than intended, leading to an 
accidental outcare which is not going to be particularly desirable. It would 
be better for the government either to step back ccrrpletely from social 
security provision, or to grasp the nettle and formulate a more ambitious 
redistributive taxation/pension scheme. 
In practice it cannot really be expected that disincentives will be 
as strong as those illustrated above. Their presence depends on individual 
rationality, and if saving behaviour is not truly optimal (as way well be 
the case), the spreading of pension dependence need not arise at all. Other 
influences may also be relevant. In particular, a social stigra way be 
attached to the claiming of social security, and some individuals may be 
reluctant to declare themselves impoverished in old age in order to obtain 
benefits. If this is true, then benefits are limited to the small number 
of willing claimants, who receive a net incorm transfer from the rest of 
the population. The state can also choose to base its inccme support on 
lifetime income, and refuse to maintain individuals who have squandered a 
high incorre in their working years. To do this requires the ability to 
ignore those whose current (but not lifetime) income is genuinely low. The% 
effects depicted here can therefore potentially be avoided in reality. 
Nevertheless, statistics do show an expansion of social security over time, 
and especially state pensions (Peacock and Wiseman (1967), Klein arid 
O'Higgins (1985)). An additional feature of U. K. experience has been the 
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breakdown of the insurance/social security division envisaged in the Beveridge 
Report; inccm support for pensioners is now dependent on social security 
payments not originally intended for that purpose. These facts are broadly 
consistent with the preceding discussion, although they do not perforce 
result frcm saving disincentives. 
A possible rationale for state intervention now en-erges, despite the 
optimal saving assumption and the absence of redistributive arbitions. 
It goes on the following lines. Firstly, some degree of income maintenance 
is always necessary (a fact agreed on by almost all economists), and some 
of the aged are almost certain to be among the recipients. Given optimal 
saving and non-redistributive taxation, this leads to saving disincentives 
in a group much larger than the original targets for income maintenance. The 
result is that a significant part of the population becomes reliant on a 
'pension' which was intended only as minimum income support. One is left 
with a haphazard system of state pensions, which is unplanned, inadequate 
and produces an inferior social outcome. It is preferable to accept the need 
for state intervention and design a more extensive set of redistributive 
policies (which, at a first best, would not necessarily involve pensions). 
Although such an argument way seem a little fanciful, it does show that 
optimal individual saving can be consistent with a case for state intervention 
and that strong saving disincentives can be used to argue for, as well as 
against, social security measures. 
(b) Retirenrent Dates and Aggregate Output 
The discussion so far has been restricted to individual choice, with 
no mention of the productive inpact of pensions and retiren-ent. It may be 
that observed policies are determined by productivity considerations, which 
(justifiably or not) dominate individual preferences; analyses based on these 
lines are Lazear (1979) and Lapp (1985). In the present context, the 
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relevant issue is whether the government wishes to use pension policies to 
influence aggregate production. A binding statutory retirement age 
provides a direct control over total labour supply; if individuals can 
choose their retirement date, their decision can be influenced by linking 
pension receipts to retirement. For instance, the Beveridge Report 
(Beveridge (1942)) insisted on the 'retirement condition'. requiring 
individuals -to cease full-time work before they could claim the state pension. 
The intention was to encourage people to continue work beyond the statutory 
retirement age, on the assmption that scme individuals would prefer an 
extended working life to early receipt of the pension (though in practice 
it seems the opposite has occurred, with a large majority of people now 
retiring at the statutory age). To place an extraconsiraint on the pension 
scheme is never desirable from the viewpoint of individual choice. For 
the government to do so there must be scre additional relevant feature, 
the most likely being a wish to increase the aggregate output level by 
inducing higher labour force participation. 
The position can be illustrated by a sirrple niodel which allows 
individuals to choose their retirement date. It is assumed that people have 
a known continuous life span from 0 to D, and are able to decide on any 
retirerrent date, R, such that Rc [0, D]. Weekly working hours are fixed at 
T-1 (where T is total time available and 1 is leisure), the wage W is 
constant over tirre, and future utility is discounted at a rate p. 
Saving is assumed to be a constant, s, over the working period (which my 
not be a totally unrealistic view of actual saving behaviour) and accumulated 
wealth at retirement is consumed at a constant rate. Interest returns on 
wealth are assured to be zero in order to sirrplify the outcome. Individuals 
therefore adopt a 'pyramidal' form of wealth holding, 
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Rs 
0 
which approximates to the usual (I-shape pattern of life-cycle saving. 
Total utility is given by 
- pR - Plý e7 pD) U(Rs , T) V= (1- e) U(W(T-1)-s, 1) + (e -e D-R 
where U, Fj are the utility functions pertaining to the enployed and 
retired (not necessarily identical). The individual chooses R and s to 
maximise V, yielding 
av 
-- pe-pR(U_5) +(e 
-pR -e 
-pD) W Ds 0 3R ax (D-R)l- 
av 
_(, _e-PR) 
2U 
+ (e-pR -e -pD) 
R ýu 0 as -- ax D-R ax 
where x denotes consurrption of 'goods' (price normalised to unity). The 
condition for retirement requires that the utility return from the higher 
income gained in delaying retirement be equated with the loss frCM shortening 
the retirement period. It is noteworthy that voluntary retirement before 
death occurs only if U >U, so that the retired have a higher utility than 
workers. Retirement in practice does not always seem to have this 
characteristic, suggesting difficulties in picturing actual retirement 
behaviour as resulting from voluntary choice of this nature. The saving 
condition implies that the utility loss from a marginal increase in saving 
during the working period is equated with themarginal, gain fran increased 
consLrption during retirement. 
RD 
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Suppose now that the governn"ent pays out a pension B during the 
retirement period, financed by a tax of b on the employed. If the pension 
scheme operates as actuarially fair insurance, then net pension receipts 
are equal to total tax payments; B and b are linked by the relation 
Rb 
DR 
Since this has no net effect on lifetirm inccrTp-, it does not influence 
the total saving level derived frcrn the optimality conditions above. Mie 
sole inpact is to displace an amount of private saving equal to b, leaving 
the retirement date unchanged. As was remarked in part (i), there is no 
resason to irrplement policies of this type. 
In a more general case the tax and pension can be introduced 
without being linked by a budget constraint, so that B and b each take a 
fixed level. Individuals under these conditions no longer receive a higher 
pension when retiring later, and face a loss of pension inccrre when deciding 
to extend their working life. The -retirermnt condition now takesthe form 
pe - 
PR (W(T-1)-s-b, 1) - 
FJ Rs + B, T+ (ý-pRý_'eý-pD) 
;U Ds IU (D 
R 5; i (B: R-)2ým 
0 
and is therefore no longer independent of b and B. In general a rise in 
either b or B will tend to induce earlier retirement and a reduced level of 
private saving. The goverment is now in a position to use pensions to 
influence individual behavour if it wishes to do so, giving a possible 
rationale for a state pension scheme. The crucial feature is that net 
pension receipts are made to be dependent on the individual's retiremant 
decision, and appropriate scheffes could take several different fornr.; a 
Iretirenvent condition' fulfils this function if there is a loss of expected 
inccrre when retirement is delayed. 
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As was mentioned above, the most likely reason for a divergence 
between government and individual attitudes is the level of aggregate output. 
Individual consurption must ultimately be related to production, and it 
is not assured that individual decisions on retirement (and other issues) must 
always produce the best possible aggregate output level. In particular, 
individuals do not take account of the physical link between work and 
output when making decisions, even though this may be of relevance to them 
in social welfare terms. It could be that the government has a better 
knowledge of the economy's aggregate characteristics, allowing it to guide 
individual decisions towards an outcorre superior in social welfare terms. 
Otherwise the society might, for example, find itself facing restrictions 
on its consuTption that it would prefer not to have and which could be 
alleviated by an alternative working arrangement. In practice it is likely 
that some considerations of this type are relevant, since the determinants 
of national prosperity are not generally known to individuals and do not 
feature in their decision making. It is hot always clear that'governments 
have this knowledge either, but they ought to be in a better position to 
judge the condition of the national economy. Such notions go well beyond 
the individualistic framework used here, and would in any case be difficult 
to depict theoretically in a plausible way. Their conceivable relevance 
should nevertheless be borne in mind. 
In conclusion, Section (3) has identified only three theoretical 
situations in which pensions are beneficial. The first is where iridividuals 
cannot organise their own savings optimally, whether this be due to lack 
of information or a mere inability to handle finances. A 'paternalistic' 
state pension is then justifiable. Secondly, it may so happen that a 
suboptimal pension scheme arises spontaneously out of a limited social 
security system, because of strong saving disincentives. A purposely designed 
state pension could improve on this position. The third case is where a 
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state pension is used to influence aggregate labour supply and output, in 
the interests of attaining a higher social welfare level. 
Apart from these cases, the outcorre is that rational individuals 
are capable of looking after their awn intertenporal finances, and that 
pensions are superfluous. The one other reason for having pensions is 
as a redistributive tool, and this is considered in the following section. 
(4) Pensions and Redistribution 
Unlike taxation, pension policies are seldom seen as redistributive 
in purpose. Any pension systern must nonetheless entail redistribution 
unless individual pensions are deliberately designed to preserve lifetime 
incomes : the general situation is for pensions to be redistributive, with 
insurance-based non-redistributive pensions as a special case. A truly 
optimal pension policy would unavoidably encounter redistributive questions, 
so it is relevant to broaden the discussion sufficiently to include them. 
Redistribution through pensions is a nx)re ccuplex issue than in 
the static models considered in other chapters. In particular, the 
treatrent of pensions requires intertemporal modelling, so that redistribution 
can occur between different dates and generations as well as between 
individuals at a single date. With a varying population and uncertainty, 
the position in reality is far from straightforward. The discussion 
below separates the 'static' problem of redistributing between wxbers 
of a given generation from the lintertenporall problem of redistributing 
between individuals of different ages; Section (4) considers the forn-ar 
case and Section (5) the latter. It should be noted that such a 
distinction does not arise naturally, and that an optimal pension scham 
would simultaneously involve both types of redistribution. 
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In the present section intertenporal redistribution is removed 
by assuming a constant steady-state population. Each generation is then 
identical to all other generations, and can be treated as representative 
of the population at large. Policy neasures aim to redistribute incom 
within a particular generation, which need not be dated since all generations 
are identical. The problem therefore reserrbles the static redistributions 
considered in other chapters. Several cases are discussed below under 
varying sets of assuaptions. 
(i) Optimul Saving/First-best IncaTe Redistribution 
Suppose firstly that individuals follow an optimal savings pattern, 
and that the goverment possesses full information on individual character- 
istics. These are the ideal conditions for undertaking redistribution, 
providing no obstacle to a first-best outccn-e. Intervention is necessary 
only at a single date, involving lunp-sum inccne/wealth transfers on the 
pattern of Chapter 4, Section (3). Rational individual saving ensures 
social optimality at all dates, as long as individual preferences coincide 
with the government's (which can be assumed here). It follows that there 
is no need for formal pensions, and any retirement period is covered by the 
individual's private savings. 
(ii) Optimal Savinq without First-best Inccrm Redistribution 
Suppose now that a first-best is not attainable, so that pensions 
n-ay have scme redistributive role. The case considered below involves 
the linear inccrre and ccmnodity taxes of Diamond (1975), used in Chapter 2 
Section (3). Individuals are assumed to live for two periods, 'Working in 
the first and consuming from savings or pension inccrre in the second. 
With H individuals and N caT=dities, individual utilities take the fonn 
- ýh -h U(xl, XN ' 1) + T) l+P X, XN' 
lo 
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where U, 'D denote preferences during the working and retirement periods, 
h -h and consumption levels x- i, xi are differentiated in a similar way. 
incorporates a fixed number T of leisure hours per week, and need not irrply 
a utility function identical to U if retirermnt alters the nature of 
individual preferences; the leisure of the errployed, 1, is variable and 
chosen in the conventional way. Governrmnt policy is based on linear direct/ 
indirect taxes, tl,, ... " tN (under the usual assumption of fixed producer 
prices normalised to unity and a tax on employment inccrm normalised to zero), 
and two uniform lurrp-su-n payments/taxes b, B applying to the employed and 
retired respectively. A positive payment B can be regarded as a state 
pension paid to retired individuals. Under optimal saving the timing of the 
payments b and B is inmterial, and they can be unified as a single payment; 
in the discussion below this is interpreted as a second-period pension 
payment, a, such that a= b(l+r) + B. The policy problern is to choose 
tiop i=l, N and a to maximise social welfare subject to a revenue 
constraint. Such an optimisation is virtually identical in form to the 
standard case, except for the presence of dated ccnu-odities and discounting; 
the optimality conditions are analogous to those for the single period =del. 
The main feature of interest here is the presence of a redistributive 
'pension' payment. Cptimal taxation models are rmst often used to show 
that ccmnodity/inccrm taxes can serve redistributive ends, given that a 
lump-sum tax is the better revenue raising tool if redistribution is an 
issue. The argument works equally well in the reverse direction, justifying 
government inccm support either as a pension or in scrm other guise. 
Indeed, there is a good chance that it is the uniform lump-sun payment that 
is responsible for redistribution at the optimm, not the taxes. Commiodity 
taxation is then valuable not as a direct redistributive tool, but as a 
means of financing a progressive uniform payment (albeit inefficiently), 
which is the main agent of redistribution. The part played by the uniform 
lump sum in this case should not therefore be neglected, and it is 
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misleading to view the nodel as 333 u trating the effects of taxation alone. 
Redistribution can be taken further if the goverment also taxes 
retirement inccrres. Suppose, for exan-ple, that a linear tax at the rate 
is inposed on savings transferred into the retirement period (noting that 
the question of observing the wage rate does not occur among the retired). 
This can be interpreted in a number of ways: as a direct tax on observed 
savings; as an indirect interest rate tax, leaving a net return to saving 
of r-0; or as a pension inversely related to private nr-ans. The model 
below follows the last of the interpretations, so that individual receive 
a uniform lurrp-sum 'pension', a, in the second period, from which an amount 
is deducted equal to ý times their level of private savings (with a, 0 free 
to take negative values). Individual budget constraints take the form 
-h N 
^h xI I (1+t X. + fy h=1, H Wh(T-1h) + 1+r-O 
and the level of savings is equal to fir t-period inccrre minus consumption, 
that is 
N 
P(l+t 
Wh(T-1h) x 
The government Is revenue constraint is therefore 
N 
1 
H -h (-h 
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In order to undertake policy optimisation it is convenient to write 
individual utilities as an indirect utility function dependent on prices, 
wage levels, the rate of interest and the rate of tim preference, such that 
U(p, w, r, p)1, 
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where U=U+/ 1+p , and /Br <0 will generally hold. Policy 
optimisation goes ahead as usual, choosing a, $ and ti, i-1, ... ' N to 
maximise social welfare, V, subject to the revenue constraint above. 
The Lagrangian and first-order conditions are: 
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Let the MSU of incorre to individual h be denoted by 
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which resenbles the usual case, except for the presence of dated comnodities 
and the final term reflecting revenue from the interest/retirerrent inccrre- 
tax (3Mh denotes a change in first-period inccrre) 
From the condition 
aL / 
3a ý 
H 
1+r h=l 
allowing for the fact that a is a second-period incam payrmnt. 
Modifying Roy's Identity to the present circumstances yields 
-h hH @Ljh @Tjh h Xk 
at j: ý Xk + r-a kk1, N 
and the Slutsky equations take the form 
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Substituting these into the tax equation, rearranging and dividing by if 
gives 
N 11 -h 'k 
. 
1: 1 ý, Lh ) (^h + t Sik +1t if i xk Xk 1+r i 1+r i 
gik 
h=l x 
Carpensated reduction in demand Distributional characteristic of k 
from taxing k 
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s lk 
k 1, "..  N 
Savings effect of taxing k 
where a bar denotes averages over h. 
This has a broadly similar form to-the standard tax equation, except for the 
final expression. The term on the left-band side is the ccapensated reduction 
Jn demand resulting frým taxing good k; the first tem on the right-hand 
side is the 'distributional characteristic' of the good, that is, the 
extent to which it is consumed by individuals with a high MSU of income 
(note, however, that the expression is now influenced by $). The final 
savings effect indicates the extent to which taxing good k influences 
ccn-pensated final-period consumption expenditure : the m=e negative it is, 
the more the tax discourages first-period spending and encourages saving. 
The compensated reduction in demand is therefore greater for goods which are 
highly substitutable between time periýds, and vice versa. No obvious 
intuitive label can be placed on such ccnmx)dities. In general, the 
fixed leisure hours of the retired sh6uld reduce their substitutability 
in consumption relative to a work force with flexible labour supply, 
since rationing lessens substitution between commodities (according 
to the Ile Chatelier Principle' of Samuelson (1947)). From the 
government's viewpoint the reason for acknowledging the savings effect 
is entirely in terms of revenue raising, on the grounds that forcing - 
later consumption allows a 'double taxation' of both consumption expenditure 
and savings. 
Let vh denote the MSU of a rise in the interest rate as it affects the 
ýth individual, so that 
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The optimality condition for the interest/retirezent incorm tax then 
irrplies that 
H 
IVh 
Total Savings 
so that the MSU of government revenue and the mean MSU of inccme to 
individuals are equated with the sun of the vh 's divided by total first- 
period savings. This is intuitively appealing, as the last term describes 
the MSU of increasing $ per unit of savings; at the optimum the MSU of 
government revenue therefore matches the impact of the equivalent relaxation 
of the interest tax or rise in the uniform lunp-sun payrmnt. 
The main inportance of this case is that it allows for redistributive 
neasures iaWsed during the retirermnt period. A positive a and 6 produce 
a progressive redistributive pension, where state pension receipts decline 
with the extent of private savings. Consequently, in second-best situations 
optimal pensions way be paid on redistributive principles. 
In more corrplex models there is a clearer distinction between 
interest taxation and direct taxation of retirement income. Considerjor 
example, a situation with work and retirement periods spanning more than a 
single date (as is true in practice). An interest tax applies at the same 
rate at all dates, regardless of whether individuals are working or retired. 
A retirement income tax/redistributive pension, on the other hand, depends 
partly on an individual's age, applying only to the retired (though it may 
still be beneficial to tax interest or wealth at earlier periods). The tax 
could also be inposed at a rate varying continuously with age, instead 
of remaining constant throughout retirement. The informational requirements 
for a direct tax are greater than for a tax on interest, and if knowlodgo 
of retirement incomes is not available an interest tax nuy be the best 
feasible policy tool. when full information on incorres is present, it is 
desirable to use it in inposing a direct tax. The linear structure assunod 
above is not the ideal form, and an unrestricted non-linear tax structure 
varying over tirre would achieve better results. The (already quite ccnplex) 
structure of the model is capable of substantial extension, to include 
continuous tirre, non-linear pensions/taxes in retirermnt and various 
different foms of incorre, wealth and ccmnodity taxation during the working 
period. This would not alter the main point, however, that a failure to 
reach a first-best incaTe redistribution an-ang the working population 
opens the way for redistributive pension schenes. 
(iii) Pensions as a Redistributive Tax on Age 
A rather different view of pensions emerges when a person's age 
is seen as an observable characteristic, open to taxation like any other. 
There is no reason to tax age on its own (under optimal saving), but it rmy 
be a proxy for some unobservable characteristic which has distributional 
relevance. This is a possibility whenever the population varies in a 
systematic way with age, as a result of different death rates in different 
groups. If people with a certain characteristic have a lower death rate 
than those without, then that characteristic occurs in a higher proportion 
of the population as age increases. It is then possible to tax the 
characteristic indirectly by in-posing age-related payments which increase 
over time. In models with differing death rates (unlike the fixed life spans 
above) , it is possible to 
justify pensions as a form of age tax/benefit, 
where age is correlated with some other unobservable characteristic. Even 
when the wain aim of pensions is not seen in these terms, the effect nust 
influence the policy optimun of any model with varying death rates. 
Since death rates in practice do vary quite considerably between population 
groups (Kelsall (1979)), the in-pact of population 'sorting' over tirm is 
almst certain to be relevant to the design of pension scherms. 
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To illustrate this consider a model with two groups in tho population, 
differentiated by their initial w-alth and their death rates. Individuals 
live for either one or two periods and are assuTed to save optinully, 
nexin'Lising expected lifetin-e utility. The 'wealthy' group has a highar 
initial capital level 1ý- and a mortality pararreter Q., where QW is tho 
chance of a wealthy individual living for two periods. The corresponding 
values for the 'poor' group are KP and E) , such that 
RKP < KW and 0p00 
0< Op <0<1. Expected lifetime utilities are W 
U. = U(61) +e U(cl) W, p 10i1 
with all individuals aware of the relevant E) value. The governrent knows 
the patterns of wealth and mortality in the population, but for some reason 
(informational or otherwise) does not tax initialwealth directly. It remains 
possible to place a uniform lump-sun tax/payment on a person's age, arid, 
given the disparity between E) W and 
E) 
p, 
this is a potential tool of 
redistributive policy. 
Let bt denote the tax payable by imlividuals of age t, t-0,1, 
so that a negative value represents a 'pension' payrrent. The revenuo 
constraint is then 
H 
(bo 
+ 
(aw OW +a 
bl) R 
1+r 
where H is the size of the Population, otW# aP are the proportions of wealthy 
and poor individuals (a W+ ap = 
1), and R is the revenue requiremant. With 
a utilitarian social objective there is no problem of saving disincentives, 
since individuals save optin-ally and taxes take a lunp-surn form. Treating 
Iw ýW. CP cP. as policy instruments, the gavernimnt nuximises social %, 1'. o' I 
uelfare subject to the individual budget constraints and the revenuo 
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constraint above, yielding the Lagrangian 
0bi 
HEa, 
(u* 
+ Xi(Ro-b -i 
S) 
100 1+r Cý 1+r i=w P 
ai 01 bjý 
+ P(H 
(bo 
+R 
i-W, p 1+r I 
Frcm the f irst-order conditions for the consunption levels it follows that 
au au 
aci 
+r 
aci 
01 
i-W, p 
coinciding with the individual optiml saving conditions. Choioo of ýO and 
b, gives 
o1w OW XW + ap O. Ilp 
a ýW +aX= wpp aW OW +ap0p 
W> 11 = XP 
The optirrun is consequently a first best, equating the MSU of incorm to the 
wealthy and poor groups. If preferences are unifom this rmans an equating 
of expected lifetirm incomes, with tax rates 
4. 
- ! 
T) 
aWOW +cip0p) 00 W- p 
00 
E)w -0 p 
A 
The second-period tax b, pexmits dif ferential. treatment of the wealthy 
and poor, owing to their varying survival rates, and is loviod at a rato 
which equates expected incomes. The f irst period tax bo may well be 
Z7Z 
negative, iirplying a uniform benefit, unless the revenuo requirement is 
sufficiently high to require taxation in both periods. Rodistribution 
thus involves a tax paymnt increasing with age, exploiting tho greater 
longevity of the uealthy. 
In practice the correlation between wealth and lifo span is less 
than perfect, preventing the achievement of a first Wst . tho position 
then resenbles that in section (2), with longevity as a proxy for incom 
or wealth. It is also likely that mortality is at least partly endogenous, 
such that life spans converge as wealth beconras m=M equal. Although 
changing the details of the model, these effects would, if anything, 
strengthen the case for redistributive policies, based either on ago or 
initial wealth. 
A redistributive age-related tax is potentially justifiod whenever 
death rates differ systematically with income or wealth and more direct 
measures are not feasible. The outccrm has little in caTuon with the usual 
notion of pensions, having no link with retirement and (probably) implying a 
tax increasing with age. In a more ccaprehansive model these redistributive 
considerations would have to be superimposed on the conventional case for 
benefit payments increasing with age. Even if pensions am not seen as 
primarily redistributive, scm consideration of changing population 
ccmposition is almost certainly relevant to the design of optimal policy. 
Sub-optiml Savings 
With suboptimal saving there is already a possible rationale for a 
paternalistic pension scham. Rodistributive concerns nust stand alongsido 
any paternalism, and rray or rray not conflict with it. 
Introducing suboptiml bebaviour can potentiaUy wwken tho conclusionn 
of (ii) and (iii) above. 7ho drift of tho socond-best policy optirm darivod 
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there is that, in the presence of a failure to achieve af irst-bast inccm 
redistribution, a set of redistributive taxes and payments in tho retirement 
period may be desirable. This gives the impression of being harsh on the 
retired in (ii) they may have to pay a tax on their accumulated saving, 
and in (iii) they face payments increasing with age. Under optimal savings 
the timing of payments and receipts has little importance, and individuals 
can readjust their behaviour in response to any net changes in their 
lifet hTe inccn-e. If a group of individuals follow suboptimal saving, 
hawever, they may be more vulnerable to the timing of any taxation. Fbr 
example, individuals who save in an excessive and inflexible mcmnear am 
hard hit by taxation of savings; conversely, individuals who do not save 
sufficiently suffer under an increasing tax on age. Making allowance for 
such cases in social preferences discourages the imposition of such high 
redistributive taxes and thus tempers the conclusions obtained. The severity 
of the effects depends on the initial wealth of the suboptimal groups, 
attaining a maximun where they are the poorest individuals. 
When many varieties of suboptimal saving are present, the ability 
to redistribute income depends on the relation between incoma levels and 
saving behaviour. If the rich save in one way and the poor in another, it 
should be possible to organise redistributive paymants so as to benefit tho 
poor (and in the extreme case observed saving behaviour would fully identify 
the rich, allawing direct lurip-su-n twms to be inposod). Where no such 
relationship occurs, the effects of policy on particular types of saving 
behaviour is not concentrated among rich or poor, and it is more difficult 
to achieve income redistribution. one can say in conclusion that, although 
redistribution (if anything) strengthens the case for formal pensions under 
suboptimal saving, the degree of redistribution attainable relies on 
the forms of saving behaviour present and their relation with tho initial 
income distribution. Possible outccmes range fr(xn the first boat (or 
something close to it) to an inability to secure any significant 
redistribution. 
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The discussion above suggests that in many cases pensions or ago- 
related paywents can be used to redistribute income. The m-Ain exception 
is in the presence of a first-best incom distribution mid optiml saving, 
when pensions are not justified on redistributive or any other grounds. 
Otherwise, under rational saving, three particular possibilities arisot 
(a) In carbination with optimal carmodity and incorm taxation, a 
uniform lurrp-sum payrmnt can have a progressive iffpact on the 
incaTe distribution. If paid in the retirement period this my 
be interpreted as a pension payment. 
(b) The scherm in (a) can be extended by allowing a tax to bo irrposed 
on retirement incomes or savings (assuning these are observable). 
If incorporated in a pension schcrm, such a tax produces genuinely 
redistributive pensions, in which receipts decline with the extent 
of other income. When savings are not directly observed, it my 
still be possible to achieve similar effects by taxing the 
interest rate. 
(C) Under differing death rates, age-related paymnts can rodistributo 
lifetirre incam, irrespective of work and ratiramnt practices. 
Since death rates usually decline with uralth, the chanco is that 
optimal paymnts are decreasing. 
Reality is inevitably more carplex than the models above, with 
population out of steady state. This leads to the issuo of intcxgenorational 
transfers, considered in Section (5). 
(5) Pensions and Retirement Practices under Population Againg 
Observed populations normlly riso or fall over tiro, experiencing 
variations in the relative sizes of different ago groups. Countrics with 
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fast growing populations face 'population youthening', whom the average 
age of the population decreases and the elderly arc a falling proportion 
of the total. Conversely, countries with stagnant or falling populations 
often face 'population ageing', with a rising average ago and an oldarly 
commmity of growing relative inportance. Changes of this nature am 
relevant to pension policies, since pension paynr-nts are frequently finanood 
from the inccmes of the working population. An ageing population suggests 
that the elderly way beccme an increasing 'burden' on those currently 
enployed. 
The U. K. has faced population ageing for almost a century; its 
irrplications for pensions were considered in the Beveridgo Report, arid 
by several authors in the 1950's (Paish and Peacock (1954), 11opkin (1953), 
Titmuss (1955)). More recent debate has centred on the 1975 conmitrmnt 
to the 'State Earnings Related Pension Scham'(SERPS) and its effect on 
pension payrmnts in the tux-%nty-first century (Ermisch (1981,1983), Creody 
(1982), Hemming and Kay (1982)). This has led to proposals for reducing 
the provision of SERPS or for abandoning it altogether. 
Against this background of policy discussion, it is interesting 
to consider fornial policy optimisation under population ageing. The 
discussion below sets up a sirrple theoretical niodel that permits population 
ageing, and looks at the retirermnt and pension practices that arise frCm 
social welfare noximisation. Before proceeding it is convenient to 
distinguish three possible rmthods of financing. 
Insurance Principle (no transfer betucen generations) 
Under conventional insurance principles individuals finance their 
own pension receipts, with no transfers either fycl, their own generation 
or fran people of different ages (assumed in sections (2) and (3) abova). 
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This can be relaxed slightly to permit redistribution within a generation 
(as in Section (4)), but not between individuals of different agas. 
'Pay-as-you-go' (limited transfer between generations) 
In practice pensions are often finanood from current tax revenuo, on 
lpayýas-you-gol principles. If the government budget approxirrutoly balances 
at each date, there will be a limited income transfer botwen generations, 
restricted to those working or retired at the particular date in question. 
Transfers between individuals with non-overlapping adult life spans do not 
occur under this system. 
'Social Funding' (unlimited transfer between generations) 
With 'socially funded'pensions, the governmnt possesses an accurTulated 
stock of pension contributions fran which current pension payments are financod. 
At any date receipts do not have to equal outgoings, allowing transfers to 
occur between any two generations; the only requiramnt is that over sorm long 
horizon (perhaps infinite) the present value of receipts is equal to that of 
payrmnts. In this case a 'social fund' is hold over nuny generations, as 
distinct from the 'individual funding' of insurance based pensions. 
By definition the insurance principle rules out interge-nerational 
transfers, and thereby avoids the need to adjust in response. Pensions 
financed in this way were considered in previous sections. Tho following 
discussion concentrates on the inplications of 'pay-as-you-go' or 'socially 
funded' financing. 
Pensions Financed by 'Pay-as-you-go' (PAYG) 
As Sauvy (1969) points out, thexe aro throo rmin options in adjusting 
pensions to demographic change : to raise twms, reduce pensions or delay 
retirenent. Sauvy favours later ratiramnt on tho grounds that it minimicoG 
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the social costs involved. This three way choice is an accurate view 
of the situation when pensions rrust be financed fran the current incams of 
the population, though not necessarily otherwise. 
The sirrplest way to represent this is to have overlapping generations 
(as initially used by Sanmlson (1958)), in which life spans have a 'young' 
and 'old' period and the old age of one generation coincides with the youth 
of the next. The discussion below adopts this rmthod, while miking a 
nuTber of additions in order to accanrodate population ageing and variable 
retirerrent dates. 
Individuals are assuTed to be identical (so there is no neod for 
redistribution within a generation, as discussed in Section (4)), and to 
live for up to two discrete periods of equal length. The periods am 
ternp-d 'youth' and 'old age', and are such that the old age of one generation 
is simultaneous with the youth of the next. Flor population ageing to be 
possible, scme assurrption must be made about the relative sizes of the 
different generations. Let fertility and mortality at date t be represented 
by the parameters at, $t defined such that 
at births at date t as a proportion of births at date t-1 
at proportion of those born at date t-1 surviving to old age 
at date t. 
As a given generation passes from youth to old ago two things happens 
a new generation is born which is at tirms the siza of the pxrsent 
generation, and a proportion 1-0 t of the middle-aged generation dies mid 
fails to reach old age. at . Ot am assumed to be exogenous and govern the 
age structure of the population at any date. M-io position can be dcpictod 
as below: 
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4 
02 ap 
ta2 
a2l 
fýH ap 
H 
a3a2 ap etc. 
H is the number of births at date 0, so that at date 1 there are 01 If in tho 
old aged group and aIH in the young group. Generally, at any date t, the 
sizes of the two groups are such that 
't 
Young population 
Ul 
ai 
)H 
t-1 
Old population t 
G: 
1 
a i) 
H 
Ratio of old to young at t 
at 
t 
At any given date the age structure of the population is described by the 
current values of at and 0t; the bias towards the elderly is greater the 
lower the birth rate, at, and the higher the survival rate, St. It mikes 
no difference which of them is responsible for a changing population structure, 
so they can be grouped together as a single exogenous expression, (B/Cl)t, 
In a steady-state population a and 8 Are constants inýlying an invariant 
rate of population growth (or decline) and a fixod age structure at each 
date. This requires no policy adjustimnts, allowing the sam pension to be 
maintained indefinitely (as, for example, in Shoshinski (1978)). 71, n 
present discussion depends on the model being out of steady state, and 
a t/ (ý 
is allowed to vary exogemously over tirno to produce a changing 
population structure. The changes am observed by the governrmnt, ubich 
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adjusts its policy n-easures accordingly. 
It is desirable to depict retirenr-nt practices in scrm way, aM 
especially variations in the retirement date. To do so, it is assumod that 
the population work throughout their period of 'youth' and also for a fixod 
proportion, yt, of their 'old age'. The parameter yt is chosen by the 
government and can be altered to allow for changes in the population structure; 
this corresponds to having a fixed statutory retirement age, as is indeed 
usually the case in practice. At any period t the agod population is 
divided into two groups, with a proportion yt working and 1-y t retired. 
Yt can be seen as the position of the retireimnt age within the old age 
period, a rise in y representing a later retirement date for all the elderly 
(although, strictly speaking, it does not have to be interpreted this way). 
Under these conditions the statistic that matters is not the ratio of the old 
to the young B/a 1, but the ratio of the retired to the working population, 
which can be termed the 'dependence ratio'. This can be expressed as 
follows 
(1- yt ) st Dependence ratio at tirm t 
t+Y,. Pt t 
Nt +yt 
so that the ratio rises with 
(a2-) 
(but in a lesser proportion) and falls 
with yt. The governn-ant's policy problem is to mAe adjustrmnts to its 
pension and retirem--nt practices in response to changes in the dependence 
ratio caused by shifts in the population ageing paramter, 
Ot 
/a 
t 
In each period a uniform state pension, Bt, is paid to the retired, 
financed by a uniform tax, bt, levied on the enployed (regardlese of thair 
age). Individuals are assumd not to undertake their own saving, relying 
entirely on the state pension in thoir retirermntl tho effacts of dropping 
this assuTptim are considered below, although it can be defended as a 
reasonable picture of reality. In the face of changes in 
Ot 
/a 
t, 
the goverrmint 
Lw 
is able to adjust its policy variables Bt, bt, yt at each date t in such a 
way as to maximise current social welfare. This does not necessari. 1y 
man that pension policies are being rapidly altered, and each period can 
be viewed as a quite substantial stretch of tirre (say, thirty to forty 
years). The policy adjustrrents are. thus compatible with a certain stability, 
as one would expect with pension and retirerrent conditions. PAYG irrplies no 
connection between policy finance at different dates, and policy optimisation 
at each date is on the basis of the currently living population. Utilitarian 
social welfare is expressible as 
Vt 
[(, 
a 
t+Yt 
U(M-b 
t), + (1-Yt 
U(B 
t) 
Vt 
where M is the income of the employed, and U, U are the utilities of the 
employed and retired respectively. Preferences of the employed and retired 
are different in form, and this can be interpreted as due to the greater 
leisure-of ýhe retired or alternatively caused by a shift in preferences 
resulting fran the different conditions experienced in retirement. The 
supposition is that for a given income or utility level the retired have a 
higher marginal utility of income. Under PAYG the government balances its 
budget at each separate date, yielding a revenue constraint of the form 
+ Yt bt Bt 
The policy problem is to nk-iximise Vt subject to the revenue constraint above, 
producing the following Lagrangian and first-order conditions: 
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t) -LU - 
(1-yt) pt amt - mt 
t zIlt 
aL 
+ yt au ++ yt jit =0 
au 
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(ilý 
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Ut-Ut + 114bt+Bt) 0 11 tbt +Bt 
There are no behavioural disincentives, so the optirmn successfully equates 
the rarginal utilities of inccrre for the enployed and retired. 
Since 11 t>0, 
the Yt condition can be satisfied only if Ut > ut, 
that is, if the utility of the retired exceeds that of the enployed. 
Otherwise there would be no incentive to have retirerrent, and the optimun 
would be a corner solution in which y=1 and everyone works for their 
full lifetime. This utility gain is to be expected, as retirerrent involves 
a sacrifice of incone (both for the individual and society) and will be 
undertaken voluntarily only if it brings sarie non-imnetary utility return. 
Retirement therefore has to be a pleasant experience, superior to the 
vnrking alternative for it to be justified as the outccn-e of social or 
individual choice. 
It is assumed here that there is sare benefit derived from 
retiring, and that the goverment does implerrent a retirement date before 
the end of the old age period. The fact that Ut > Ut mans that individualE 
cannot be allowed to choose their own retirement date for given Bt, bt valuei 
since all would choose the earliest possible retirement and the systern 
z8z 
would collapse. Individual choice of retirement dates is feasible only 
if pension receipts are more closely linked to contributions so that 
retirement automatically means a drop in the pension received. Adjustments 
in the retirement date can then be achieved by manipulating individual 
choices through the pension scheme, rather than by varying a statutory 
ret irement date ý 
The main item of interest is the optimal response to population 
ageing, in other words, the carparative static effects on B, b and -y of a 
shift in a/ Let a/, fal I marginally, inplying that society faces an 
ageing population *structure. Inspection of the first-order conditions shows 
that both a/$ and ny appear only in the revenue constraint, and that the 
three n-argindl conditions are soluble for B, b, P. The optimality 
conditions can be preserved by holding Bt, bt constant and making a 
ccrrpensating adjustrmnt in -y, to. hold revenue constant. SpecificaUy, it t 
must be true that 
dy -b 0 d (j) b+ dY (B+b) =0 
d( a/ B+b 
so that a fall in a/$ produces a rise in y and vice versa. The best policy 
to adopt under population ageing is therefore to increase the retirement 
age, while maintaining the same level of pensions (and vice versa for 
population youthening). This has a fairly clear intuitive rationale, since 
at any given date changes in the ratio of contributors to retired in the 
budget constraint are autcmatical-ly balanced by the same changes in the 
social welfare function, irrespective of the values of a and y; 
the only adjustimnts needed are to satisfy the revenue constraint, and these 
a can be limited to canpensating moverrents in 70 and y. Society consequently 
fixes a constant real level of pension provision and makes any appropriate 
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movements in the retirermnt age needed to finance pensions at each date. 
The outcome confirms Sauvy's conclusion on the desirability of 
raising the retirermnt age under population ageing, but it is at odds with 
much recent cam-entary on pensions, which often argues for cuts in pension 
provision. In the present model the latter views can be optimal only under 
the assuirption of a fixed retirement date, leaving a fall in pensions and 
rise in taxes as the only means of preserving the revenue constraint. 
They might also arise if the comrentator sees current pensions as sitcptimal 
and too generous, requiring a cut in pensions as a movenent towards an 
optimal position. Much of the concern over pension finance is based on the 
possible disincentive effects of raising future taxation levels. Paish 
and Peacock (1954) discuss the 'transfer problem' of having to shift 
increasing resources from the working to the retired population; &mng 
their suggested solutions are more flexible forms of retirement, encouraging 
later retirement dates. Such conclusions accord with the analysis above, 
but for the wrong reason. In the present model later retirement is 
intrinsically desirable, and the question of tax disincentives is never raiseý 
The redistributive effect of PAYG is to benefit those generations 
which are small relative to the generation following; it is consequently 
in a given generation's interest to more than reproduce itself and to have 
high mortality at en ly ages (for those who survive, at any rate). Under 
the optimal policy this allows them to retire earlier than other generations, 
and, as retirement brings a utility return in this model, they have higher 
lifetime utility. The position is in line with the 'relative generation 
size' hypothesis used in the forecasting and explanation of population 
trends. This assumes that small generations always benefit throughout 
their life cycle from snaller family size, better employment prospects, 
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faster prarction, etc. (Easterlin (1980)). Without the transference 
of vealth over many generations, it is difficult to see how these effects 
can be preventecl from spilling over into pensions policies, even at the 
policy optiman. 
Pensions Financed by 'Social Funding' 
An alternative approach is to set aside a special fund to cover 
all pension paymnts. At any given time the eaployed contribute to the fund 
and pensioners draw from it, subject to the sole requirenent that the fund 
breaks even over scne long future horizon (possibly infinite). The 
governmnt is then acting as if it were a single long-lived individual, 
making rational saving decisions to maximise social welfare. Where such a 
schem is feasible, the outcam must always be preferable to PAYG, which is 
an arbitrarily restrictive special case. 
ý 
The model assurms a unifom population, so the contribution of social 
fundirg turns on redistribution between generations. 7bis can only be 
achieved when it is possible to forecast population changes over som 
future period, the longer the better. Unlike (i), the discussion below 
assumes that the goverment can forecast accurately the relevant population 
structure over some given period. Let T denote the planning horizon over 
which policy is f8rnulated; both social welfare and the revenue constraint 
are now defined over the full T periods, rather than for each separate 
date. A single formal retirement date, y, is chosen optimally for the 
whole planning period, along with variable tax and pension levels. With 
no discounting of future utility (as seems reasonable), social welfare is 
the sum of current utilities in the population for all relevant dates, that 
is 
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where H is the population at -date zero and M is assumed constant (an 
assumption dropped in Section (4)). The goverment is content to %eight 
each generation by population size and does not seek to give wore equal 
we-ightings to generations by using average utility measures. The 
corresponding revenue constraint takes a similar form, such that 
t-1 
TQ 
(a t +Oty)b t- 
at(l-y)]3t H=0 
t= (1+r)t 
where r is the constant interest rate received by the governrmnt. maximising 
V subject to the single constraint above yields the first-order conditions 
aj) a3t t DBt i=l (1+r) 
t-1 ai 11 
)= 
.I 
au ftaj) 
ab 2bt i ;lt 
T t-1 
11 aj) Bt 
((Ut-5t) 
+ (Bt+bt 0 J, (i=j 
(1+r)t 
As under PAYG, y drops out of the 2T+1 equations above, which are soluble 
for Bt, bt, t=l, ... ' T, and p. The rrarginal utilities of income for 
the errployed and retired are equated, inplying a first-best incane- 
redistribution. The ability to transfer incares freely between dates mans 
that the only influence on the time structure of pension payrrents is the 
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interest rate. If r<0, then marginal utilities of income are falling 
and incares are rising: consequently pensions increase over thm and taxes 
fall. The government in these circumstances builds up a positive pension 
fund, which subsidies later generations at the expense of earlier ones. 
If rS0, then transferring wealth between dates brings no net income gain 
(a loss if r< 0) and is counter-productive; the govemnent then reverts to 
PAYG, as in (i). optimal choice of y means that the aggregate utility 
loss from retirement in the planning period is balanced by the revenue gain. 
The particular value of Y is derived from the revenue constraint, such that 
t=l t T[ a. )/(l+r) ) ptbt-ýtBt) 
Y 
1=1 I 
t-l t (Bt+b 
tt 
where Bt, bt are the optimal values derived from the first-order conditions. 
Social funding has the usual characteristics of optin-al saving, where 
events within the planning period are allowed for in the ihitial decision. 
Population ageing is not an active policy issue, except for its role in the 
initial planning of policies. At the extrem of perfect foresight over an 
infinite horizon there is no need to respond to population ageing at all, 
and the entire future course of policy is determined at the initial date. 
Otherwise there remains a need for recalculation of policy plans, as the 
current horizon is reached or new forecast infonnation is received; 
this would necessitate policy adjustirents, as in (i) above. Reality 
probably ccrres between the extrems, where the feasible planning horizon 
is neither zero (as in PAYG), nor certain and infinite (as in idealised 
social funding). 
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(iii) Extensions to the Basic Model 
Two extensions are considered here: the jxrpact of rising incares and 
productivity growth, and the presence of private saving. The discussion 
below introduces these into PAYG and socially funded models. 
(a) Technical progress and productivity growth 
Since the tin-e periods being considered are quite lengthy, it is 
possible that changes in technology and productivity are taking place 
alongside population change. All being well these will involve a secular 
rise in productivity, leading to rising real incoms &nong the enployed. 
They can be represented straightforwardly by assuming an exogenous rise 
in the general level of incanes, M. 
Consider firstly a PAYG system. The inpact on the optimum of the 
changes dM and d(a/ý) can be identified by totally differentiating the 
first-order conditions in (i) and solving out. 'This yields expressions 
dB -m- dM U 
M(B+b) m 
V 
+ ve 
db = 
U M(B+b) m 
- ve 
dM 
-b 1 -UM(l- 
Y) 
dy d(a/a) +- (B+b) (B+b) U. (B+b) ( 
mm + ve 
+-Y) 
m+ dM UMM(B+b) 
ve 
Rising incares unarrbiguously produce rising pensions, with dB/dM > 0. The 
change in the tax rate can be positive or negative, but it is guaranteed 
that taxes cannot rise sufficiently to offset the rise in incorm, so the 
enployed still experience rising utility. The retirenent date continues 
to respond negatively to a /11, inplying that, ceteris-paribus, population 
28 
ageing encourages later retireffent. If, however, M also rises with 01/ý, 
then the net inipact on the retirement date can go either way, depending on 
the relative size of the term in the dy expression; ccuparison with the 
equation for db shows that y can fall only when b is rising. It is thereby 
conceivable (though not necessarily likely) to have earlier retirexmnt 
alongside population ageing at the social optimum when econanic growth is 
present. 
Under social funding known changes in future inccrre can be allowed 
for within a given planning horizon. The optimality conditions take the 
sam farm as in (ii), the pension level must be rising, and the retiren-ent 
age is constant within the period. The time path of bt depends on 
individual preferences and the nature of inccne growth. 
(b) Individual saving 
When individuals undertake private saving their behaviour must be 
included in the goverment Is policy formulation if a true social optiman is 
to be achieved. The central issue is whether or not individual behaviour 
responds to goverment policy, leading to saving disincentives. If so, the 
nature of policy adjustrrents to ageing may becon-e considerably more corrplex. 
To illustrate this, consider a PAYG financed model without the zero 
private saving assurrption made above. Suppose instead that individuals 
make saving decisions in their 'youth' and 'old age' which react to current 
policy variables; in other words, sy=Sy (B, b, y), so =s0 (B, by ), where 
sypso are the saving rates fran errployrrent in the 'youth' and 'old age' 
periods. If savings are consuTed at a constant rate in retirement, the 
utility levels of a person retired at date t are U(M-b t-l-sy 
(Bt_, #bt_, #Yt_, 
)) 
in youth, (U(M-b Cs 0 
(Btbt,, yt)) when employed in old age, and 
U(Bt+((l+r)-s 
Y +Y ts0 
)/(l-yt)) when retired, where sY is saving inherited from 
youth. The government is assumed to know the nature of individual savings, 
zsq 
and as before aims to maximise the total utility of the current population. 
Policy is set to maximise 
v (a/0) y0 tt Uý + ytui + 
('-Yt)"t 
subject to the budget constraint of (i). The resulting first-order 
conditions inply that 
3u 1 
ljt Mt 1-- -yt 
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where ji t 
is again the nultiplier on the revenue constraint. Carpared with 
(i), all these, equations are caTplicated by the addition of extra term. 
representing movements in private saving. The main point to note is that 
the ageing parameter a/a and the retirement date y now play an integral 
part in the determination of the tax and pension levels. Shifts in a/0 
can therefore be expected to produce changes in all three policy variables, 
in contrast with (i). Nothing can be said in general about the direction 
of the-movements involved, which depend on the form and strength of 
private saving adjustments. The optimun could in principle differ 
substantially from that obtained previously, although it will not'necessarily 
do so. Identical observations are applicable to socially funded pensions. 
Whether or not the earlier outcorres still obtain depends on the 
stability of the sy and s0 values. If private saving is inflexible or 
small in scale (as, say, in the 'classical savings postulate' that 
workers do not save), then saving behaviour beccrres negligible and the 
conclusions of (i) will hold. Under stronger saving responses (such as 
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optinial life-cycle saving) the position is less clear, although the pattern 
of M remains the 'desired' outcoue to be overturned. 
Consequently, economic growth or private saving can alter the 
results of (i) or (ii). No definite conclusions can be reached in these 
cases without specific infonnation on preferences and individual behaviour. 
In considering the effects of population ageing on optimal pension 
policies two main cases have been identified. When the pension scheme 
must balance at each separate date the preference is for an accomnodating 
rise in the retirement date, keeping pensions constant. When the pension 
scheze needs only to balance over a much longer period, the impact of 
population ageing is absorbed into the society's total expected income 
for the period and there is no need to make any specific responses to it; 
Policy can then take the form of rising pensions (given positive real 
interest rates) coupled with a fixed retirement age. Under ideal conditions 
it follows that the need for specific responses to population ageing can be 
avoided. But if pension finance is constrained to depend on the current 
population structure, then it should react to population ageing by raising 
the retirement age and not by cutting pensions or raising taxes. 
Qualifications to these conclusions are manifold. As was noted 
above, the findings do not necessarily apply when there is secular incam 
growth or when private saving disincentives are present. Other relevant 
features are the institutional aspect, the uncertainty attached to forecasting, 
and the question of social attitudes to retirement. With regard to actual 
policy recommndations, the position depends on whether current pension 
policies are viewed as an optimun reseirbling those in the models. If not, 
then the conclusions obtained cannot be translated directly into practice. 
Any policy reccmrendations require an analysis of the particular pension 
scheme under consideration. 
Zq I 
Conclusion 
With a rational population and individualistic social welfare, the 
immediate case for fonral pensions and retirement is by no means clear. 
Intervention is desirable only in two main sets of circumstances. 
The first is where individual behaviour diverges frcm social 
optimality. Variants of this identified above are: 
Pure paternalism, where the government knows what is best for 
individuals and/or is better placed to inplerrent it. 
Cases where productive issues are in-portant (in addition to 
individual utilities), and are not properly allowed for in 
individual decision making. 
(iii) Use of pensions for redistribution, where a first-best inccme 
distribution is not attained. 
(iv) Transfer of resources to future generations : there may be a case 
for a social pension fund, ensuring an indefinitely growing 
capital stock. 
Policies of this type all have a positive intent, geared to sorre- social 
objective not otherwise attainable. 
The other possibility is faute de mieux, as in Section (3), part (a). 
If moral hazard leads to widespread social security claims in old age, 
then the outcome is state 'pensions' at a low level of provision. The 
goverrumnt way instead prefer to introduce formal redistributive pensions 
at a higher level. 
Little can be said in general about the nature of optimal pensions 
and retirermnt. On grounds of individual choice there seem to be a good 
ZqZ 
case for flexible and gradual retirement, with pensions (if any) adjusted 
accordingly. This at least is what emerges from utility based models, 
as in Section (2) above. Scrre caution is needed in relating this to 
reality, however, given that work/leisure preferences do not cover all' 
aspects of retiren-ent decisions. It remains possible that constraints on 
individual choice are warranted by productive considerations excluded 
from the standard formulations of welfare econanics. To make specific 
policy reccrarendations it would be necessary to look more closely at the 
particular population and economy in hand. 
2? 3 
CHAPTER 8: GENERAL CONCLUSION 
The relevant concluding ccmmnts have almady been appended to th3 
separate chapters above; them is little to be added in the way of a gmeral 
conclusion. - It wi 11 suffice to reiterate a couple of the issues raised 
in the Introduction. 
The first point arises from the scarcity of general properties derivable 
from theoretical modelling of optinal policy; outccrres nearly always depend 
on assurrptions made about preferences or other featuresof the nx)dal (as, 
for exarrple, in optirral tax theory). This errphasises the irrportance of 
personal judgerrent and subjective factors in assessing policy. Such factors 
appear at two levels in the present context. At one level they are built 
into the model, in the form of individual preferences. The conclusions 
reached depend on what preferences are like in the case being considered. 
or, rather, on what we think they are like. At the higher level there is 
a judgerrent to be n-ade about the model itself. It rrust be felt to be providing 
an acceptable picture of issues which are significant in reality., If this 
is so, then the model n-ay be of assistance in fonning opinions about policies., 
But its role is always as an aid to personal judgement, not a substitute 
for it. 
Exercising a little judgenent leads on to the second point. It 
seems that there is a considerable gap between the policies observed in 
reality and those imaginable as in any circumstances 'optimal'. This observation, 
if accepted, can produce a multitude of alternative conclusions. It can 
lead to calls for policy reform, scepticism about the impartiality of govexnrrent, 
doubts about the quality of the model, advocacy of a change of economic 
system, accadence to the result of a Idemx)=tic' process, and so on.. None 
of these is beyond question, and the conclusion selected is entirely a rratter 
of opinion. 
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